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Part I
Introduction
1
Introduction
In macroeconomics, it is common to assume that a decision maker, whether it is a house-
hold, a firm or a government, has the ability to commit to future actions. While this
assumption often is a reasonable or at least an innocuous one, there are many instances
where an agent’s lack of commitment is arguably more realistic and crucial to understand
certain economic phenomena.
This thesis presents three self-contained essays that are dedicated to applications
where lack of commitment matters for the decisions made by public or private agents.
Chapters 1 and 2 study monetary-fiscal policy interactions when a government cannot
commit to future policies and in particular not to service its outstanding debt payments.
Chapter 3 presents a model of a two-person household whose members cannot commit to
future actions and might not cooperate.
To see under which conditions lack of commitment matters, consider the dynamic
decision problem of an agent. This decision problem could be the consumption-savings
problem of a household, the pricing decision of a firm or the borrowing decision of a
government. Suppose that at some initial point of time t = 0, the decision maker chooses
a plan for all of his future actions. When the agent arrives at some later date t > 0 and
still finds it optimal to stick to the plan made in the initial period, this plan is called
time consistent. If however, he finds it optimal to deviate from the actions prescribed
by his period-0 plan, this plan is called time inconsistent. The implementation of such
a time-inconsistent plan would require the decision-making agent to have a commitment
technology and will not generally be carried out in practice if decisions are made from
period to period.
There are several examples of time-inconsistency problems in macroeconomics. Some
of the most famous ones are the taxation of capital in public finance (see e.g. Benhabib
and Rustichini, 1997, Klein et al., 2008, Martin, 2010), the use of surprise inflation in
monetary policy (see e.g. Kydland and Prescott, 1977, Barro and Gordon, 1983b, Calvo,
1978) and the consumption-savings problem of a household with self-control problems
(see e.g. Laibson, 1997, Krusell et al., 2002). In political economy models, time-
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inconsistency problems arise when political parties with different objectives alternate
in power (see e.g. Persson and Svensson, 1989, Alesina and Tabellini, 1990, Aguiar
and Amador, 2011). Firms and labor unions have also been shown to suffer from time-
inconsistency problems (see e.g. Nakamura and Steinsson, 2011, Krusell and Rudanko,
2013).
This thesis contributes to the study of time-inconsistency problems in macroeco-
nomics. All three essays contained in this thesis analyze the intertemporal trade-offs faced
by decision makers in the absence of commitment and study how these trade-offs depend
on the details of the respective model environment. Methodologically, a common de-
nominator of all three chapters is the focus on Markov-perfect equilibria (see Maskin and
Tirole, 2001). The Markov-perfect equilibrium concept is a refinement of the subgame-
perfect equilibrium concept and hence ensures that agents act in a time consistent way. It
requires that players base their strategies only on payoff-relevant states, ruling out the pos-
sibility of reputational considerations based on trigger strategies. Recent work has applied
this equilibrium concept to study macroeconomic questions (see e.g. Krusell et al., 2002,
Klein et al, 2008, Azzimonti, 2011) and highlighted its usefulness for understanding how
lack of commitment affects aggregate outcomes.
Chapters 1 and 2 contribute to this literature by investigating how lack of commitment
shapes the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy. In the literature on optimal monetary
and fiscal policy, the dominant approach has been to consider the policy problem of a
Ramsey planner who, before time starts, commits to a time- and state-contingent (Ram-
sey) policy plan for all future periods, anticipating the response of the private sector (see
e.g. Chari and Kehoe, 1999). While the Ramsey approach provides a useful benchmark
for how policy should ideally be conducted, its policy recommendations typically are not
time consistent. A well known source of time inconsistency is the presence of nomi-
nal government debt (Lucas and Stokey, 1983). When a policy maker inherits a positive
amount of nominal debt, he will be tempted to reduce the real debt burden via surprise
inflation and relax the government budget. While inflation might generate distortions in
the present that are internalized by the policy maker, he does not internalize that rational
lenders in previous periods anticipate the use of inflationary policies and demand higher
nominal interest rates in return. By contrast, a Ramsey planner would internalize this ef-
fect as well and tend to refrain from using inflation surprises in a systematic way (see e.g.
Chari et al., 1991, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004, Siu, 2004).
In practice, public policy typically is chosen under discretion. It is thus interesting
to ask what optimal policy looks like in the absence of commitment. Can models that
have previously been used for normative purposes even explain polices implemented in
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practice and therefore offer a positive theory of monetary and fiscal policy? Following the
work of Klein et al. (2008), recent studies have shed light on such questions by analyzing
optimal monetary and fiscal policy without commitment (see e.g. Martin, 2009, Niemann
et al., 2013a), demonstrating that fairly standard macroeconomic models can replicate
empirically observed features of public policy. While these papers analyze optimal policy
without commitment, they maintain the assumption that the policy maker cannot default
on his debt payments. Lack of commitment to debt service thus never is an issue. How-
ever, in the past, governments have defaulted on nominal debt (see Reinhart and Rogoff,
2011).
The contribution of Chapter 1 is to study optimal monetary and fiscal policy with-
out commitment when the policy maker can choose whether to default on outstanding
debt payments. The studied model economy is a version of the cash-credit good econ-
omy introduced by Lucas and Stokey (1983), in which a benevolent policy maker (in the
remainder also referred to as the government) levies distortionary taxes to finance exoge-
nous government spending. To model the default decision, Chapter 1 follows the recent
literature on sovereign default in emerging economies (see e.g. Aguiar and Gopinath,
2006, Arellano, 2008) and introduces a discrete default choice that involves certain costs
for the economy if default is chosen over repayment.
The government prefers to default in particularly bad times, i.e. when output is low
and/or public debt levels are high, allowing it to reduce labor taxes and inflation. An
economy where the government has the option to default is found to experience lower
average inflation rates than an otherwise identical economy where default is ruled out by
assumption. While a default allows the government to reduce inflation, it is mostly an
indirect mechanism that leads to lower average inflation. When a default might occur in
equilibrium, lenders price the risk of default, increasing interest rates. The government
responds to the change in borrowing conditions by issuing less debt on average, which
in turn reduces the incentive to use inflation. The adverse effect of sovereign risk on the
interest rate faced by the government also negatively affects the role of public debt as a
shock absorber, leading to more volatile policies and aggregate outcomes.
Chapter 2 is also dedicated to the time-inconsistency problem created by the inter-
action between nominal public debt and monetary policy but looks at it from a different
perspective. Instead of studying how optimal policy is conducted in the absence of com-
mitment, it reconsiders a suggestion made by Rogoff (1985) about how to mitigate the
time-inconsistency problem. Rogoff (1985) proposes the delegation of monetary policy
to an independent central bank that is ”monetary conservative” and has a greater distaste
for inflation than society. Even though this central bank acts under discretion and is not
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benevolent, it might implement a welfare-enhancing policy relative to a benevolent policy
maker who lacks commitment because he is less tempted to use surprise inflation.
It is however important to look at the details of an economy to evaluate the costs and
benefits of monetary conservatism. Chapter 2 studies the implications of monetary con-
servatism for a model economy that faces incomplete financial markets, lack of commit-
ment to debt repayment and political economy distortions. These frictions are relevant for
many emerging economies, which increasingly introduce independent central banks with
a focus on price stability (see Carstens and Ja´come, 2005), and might reduce the desirabil-
ity of monetary conservatism. When a government issues non-state contingent nominal
debt, inflation provides a potentially useful hedge against adverse outcomes since it can
be used to adjust the real value of nominal debt payments in response to shocks. Similarly,
the flexible use of inflation might also reduce the risk of experiencing a sovereign default
since such an event can in principle be avoided if a central bank is willing to lower the real
debt burden via inflation. By reducing the flexibility of monetary policy, monetary con-
servatism could thus hurt an economy. If a government mostly issues debt due to political
economy considerations (see e.g. Alesina and Tabellini, 1990), monetary conservatism
might also entail welfare costs by reducing the cost of borrowing and encouraging the
accumulation of public debt levels that are not in the interest of society.
To evaluate the role of monetary conservatism in the presence of financial and political
frictions, Chapter 2 follows a recent literature on monetary-fiscal policy interactions (see
e.g. Niemann, 2011, Martin, 2014) and considers a model where a government consists
of two independent authorities: a central bank and a fiscal authority. The central bank
is in charge of monetary policy, whereas the fiscal authority decides on public spending,
debt issuance and whether to repay bond holders. The fiscal authority is not benevolent
because of a deficit bias that is due to political economy distortions. By contrast, the cen-
tral bank shares the preferences of society except that it might be monetary conservative.
The policy authorities both cannot commit to future policies. The main finding of Chap-
ter 2 is that an increase in the degree of monetary conservatism leads to a higher average
debt burden, lower average inflation and more frequent default episodes. In addition, it
is also associated with less volatile inflation but an increase in the volatility of govern-
ment spending. The success of lower and more stable inflation thus comes at the cost
of rising indebtedness and more volatile fiscal policy. In terms of welfare, the benefits
of monetary conservatism are however shown to still dominate the potential costs. Even
economies that experience several frictions can thus benefit from adopting central bank
independence.
As in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 also studies decision making without commitment in an en-
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vironment where two agents with potentially differing objectives interact. However, these
two agents now are the individual members of a household instead of independent policy
authorities. In economics in general and in macroeconomics in particular, it is common
to model households as single decision units and to abstract from the interaction between
different members of a household. Chapter 3 explicitly models the within-household in-
teraction between individual household members. More specifically, similar to Hertzberg
(2012), the household studied in Chapter 3 consists of two members that are altruistic to-
wards each other and cannot commit to future actions. The main contribution of Chapter 3
is to analyze how time-consistent household behavior depends on whether the household
members cooperate or not. In particular, it studies the consumption-savings problem of a
two-person household (a couple) whose individual members choose their own consump-
tion and labor supply. The household’s savings position then is determined residually via
the joint household budget constraint.
When the household members cooperate, the household behaves as in the collective
household model introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and recently extended to a dy-
namic context (see Chiappori and Mazzocco, 2014). In this case, the outcome is equiva-
lent to that chosen under commitment, i.e. there is no time-inconsistency problem when
household members act under full cooperation. This changes when household members
do not cooperate. The non-cooperative interaction between the household members is
modeled as a dynamic game in which the household members take as given the decisions
of the spouse. If the household members are imperfectly altruistic, they are shown to save
less relative to the cooperative case. When a household member decides whether to con-
sume a unit of resources today or to save it for tomorrow, it takes into account that, in the
next period, its spouse will also consume part of the savings. When imperfectly altruistic,
consumption of the spouse is however valued less than the own consumption. As a re-
sult, imperfectly altruistic household members have an incentive to save less and consume
more in any given period. The non-cooperative household thus exhibits an undersaving (or
overborrowing) bias relative to the cooperative one when individual members are imper-
fectly altruistic. If the household members are perfectly altruistic, i.e. they place the same
weight on their own utility and the utility of the spouse, the savings distortion vanishes and
the household behaves like the cooperative one, eliminating the time-inconsistency prob-
lem. Using a quantitative model version with idiosyncratic labor income risk, Chapter 3
shows that lack of cooperation can lead to sizable reductions in household savings when
household members are imperfectly altruistic, resulting in substantial welfare losses.
To summarize, this thesis studies decision making in the absence of commitment and
shows how details of a model matter for the way lack of commitment affects outcomes.
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More specifically, Chapter 1 highlights how the option to default affects policy outcomes
when a government lacks commitment. Chapter 2 shows how delegation of monetary
policy to a central bank changes the way fiscal policy is chosen without commitment.
Chapter 3 shows that lack of commitment matters for the way a household acts, depending
on whether individual household members cooperate or not.
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Part II
Chapters
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Chapter 1
Monetary and Fiscal Policy with
Sovereign Default
1.1 Introduction
Suppose that a government faces high nominal debt payments that can only be refinanced
at high interest rates. If it is not willing (or able) to raise primary surpluses to pay bond
holders, there are essentially two options left: inflation and sovereign default. While
default and inflation both can lower the real debt burden, there are several differences
between these two policy options which make them imperfect substitutes. For example, a
government can collect seigniorage when engineering inflation by issuing currency while
a default does not generate additional tax revenues. Another difference is that default
directly affects the return on government bonds whereas inflation impacts on the return on
all nominal assets. Being a continuous variable, inflation can also be adjusted rather easily
while the discrete default choice does not offer the same degree of flexibility. Given the
distinct roles of money and government bonds for the private sector, default and inflation
may also distort economic activity through different channels.
The contribution of this chapter is to study the implications of allowing a policy maker
not only to use standard instruments of monetary and fiscal policy but also to choose
outright sovereign default.1 In particular, it extends previous studies on optimal monetary
and fiscal policy with nominal debt that focus on the case of lack of commitment but
still assume that the policy maker is always committed to service debt (see e.g. Diaz-
Gimenez et al., 2008, Martin, 2009, Niemann et al., 2013a). In the model studied here,
a benevolent government jointly chooses monetary and fiscal policy under discretion to
finance exogenous government spending in a representative agent cash-credit economy
1This chapter is based on Ro¨ttger (2014).
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that is subject to productivity shocks.2 More specifically, it sets a labor income tax rate,
chooses the money growth rate, issues nominal non-state contingent bonds and decides on
whether to repay its outstanding debt or not. The default decision is modeled as a binary
choice (see Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981). Following the quantitative sovereign default
literature,3 a default is costly because it leads to a deadweight loss of resources that takes
the form of a reduction in aggregate productivity and exclusion from financial markets for
a random number of periods.
As is common in the literature on optimal monetary and fiscal policy, I consider a
closed economy. This chapter thus contributes to the study of domestic debt default
which, despite being a historically recurring phenomenon with severe economic conse-
quences, has not received a lot of attention in the sovereign default literature (see Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2011). In a closed economy, a default does not redistribute resources from
foreign lenders to domestic citizens. The government may still choose not to repay its
debt to relax its budget constraint and reduce distortionary taxes. The model is calibrated
to the Mexican economy which has experienced periods of high inflation and sovereign
risk in the recent past.
I study the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the public policy problem (see Klein et al.,
2008). The government’s decisions hence only depend on the payoff-relevant state of the
economy which consists of aggregate productivity, the beginning-of-period public debt
position and whether the government is in financial autarky or not. Since the government
optimizes sequentially, it cannot commit to future policies and does not internalize how
its current decisions affect household expectations in previous periods. However, the
government is aware that (expected) future policy will depend on its borrowing decision
because it will affect the incentive to reduce the real debt burden via default or inflation
in the next period. With lack of commitment, the option to default thus matters for the
government’s response to adverse shocks by allowing it to adjust the real debt burden as
well as by affecting the cost of borrowing and thus the attractiveness of debt as a shock
absorber. However, only the first effect is internalized by the government.
Compared to an otherwise identical economy without default option (or equivalently
an economy with prohibitively high costs of default) the availability of sovereign default
results in lower average inflation. Since inflation does not reduce the real debt burden
when a default takes place, it is lower when default is chosen instead of repayment. How-
2I assume that there is only one policy maker, referred to as the government, who is in charge of
both, monetary and fiscal policy. Niemann (2011), Niemann et al. (2013b) and Martin (2014) study time-
consistent public policy without sovereign default in models where a central bank and a fiscal authority
interact. Chapter 2 in this thesis will consider a model with independent monetary and fiscal authorities that
allows for sovereign default and political frictions.
3See e.g. Hamann (2004), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008).
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ever, this direct effect of default on inflation is negligible at a plausible default frequency.
The key mechanism that leads inflation to be lower when the default option is available
is an indirect one. The attractiveness and hence the probability of default increases with
public debt and decreases with aggregate productivity. With default risk, bond prices
become more debt elastic in recessions than with only inflation risk and the marginal rev-
enue from debt issuance decreases faster.4 Consequently, the government borrows less
which reduces its incentive to implement high inflation rates. Since lower average debt is
associated with less inflation, less money is issued and seigniorage revenues decline. The
government then has to adjust the primary surplus, leading to a higher labor tax rate in the
long run. In the short run, the increased sensitivity of bond prices to productivity shocks
and bond issuance that is induced by sovereign risk impedes the government’s ability to
smooth tax distortions across states. Relative to an economy without default option, tax
and inflation rates are thus more volatile, amplifying the impact of productivity shocks on
the economy. In times of high sovereign risk, debt issuance is costly and the government
tries to avoid a default by reducing the real debt burden via inflation. A sovereign debt
crisis thus is inflationary which is consistent with empirical evidence (see Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2009).
From a welfare perspective, it is not obvious whether it is desirable to endow the
government with the option to default when it cannot commit to future actions.5 As dis-
cussed above, the risk of default affects public policy in the short and the long run. With
productivity shocks, the government would like to smooth tax distortions by running a
budget deficit (surplus) during bad (good) times, following the logic of Barro (1979). De-
fault risk makes debt issuance more expensive in recessions which leads to welfare losses
due to more volatile public policy. The long-run implications of sovereign default might
however outweigh these costs. As in Martin (2009) and Diaz-Gimenez et al. (2008), the
government chooses positive average debt positions because of its lack of commitment
and a household money demand that increases with expected inflation. By increasing the
cost of borrowing in recessions, risk of default renders public debt accumulation less at-
tractive, thus avoiding high debt levels and the implementation of high average inflation.
A welfare exercise reveals that the counterfactual elimination of sovereign default leads to
a negligible welfare loss. From a welfare perspective, lack of commitment to debt service
hence is not important.
4Even without sovereign risk, higher debt issuance leads to higher interest rates by increasing expected
inflation.
5The same is true in the context of consumer default where there exists a trade-off when reducing
the costs of filing for bankruptcy. On the one hand, indebted consumers receive the ability to make debt
payments state contingent. On the other hand, this flexibility comes at the cost of higher borrowing costs
that compensate lenders for the increased risk of default (see e.g. Livshits et al., 2007).
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This chapter builds on the literature on optimal Markov-perfect monetary and fiscal
policy with nominal government debt. Martin (2009, 2011, 2013) extensively studies the
short- and long-run properties of public debt and inflation when the government lacks
commitment. I will discuss how his findings relate to mine in Section 1.3. Diaz-Gimenez
et al. (2008) show how public policy and welfare depend on whether debt is indexed to
inflation or not. Among other things, they find that without commitment welfare can be
lower when debt is indexed. In a model with nominal rigidities, Niemann et al. (2013a)
show that the presence of lack of commitment and nominal government debt leads to per-
sistent inflation. Despite highlighting the role of lack of commitment for public policy, all
of these studies maintain the assumption that debt is always repaid and thus abstract from
sovereign default. This chapter is also related to recent papers that study domestic debt
default. In a model with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic income risk, D’Erasmo
and Mendoza (2013) show that a sovereign default can occur in equilibrium as an opti-
mal distributive policy. Pouzo and Presno (2014) extend the incomplete markets model
of Aiyagari et al. (2002) by considering a policy maker who cannot commit to debt
payments. Sosa-Padilla (2013) studies Markov-perfect fiscal policy in a model where a
sovereign default triggers a banking crisis. All of these papers feature real economies and
hence do not discuss monetary policy.
This chapter also relates to the quantitative sovereign default literature that studies
how risk of default affects business cycles in emerging economies.6 With this literature,
it shares the assumption of the government’s lack of commitment and the way sovereign
default is modeled. Within this literature, the studies that are closest to this chapter are
Cuadra et al. (2010), Hur et al. (2014) and Du and Schreger (2015). Cuadra et al.
(2010) study a production economy with endogenous fiscal policy but abstract from mon-
etary policy and - as is common in the sovereign default literature - look at a small open
economy that trades real bonds with foreign investors. Hur et al. (2014) consider an
endowment economy with nominal debt, exogenous shocks to inflation and risk-averse
investors. They find that the cyclicality of inflation matters for public debt dynamics by
affecting risk premia and thus the cost of borrowing. Du and Schreger (2015) study a
model of a small open economy where the government borrows in local currency from
foreign investors and can reduce its real debt burden by using inflation. Since domestic
entrepreneurs have liabilities denominated in foreign currency but earn revenues in local
currency, inflation hurts firm balance sheets by depreciating the local currency.
In independent and contemporaneous work, Sunder-Plassmann (2014) also studies
time-consistent public policy for a version of Martin (2009)’s cash-credit good economy
6A recent summary of this literature can be found in Aguiar and Amador (2014).
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that allows for a default decision as in Arellano (2008). However, there are several dif-
ferences between our studies that make them complementary. First, as in Diaz-Gimenez
et al. (2008), the focus of her paper is on comparing the long-run properties of a model
economy with nominal government debt and an otherwise identical model economy with
real government debt. She finds that real debt leads to higher average debt, more frequent
default events and higher inflation than nominal debt, which is shown to be consistent with
cross-country evidence for selected emerging economies. By contrast, I focus on how the
ability to default changes the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy in the short and the
long run relative to an economy without default, using a model that can replicate short-
and long-run properties of the Mexican economy. To model business cycle fluctuations,
I study a model with productivity shocks, whereas she considers government expendi-
ture shocks. Another difference between our two studies is that her model assumes an
exogenous and constant labor tax rate, whereas I allow the government to choose the tax
rate.
Recently, Aguiar et al. (2013) have also developed a model to jointly study inflation
and sovereign default when a government cannot commit to future policy. However, their
analysis differs from mine in several ways. First, their model features an endowment
economy that is not subject to fundamental shocks and borrows from abroad. Second, the
authors assume that the government experiences an ad-hoc utility cost of inflation. Third,
in the spirit of Cole and Kehoe (2000), they exclusively focus on self-fulfilling sovereign
defaults and characterize analytically how a government’s ”inflation credibility” - as mea-
sured by the weight on its disutility of inflation - affects an economy’s vulnerability to
sunspot-driven rollover crises.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model that is
analyzed in Section 1.3. The welfare implications of sovereign default are discussed in
Section 1.4. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model
The model extends the cash-credit economy studied in Martin (2009) by allowing for
productivity shocks and sovereign default.7 Time is discrete, starts in t = 0 and goes on
forever. The economy is populated by a unit mass continuum of homogeneous infinitely-
lived households and a benevolent government. Taking government policies and prices as
given, the households optimize in a competitive fashion. They supply labor nt to produce
7The focus on productivity shocks allows me to study how the possibility of sovereign default affects
the business cycle properties of a monetary economy.
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the marketable good yt , using a linear technology to be specified below. In addition, they
choose consumption of a cash good c1t and a credit good c2t , and decide on money (m˜t+1),
nominal government bond (b˜t+1) and nominal risk-free private bond (b˜
r f
t+1) holdings. The
unit price of a government (private) bond is denoted as qt (q
r f
t ). The risk-free bonds are
only traded by households and will thus be in zero net supply. While all assets are nominal
and thus subject to inflation risk, only government bonds are subject to default risk. A
role for money is introduced by tying consumption of c1t to beginning-of-period money
holdings via a cash-in-advance constraint (see Lucas and Stokey, 1983)
m˜t ≥ p˜tc1t ,
with p˜t denoting the price of consumption in terms of m˜t .
To finance constant government spending g and outstanding nominal debt payments
B˜t , the government chooses from a set of policies that includes the money growth rate
µt , a linear labor income tax rate τt , the binary default decision dt ∈ {0,1}, and issuance
of nominal non-state contingent one-period bonds B˜t+1. A default occurs when dt = 1 is
chosen, while the government fully repays its obligations for dt = 0. In the default case,
the government is excluded from financial markets for a random number of periods (see
Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006, or Arellano, 2008). It can thus neither borrow from nor lend
to households during this time, i.e. B˜t+1 = 0.
1.2.1 Private Sector
Before formulating the government decision problem, I will first discuss the behavior of
the private sector.
Households
The households have preferences given by
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β tu(c1t ,c2t ,nt)
]
,
with discount factor β ∈ (0,1) and period utility function u :R3+→ R. The utility function
is additively separable in all its arguments and satisfies u1,u2,−un > 0 and u11,u22,unn <
0 with ux (uxx) denoting the first (second) derivative of u(·) with respect to x ∈ {c1,c2,n}.
Households have initial assets (b0,b
r f
0 ,m0) and take as given prices {p˜t ,qt ,qr ft }∞t=0 and
government policies {dt ,µt ,τt , B˜t+1}∞t=0. The aggregate money stock evolves according
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to M˜t+1 = (1+µt)M˜t . The labor productivity of the households {at}∞t=0 is subject to ran-
dom shocks and follows a stationary first-order Markov process with continuous support
A⊆ R+ and transition function fa(at+1|at).
Households maximize their expected lifetime utility subject to the period budget con-
straint
(1− τt)ψ(at ,dt)nt + m˜t +(1−dt) b˜t + b˜
r f
t
p˜t
≥ c1t + c2t +
m˜t+1+qt b˜t+1+q
r f
t b˜
r f
t+1
p˜t
,
the cash-in-advance constraint
m˜t
p˜t
≥ c1t ,
as well as the No-Ponzi game constraint
limT→∞Et
[(
qr fT b˜
r f
T+1+qT b˜T+1
)
∏T−1s=0 qr ft+s
]
≥ 0.
Households use their labor supply nt to produce a marketable good according to the lin-
ear technology yt = ψ(at ,dt)nt . They take as given their effective labor productivity
ψ : R+×{0,1}→ R+ which depends on random productivity at and the government’s
default decision dt . Effective productivity ψ(·) increases with exogenous productivity
(∂ψ(at ,dt)/∂at ≥ 0) and is negatively affected by a default (ψ(at ,0)≥ ψ(at ,1)).8
In the model, lack of commitment to public debt repayment will require costs of de-
fault that are internalized by the government to sustain positive levels of debt. As is com-
mon in the quantitative sovereign default literature (see e.g. Arellano, 2008 and Cuadra et
al., 2010), there are two types of default costs. First, the government is excluded from the
bond market in the default period. Conditional on being in autarky, the economy regains
access to financial markets with constant probability θ in the subsequent period. Second,
the economy experiences a direct resource loss governed by ψ(·). As in Cuadra et al.
(2010) and Pouzo and Presno (2014), these costs capture in reduced form productivity
losses that occur in periods of default (and financial autarky). Despite being arguably ad
hoc, such a specification allows me not to take a stand on how exactly a sovereign default
is propagated through the economy. While there is evidence for domestic output costs,
there is still no consensus on which mechanism is the most relevant one (see Panizza et al.,
2009). In addition, two recent papers show that models with endogenous default costs that
arise due to private credit disruptions (Mendoza and Yue, 2012) or banking crises (Sosa-
8It is straightforward to modify the model to include a representative firm that is owned by households
and produces the homogeneous good yt , using labor supplied by households at a real wage wt . Due to
linearity of the production function, the wage rate will equal effective productivity ψ(at ,dt) and profits will
be zero, such that the behavior of the economy will not change with such a firm sector.
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Padilla, 2013) deliver similar qualitative and quantitative results as those with exogenous
default costs.
The household optimality conditions are given by the first-order conditions
− un(nt)
u2(c2t)
= (1− τt)ψ(at ,dt), (1.1)
u2(c2t) = βEt
[
u1(c1t+1)
p˜t
p˜t+1
]
, (1.2)
u2(c2t)qt = βEt
[
(1−dt+1)u2(c2t+1) p˜tp˜t+1
]
, (1.3)
u2(c2t)q
r f
t = βEt
[
u2(c2t+1)
p˜t
p˜t+1
]
, (1.4)
and the complementary slackness conditions
λt = u1(c1t)−u2(c2t)≥ 0, m˜t/p˜t− c1t ≥ 0,λt (m˜t/p˜t− c1t) = 0,
with λt denoting the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint.9
Intuitively, the cash-in-advance constraint is binding whenever the marginal utility of
cash-good consumption exceeds the marginal utility of credit-good consumption. The
inequality
u1(c1t)−u2(c2t)≥ 0, (1.5)
needs to hold in equilibrium to satisfy λt ≥ 0. Equation (1.1) characterizes the optimal
household labor supply decision which is distorted for non-zero tax rates τt 6= 0. The
conditions (1.2)-(1.4) are the Euler equations for money and bonds. Since nominal gov-
ernment bonds are defaultable, they have to compensate households for the risk of default
(see condition (1.3)). However, all assets need to compensate for expected (gross) infla-
tion p˜t+1/ p˜t .
As in Martin (2009), I normalize all nominal variables by the beginning-of-period
aggregate money stock M˜t : xt ≡ x˜t/M˜t with x ∈
{
B,b,br f ,m, p
}
. This normalization
renders the model stationary. It implies that the inflation rate in period t is given as
pit ≡ pt (1+µt−1)pt−1 −1,
such that inflation equals money growth in the long run.
9In a household optimum, the household budget constraint and the No-Ponzi game constraint hold with
equality.
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After normalizing nominal variables, the Euler equations are now given as
u2(c2t) = βEt
[
u1(c1t+1)
pt
pt+1
1
1+µt
]
, (1.6)
u2(c2t)qt = βEt
[
(1−dt+1)u2(c2t+1) ptpt+1
1
1+µt
]
, (1.7)
u2(c2t)q
r f
t = βEt
[
u2(c2t+1)
pt
pt+1
1
1+µt
]
. (1.8)
Market Clearing
In equilibrium, goods and asset markets clear:
ψ(at ,dt)nt = c1t + c2t +g,
bt+1 = Bt+1,
br ft+1 = 0,
mt+1 = 1.
If real balances are high enough, i.e. 1/pt ≥ u−11 (u2(c2t)) holds (see condition (1.5)),
households equalize marginal utility across cash and credit goods. If not, households are
cash constrained and the allocation of consumption is distorted. As in Martin (2009), in a
monetary equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium in which money is valued,
c1t = 1/pt ,
needs to hold. Note that this still allows for an unconstrained consumption allocation
if the cash-in-advance constraint is just binding, i.e. when pt is such that λt = 0 and
c1t = 1/pt = u−11 (u2(c2t)).
1.2.2 Government Problem
In this section, I formulate the decision problem of the benevolent government. When
the government defaults, the economy suffers a productivity loss governed by ψ (·) and
it cannot access the bond market for a random number of periods.10 Conditional on the
10Note that households can still trade risk-free bonds among each other when the government is in fi-
nancial autarky. However, since they are homogeneous and private bonds are in zero net supply, this is not
going to affect the way public policy is conducted.
17
default decision, the government budget constraint is
g− τtψ(at ,dt)nt =
{
M˜t+1+qt B˜t+1
p˜t
− M˜t+B˜tp˜t , if dt = 0
M˜t+1−M˜t
p˜t
, if dt = 1
It can be written as
g− τtψ(at ,dt)nt =
{
(1+µt) 1+qtBt+1pt −
1+Bt
pt
, if dt = 0
µt
pt
, if dt = 1
by using M˜t+1 = (1+ µt)M˜t and applying the normalization of nominal variables used
before.11 In the default (and autarky) case, the government has to finance public spending
g with income tax revenues τtψ(at ,1)nt and seigniorage τmt ≡ µt/pt . When the govern-
ment repays its debt, it additionally has to make debt payments but can access the bond
market and issue debt.
The government is benevolent and sets its policy instruments to maximize the ex-
pected life-time utility of the households, anticipating the response of the private sector
to its policies. However, it cannot commit itself to a state-contingent (Ramsey) policy
plan for all current and future policies but optimizes from period to period instead. In the
model, the presence of nominal public debt leads to a time-inconsistency problem since a
sequentially optimizing government will be tempted to use default or surprise inflation to
relax the government budget. To analyze the public policy problem of the government, I
restrict attention to stationary Markov-perfect equilibria (see Klein et al., 2008). In such
an equilibrium, the optimal decisions of the government in any period will be character-
ized by time-invariant functions that only depend on the minimal payoff-relevant state of
the economy in that respective period. In the model, this state consists of the beginning-
of-period debt-to-money ratio Bt , labor productivity at and whether the government is in
financial autarky or not. By requiring the government to only condition its decisions on
the current payoff-relevant aggregate state, the Markov-perfect equilibrium concept rules
out the possibility that the government is able to keep promises made in the past. This
is because at the start of a period, the government does not care about the past and only
considers its payoff in current and future periods.12 By construction, the government thus
is ensured to act in a time-consistent way.
The Markov-perfect policy problem will be formulated recursively. In the remainder,
I will thus adopt the notation of dynamic programming. Time indices are hence dropped
11Note that the normalized aggregate money stock is constant and equal to one.
12The focus on Markov-perfect strategies also rules out the possibility of reputational considerations
based on complex trigger strategies as in Chari and Kehoe (1990, 1993).
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and a prime is used to denote next period’s variables. Given the aggregate state at the start
of a period, the government takes as given the policy function D(B′,a′) that determines
next period’s default decision as well as the policy functions X r(B′,a′) and X d(a′), with
X ∈ {C2,P}, that determine consumption and the price index in the next period for the
case of repayment (r) and default (d).13 Expectations of these variables enter the house-
hold optimality conditions (1.6) and (1.7) and thus matter for the allocation in the current
period.14 Despite lacking the ability to commit to future policies, the government fully
recognizes today that it affects (expected) future policies via its choice of B′, which in
turn have an effect on the behavior of the private sector in the current period. In a station-
ary Markov-perfect equilibrium, the policy functions that govern future decisions then
coincide with the policy functions that determine current public policy for all states.
As in Klein et al. (2008), one can interpret the formulation of the public policy prob-
lem as a Markov-perfect game played between successive governments. Following this
interpretation, in each period, a different government is in charge of choosing public
policy, taking as given the policies set by the government in the next period. Each gov-
ernment then chooses its optimal strategies, taking as given the optimal responses of the
government in the next period and the private sector in the current period.
In each period, the government anticipates how the private sector responds to its ac-
tions in the current period as given by the private sector equilibrium conditions.15 Using
the household optimality conditions (1.1),(1.6)-(1.7), the binding cash-in-advance con-
straint and the aggregate resource constraint, the government budget constraint can be
rewritten as
βEa′|a
 u1(Pr (B′,a′)−1)1−D(B′,a′)Pr(B′,a′)
+u1(Pd (a′)−1)D(B
′,a′)
Pd(a′)
+βEa′|a [u2(Cr2 (B′,a′))1−D(B′,a′)Pr(B′,a′) ]B′
+un(n)n+u2(c2)(c2−B/p) = 0,
(1.9)
for the repayment case and as
βEa′|a
θ ×
 u1(Pr (0,a′)
−1)1−D(0,a
′)
Pr(0,a′)
+u1(Pd (a′)−1)D(0,a
′)
Pd(a′)
+(1−θ)× u1(Cd1 (a′))Pd(a′)

+un(n)n+u2(c2)c2 = 0,
(1.10)
13Remember that cash-good consumption c1 is directly linked to the price index p via the cash-in-advance
constraint.
14Households do not have an impact on the future government policies but form rational expectations
about them based on the policy functions listed above.
15The government thus plays a Stackelberg game against the (passive) private sector in every period.
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for the default (and autarky) case. This constraint can be seen as the period implementabil-
ity constraint for the government.16
In addition to this constraint, the government has to respect the following two private
sector equilibrium conditions:
0 = ψ(a,d)n−1/p− c2−g, (1.11)
0 ≤ u1(1/p)−u2(c2). (1.12)
The household budget constraint is satisfied by Walras’ Law, given the government bud-
get constraint, the market clearing conditions for bonds and money and the resource con-
straint. Let B≡ [B,B] be the set of possible aggregate debt values with −∞< B≤ 0 and
0< B<∞. Conditional on entering a period with access to financial markets, the decision
problem of the government is given by the following functional equation:
V(B,a) = max
d∈{0,1}
{
(1−d)Vr(B,a)+dVd(a)
}
(1.13)
with the value of repayment given as
Vr(B,a) = max
c2,n,p,B′∈B
u(1/p,c2,n)+βEa′|a
[V(B′,a′)] s.t. (1.9),(1.11),(1.12),
and the value of default as
Vd(a) = max
c2,n,p
u(1/p,c2,n)+βEa′|a
[
θV(0,a′)+(1−θ)Vd(a′)
]
s.t. (1.10)− (1.12).
The value V(·) is the option value of default. As is standard in the sovereign default
literature, the government is assumed to honor its obligations whenever it is indifferent
between default and repayment. If the government starts a period in financial autarky, it
solves the same problem as in the default case. In periods of default and autarky, the gov-
ernment will regain access to financial markets in the subsequent period with probability
θ . With probability 1−θ , it will stay in financial autarky.17
1.2.3 Equilibrium
The Markov-perfect equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1. A stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium is given by a set of value functions
16The derivation of the implementability constraint can be found in Appendix 1.A.1.
17On average, the government thus spends 1/θ periods in autarky after a default.
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V (B,a), Vr (B,a), Vd (a), and policy functionsD (B,a), Br (B,a), X r (B,a) , X d (a), with
X ∈ {C2,N ,P}, such that for all (B,a) ∈ B×A :
D (B,a) = argmax
d∈{0,1}
{
(1−d)Vr(B,a)+dVd(a)
}
,
{X r (B,a)}X∈{C2,N ,P,B} = argmax
c2,n,p,B′∈B
u(1/p,c2,n)+βEa′|a
[V(B′,a′)]
s.t. (1.9),(1.11),(1.12),
and{
X d (a)
}
X∈{C2,N ,P}
= argmax
c2,n,p
u(1/p,c2,n)+βEa′|a
[
θV(0,a′)+(1−θ)Vd(a′)
]
s.t. (1.10)− (1.12),
as well as
V(B,a) = (1−D (B,a))×Vr(B,a)+D (B,a)×Vd(a),
Vr(B,a) = u(Pr (B,a)−1 ,Cr2 (B,a) ,N r (B,a))+βEa′|a
[V(Br (B,a) ,a′)] ,
and
Vd(a) = u(Pd (a)−1 ,Cd2 (a) ,N d (a))+βEa′|a
[
θV(0,a′)+(1−θ)Vd(a′)
]
.
This definition highlights the stationarity of the policy problem since the functions that
solve the decision problem of the government in a given period coincide with the policy
functions that govern the optimal decisions of the government in future periods.18
1.3 Model Analysis
In this section, the role of sovereign default for public policy is investigated. Because the
model cannot be evaluated analytically due to the discrete default option, numerical meth-
ods are applied. Appendix 1.A.3 contains details regarding the numerical computation of
the equilibrium. The next section presents the model specification. A discussion of the
public policy choices can be found in Section 1.3.2. Simulation results are presented in
Section 1.3.3.
18The definition of the equilibrium is formulated following Martin (2009).
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Parameter Description Value
β Discount factor 0.9900
g Government spending 0.0379
γ1 Cash-good weight 0.0030
γ2 Credit-good weight 0.3370
σ1 Cash-good curvature 2.4300
σ2 Credit-good curvature 1.0000
σn Leisure curvature 2.0000
a˜ Default cost parameter 0.9900
θ Probability of reentry 0.2000
σ Std. dev. productivity shock 0.0169
ρ Persistence of productivity 0.9000
Table 1.1: Parameter values
1.3.1 Model Specification
To explore the model properties by computational means, functional forms and parame-
ters need to be chosen.
Functional Forms
Productivity follows a log-normal AR(1)-process,
at = a
ρ
t−1 exp(σεt) , εt
i.i.d.∼ N(0,1).
The household utility function is specified as
u(c1,c2,n) = γ1
c1−σ11 −1
1−σ1 + γ2
c1−σ22 −1
1−σ2 +(1− γ1− γ2)
(1−n)1−σn−1
1−σn ,
with γ1,γ2,σi > 0, i ∈ {1,2,n} and γ1+ γ2 < 1.19
The resource costs of default are specified as in Cuadra et al. (2010):
ψ(a,d) = a−d×max{0,a− a˜} .
If a default takes place, effective productivity equals a˜ when a exceeds a˜ while there
are no costs of default when productivity a is below the threshold a˜. This default cost
specification implies that a default is more costly in booms than in recessions. In the
quantitative sovereign default literature, it is well known that this feature is crucial for
19For σi = 1, i ∈ {1,2,n}, household utility is logarithmic for the respective variable.
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default to mostly take place in bad states and hence for countercyclical sovereign risk to
emerge (see e.g. Aguiar and Amador, 2014). This property is consistent with empirical
evidence (see Tomz and Wright, 2007) and also present in models with endogenous costs
of default (see Mendoza and Yue, 2012, Sosa-Padilla, 2013).20
Parameters
A model period corresponds to one quarter. The selected model parameters are listed in
Table 1.1. They are either set to standard values or chosen to replicate certain short- or
long-run properties of the Mexican economy.21 The productivity parameter ρ is set to
0.9 while σ is chosen to match the standard deviation of HP-filtered Mexican log real
GDP. As is common in business cycle models, a discount factor of β = 0.99 is selected,
implying an annual real risk-free rate of 4%. Based on World Bank data for 1980-2008,
g is set to 0.0379 to match an average ratio of public spending to GDP of around 11%.22
The credit-good preference parameter σ2 is normalized to 1. Targeting a cash-credit good
ratio and an average working time of one third each, γ1 is set to 0.003 and γ2 to 0.337.
For the inverse of the elasticity of leisure σl , a rather standard value of 2 is selected. The
probability of reentry θ is set to 0.2, implying that financial autarky lasts for 5 quarters
on average. This parameter value is in line with values considered in the quantitative
sovereign default literature which range from 0.0385 (Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2012) to
0.282 (Arellano, 2008).
The size of σ1 is crucial for long-run debt and inflation as will be explained in the next
section. To match the Mexican average annual inflation rate of 29.69%, σ1 is set to 2.43.23
The incentive to default critically depends on a˜. For Mexico, Reinhart (2010) documents
that there have been domestic defaults in 1982 and between 1929 and 1938. Based on
this observation, I set the default cost parameter to match an annual default frequency of
2%. The model is also solved and simulated with prohibitively high productivity costs
of default which rule out equilibrium default. This benchmark economy yields the same
results as a model without default option and will be referred to as ”no-default economy”.
The model with default option will be referred to as ”baseline economy”.
20Allowing for default costs that enter the the aggregate resource constraint (or the government budget
constraint) in a lump-sum way does not change the results of this chapter as long as these losses are also
relatively higher in good than in bad states, preserving countercyclical default incentives.
21The time series for real GDP and the GDP deflator are taken from Cuadra et al. (2010) and cover the
time period from 1980:I to 2007:I. They are seasonally adjusted via EViews’ multiplicative X-12 routine.
22More specifically, I use annual data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for general
final government consumption as a share of GDP.
23The inflation rate is calculated based on the quarterly GDP deflator time series for Mexico provided
by Cuadra et al. (2010). Using alternative measures such as the CPI also yields average inflation rates of
around 30%.
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Figure 1.1: Default threshold and selected policy functions (baseline economy)
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Notes: The policy functions are depicted for productivity values 1.5 standard deviations below (alow) and
above (ahigh) the unconditional mean of productivity. The money growth rate and the nominal interest rate
are displayed in annual terms.
1.3.2 Public Policy Decisions
The optimal policies for the economy with default can be seen in Figure 1.1. Debt is nor-
malized by nominal output Y ≡ py, evaluated at the unconditional mean of productivity.
The default decision is visualized using the default threshold aˆ(B) which is the lowest
productivity level that leads to repayment for given debt B: Vr(B, aˆ(B)) = Vd(aˆ(B)). The
threshold separates the state space (B,a) into two areas: the default region (a < aˆ(B), i.e.
below the line) and the repayment region (a≥ aˆ(B), i.e. on and above the line). As in the
quantitative sovereign default literature, default becomes more attractive with higher debt
and lower productivity (see Arellano, 2008).
The remaining policies are presented for productivity levels 1.5 standard deviations
below (dashed line) and above (solid line) the unconditional mean of productivity. The
nominal interest rate is defined as i = 1/q− 1. Since the continuous policy decisions
depend on the default decision, the objects displayed in Figure 1.1 exhibit kinks at states
where default is optimally chosen.24 In the default case, the policies also do not change
24The policy functions displayed in Figure 1.1 are given as X (B,a) = (1 − D(B,a))X r(B,a) +
D(B,a)X d(a), with X ∈ {B,C2,N ,P}. The remaining variables (µ,τ, i) are calculated by using these
policy functions and the private sector equilibrium conditions (1.1),(1.6)-(1.7).
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with B anymore.
The optimal labor and inflation tax distortions reflect the government’s financing
needs. By relaxing the government’s budget, a sovereign default allows to reduce la-
bor taxation and increase real balances relative to full debt repayment. The income tax
rate and the price index p both increase with B. An inflationary monetary policy becomes
particularly more attractive with higher debt because it lowers the real debt burden. This
implies that default and inflation are substitutes since inflation as ”partial default” be-
comes useless for d = 1. However, they are only imperfect substitutes due to the discrete
nature of default.
The intertemporal policy trade-off can be illustrated via the generalized Euler equation
β
∫ ∞
aˆ(B′)
(
ξ ′−ξ) u2 (c′2)
p′
fa(a′|a)da′ = ξ
(
∂Rb
∂B′
B′+
∂Rm
∂B′
)
, (1.14)
where ξ denotes the multiplier on the implementability constraint (1.9), Rb =((1+µ)qu2)/p
average revenues from bond issuance and Rm = ((1+µ)u2)/p (gross) revenues from
money creation.25 With the model specification of Section 1.3.1, these revenues are given
by the following functions of productivity a and borrowing B′:
Rb(B′,a) = β
∫ ∞
aˆ(B′)
γ2Cr2(B′,a′)−σ2
Pr(B′,a′) fa(a
′|a)da′,
Rm(B′,a) = β ×
{ ∫ aˆ(B′)
0 γ1Pd(a′)σ1−1 fa(a′|a)da′
+
∫ ∞
aˆ(B′) γ1Pr(B′,a′)σ1−1 fa(a′|a)da′
}
.
Households dislike volatile consumption and leisure. In the presence of productivity
shocks, the government can issue debt to accommodate these preferences and smooth
tax distortions as measured by ξ across states (see the LHS of (1.14)). Its ability to do
so is constrained by financial market incompleteness and lack of commitment. Since
only nominal non-state contingent bonds are available, the government has an incentive
to make real debt payments state contingent via inflation or default. However, because it
cannot commit to a state-contingent repayment plan for the next period, public financing
conditions will depend on the chosen debt position B′ since it affects the risk of inflation
and default. The derivatives on the RHS of (1.14) reflect this channel. The optimal debt
25The derivation of the Euler equation assumes differentiability of Vr, Rb and Rm with respect to debt
(see Appendix 1.A.2 for details). As is common in the sovereign default literature (see e.g. Cuadra and
Sapriza, 2008, or Hatchondo et al., 2015), the generalized Euler equation is only presented here to highlight
the intertemporal public policy trade-off in an intuitive way. The numerical algorithm that is used to solve
the model is not based on this Euler equation and does not require differentiability to hold (see Appendix
1.A.3 for details).
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Figure 1.2: Average bond revenues Rb(B′,a) and money revenues Rm(B′,a) for the no-
default economy and the baseline economy
policy then trades off the tax smoothing motive against the time-inconsistency problem,
i.e. how current debt issuance affects revenues Rb(B′,a) ×B′ and Rm(B′,a) by changing
household expectations of inflation and default, which matter for household bond and
money demand.26
The impact of debt issuance on public revenues is visualized in Figure 1.2. It depicts
the functions Rb and Rm for the no-default economy (first row) and the baseline economy
with equilibrium default (second row). The no-default case has previously been studied
by Martin (2009, 2011, 2013) and Diaz-Gimenez et al. (2008).
It is useful to first look at the case without default to understand how sovereign risk
26Note that revenues are weighted by the marginal utility of credit-good consumption u2(c2) and ex-
pressed in real terms.
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affects the debt policy.27 The shape of Rb reflects the relation between inflation and
beginning-of-period debt (see panel (a)). Due to its lack of commitment, the government
optimizes from period to period and therefore does not internalize how its current policy
choices affect outcomes in previous periods. More specifically, it does not internalize
that its current actions have an impact on housesholds’ demand for money and bonds
in the last period. Failing to recognize this impact, the government decides to erode
the real value of beginning-of-period debt via inflation to relax its budget. Since the
temptation to use inflation in this way increases with B, expected inflation becomes an
increasing function of end-of-period debt and the price of nominal government bonds
responds to B′ in a negative way, causing borrowing to become more expensive when
more debt is issued (∂Rb/∂B′< 0). The shape of Rm reflects the way public debt, inflation
and household money demand are related (see panel (b)). Given that real balances 1/p
are a decreasing function of B, the real payoff of money is expected to decrease with
borrowing B′, reducing household money demand today. However, lower real balances
1/p also increase the marginal utility of cash-good consumption u1 (1/p), such that the
demand for money increases with B′ since households expect to be more cash-constrained
in the subsequent period. Whether higher borrowing B′ increases net household money
demand depends on the size of the parameter σ1. For σ1 > 1, it does and an increase
in B′ leads to higher money revenues (∂Rm/∂B′ > 0). Since a household’s valuation of
money increases with B′, the government can simply issue more currency to implement a
particular price index and thus obtain more revenues from money issuance.
The long-run debt position is determined by the two effects described above. A posi-
tive sign for ∂Rm/∂B′ is crucial for non-zero long-run debt.28 For σ1 = 1, money revenues
do not respond to borrowing (∂Rm/∂B′ = 0) which eliminates the incentive to borrow in
the long run. With σ1 ∈ (0,1), the government even has an incentive to accumulate assets
(B′ < 0) due to ∂Rm/∂B′ < 0.29 These two cases are not further discussed here because
they make default a redundant policy option. When there are productivity shocks, a posi-
tive response of money revenues to borrowing also matters for the government’s ability to
smooth tax distortions across states since, without this effect, only the negative bond price
effect would be operative and make it more expensive to issue debt in low productivity
states.
When the government can default on its debt, sovereign risk changes the impact of
27In this case, the default threshold is given as aˆ(B) = 0, i.e. default is prohibitively costly.
28Looking at Markov-perfect public policy in a real economy setting with endogenous government spend-
ing and without default, Debortoli and Nunes (2013) show - for analytical and quantitative examples - that
long-run debt only deviates from zero for a small range of parameter values.
29For more details see Proposition 5 in Martin (2009) who proves these properties for a deterministic
model without default option.
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Figure 1.3: Selected policy functions (no-default economy)
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borrowing on public revenues. Panel (c) displays Rb for the baseline economy with
sovereign default. Because a default is more likely for higher amounts of debt, the bond
price would respond to B′ in a negative way even in the absence of inflation risk. As
in Arellano (2008), the debt elasticity of interest rates is higher in bad (low productivity)
than in good (high productivity) states, reflecting the default incentives of the government.
Panel (d) shows how money revenues respond to B′ when there is sovereign risk. The non-
monotonic shape results from the optimal mix of default and inflation. Since default and
inflation are substitutes, higher borrowing can lower expected inflation by increasing the
probability of default. While making money as a store of value more valuable, this in-
teraction also lowers the expected marginal utility of cash-good consumption and hence
Rm. Due to its adverse effect on bond and money revenues, sovereign risk thus ultimately
makes debt issuance less attractive. The consequences for the long-run debt position can
be illustrated via Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.3. By looking at the intersection between the
(dotted) 45-degree line and the borrowing policies, one can already see without having
simulated the model that average debt is going to be lower in the baseline model with
default. The quantitative dimension of the model properties discussed so far is explored
in the next section.
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Baseline No default
Mean
Default probability (annual) 0.0206 0
Debt-to-GDP 0.1866 0.3340
Tax rate 0.1043 0.0912
Seigniorage-to-GDP 0.0155 0.0296
Inflation rate (annual) 0.3011 0.6503
Nominal interest rate (annual) 0.3958 0.7175
Standard deviation
Output 0.0236 0.0192
Tax rate 0.0124 0.0012
Inflation rate (annual) 0.1077 0.0544
Nominal interest rate (annual) 0.0782 0.0252
Correlation with output
Tax rate -0.8597 -0.9991
Inflation rate (annual) -0.2990 -0.5599
Nominal interest rate (annual) -0.4725 -0.9093
Table 1.2: Selected model statistics
1.3.3 Simulation Results
Table 1.2 presents the averages of statistics calculated for 2500 simulated economies with
2000 periods each. The time series are filtered using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a
smoothing parameter of 1600. Output is in logs. All simulations are initialized with
S0 = (0,E[a]) and the first 500 observations of each sample are discarded.
Average debt and inflation are lower with default option. More specifically, the aver-
age inflation rate in the no-default economy is more than twice as large as in the baseline
economy with default. The possibility of default reduces average inflation through a di-
rect and an indirect effect. When the government chooses to default, there is no incentive
to use inflation to reduce the real debt burden anymore. As a result, inflation is lower in
default (and autarky) periods than in periods of repayment. The role of this direct effect
is however limited by the frequency of default and does not contribute much to the aver-
age inflation rate.30 The indirect effect of default on inflation is related to how the risk
of default affects the government’s borrowing behavior. Default risk raises the cost of
rolling over even low amounts of debt in recessions. This mechanism restricts the build
up of large public debt positions which would make higher inflation more attractive. Less
debt also implies that the tax base of the income tax increases relative to that of infla-
30The average inflation rate for periods of repayment only is 31.08% and thus only slightly higher than
the overall average inflation rate of 30.11% which includes periods of default and autarky as well.
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Figure 1.4: Impulse responses of selected model variables to a negative one-time produc-
tivity shock
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tion. Hence, the benefit of raising inflation is lower, leading to a higher average labor
tax rate in the baseline economy.31 While the accumulation of debt crucially depends
on the government’s ability to collect seigniorage (see the discussion in the previous sec-
tion), the average seigniorage-to-GDP ratio is moderate and of plausible size.32 When the
government has the option to default, borrowing is more expensive in recessions due to
the increased risk of default. The average nominal interest rate however is higher in the
no-default economy since it experiences more inflation on average.
The short-run implications of sovereign risk for public policy can be illustrated via
Figure 1.4. For the baseline and the no-default economy, it displays impulse responses
of selected model variables to a negative one-time productivity shock. The variables are
expressed as absolute deviations from their values at the stationary state to which the
economies converge when productivity is kept fixed at its long-run mean.33 Since pro-
31For Mexico, Ilzetzki (2011) calculates an average marginal income tax rate of 12.1% which is close to
the average tax rate in the baseline model (10.43%).
32Using the same definition of seigniorage as in the model, Aisen and Veiga (2008) calculate that average
seigniorage is 2.2% of GDP for Mexico.
33Of course, the two economies do not exhibit the same stationary state. The variables in such a stationary
state are close to the average values listed in Table 1.2.
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Mexico
(1980-2007)
Baseline No default
(recalibrated)
Standard deviation 0.2423 0.1077 0.0703
Correlation with output -0.2734 -0.2990 -0.4585
Table 1.3: Cyclical properties of inflation
ductivity is persistent (ρ > 0), the negative shock immediately raises the risk of default
as the incentive to default is more likely to be strong in the subsequent period. The high
sensitivity of interest rates to changes in debt issuance forces the government to reduce
its debt position in order to avoid an even larger decline of the bond price. As a result, the
government has to resort to large increases in inflation and taxes to finance debt payments
and government spending.34 Consistent with empirical evidence (see Reinhart and Ro-
goff, 2009), a sovereign debt crisis thus is inflationary. As productivity reverts back to its
mean and debt is reduced even further, expected inflation and sovereign risk both decline,
leading the government to take advantage of the improved borrowing conditions and ac-
cumulate debt again. In the no-default economy, borrowing conditions do not deteriorate
very much in response to the negative productivity shock. This property allows the gov-
ernment to effectively smooth tax distortions across states by issuing debt which avoids
large increases in taxes and inflation. Because debt cannot be easily rolled over in the
baseline model, the impact of productivity shocks on the economy is more pronounced
and output volatility is 23% higher relative to the model without default.
Since one of the main contributions of this chapter is to offer a joint analysis of infla-
tion and sovereign default, it is interesting to compare the cyclical properties of inflation
generated by the model with and without default to those observed in the data. Table 1.3
shows the results. In Mexico, inflation is very volatile and countercyclical. The baseline
model with default can replicate these findings. To give the model without default a fair
chance, it is recalibrated to match the average inflation rate and the volatility of output in
Mexico.35 While the recalibrated no-default economy yields countercyclical inflation, the
baseline model predicts more volatile and less countercyclical inflation than the no-default
model which is closer to what is observed empirically.
34This mechanism is related to the one studied by Cuadra et al. (2010) in a model of a small open
economy with real government debt. The authors show that countercyclical default risk can rationalize the
procyclical consumption taxation observed in emerging economies.
35The changed model parameter values are γ1 = 0.015, γ2 = 0.325, σ1 = 1.73 and σ = 0.02.
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1.4 The Welfare Implications of Sovereign Default
This section discusses the welfare implications of sovereign default. With commitment,
the option to default will not decrease welfare since the government would otherwise
refrain from using it.36 Without commitment, this is not necessarily the case anymore.
Section 1.3 has shown that the default option has implications for public policy in the
short and the long run. On the one hand, by increasing the sensitivity of bond prices with
respect to debt and productivity, countercyclical risk of default entails short-run costs
because the government loses some of its ability to smooth tax distortions across states.
On the other hand, default risk might lead to welfare gains due to its impact on long-run
debt. The model features a long-run borrowing motive that stems from the presence of
two frictions, lack of commitment and a liquidity constraint (see the discussion in Section
1.3.2). The government acts in a time-consistent way and does not internalize the effect
of its current choice of inflation on the borrowing behavior in previous periods. When
household money demand and thus the value of money are increasing in the amount of
issued debt, the government persistently chooses positive debt positions which then lead
to high average inflation. By limiting public debt accumulation via more sensitive interest
rates, the default option reduces average inflation and the misallocation of consumption
compared to the no-default setting.
To evaluate whether the addition of the default option to the set of policy instruments
is welfare enhancing, welfare measure ∆ is calculated. It measures the percentage increase
in credit-good consumption that households in the no-default economy need to be given
in each period to achieve the same expected lifetime utility as in the baseline economy
with default:
E0
[
T
∑
t=0
β tu(cD1t ,c
D
2t ,n
D
t )
]
= E0
[
T
∑
t=0
β tu(cN1t ,c
N
2t(1+∆),n
N
t )
]
.
The sequences of consumption and labor supply in the economy with ( j =D) and without
default option ( j = N) are denoted as {c j1t ,c j2t ,n jt }Tt=0. Expected lifetime utility is calcu-
lated for both types of economies by averaging realized lifetime utility of 2500 samples
with simulated time series of effective length T = 1500 each.
The calculated welfare measure is ∆ = 0.00006. For the no-default economy, credit-
good consumption thus needs to be increased by only 0.006% in each period to equalize
household welfare in both types of economies. Since these gains are of negligible size,
36For a real small open economy with incomplete markets and costly sovereign default, Adam and Grill
(2012) show that welfare can be increased when the Ramsey planner can commit to a state-contingent
default plan.
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one can argue that, from a welfare perspective, lack of commitment to repayment is not
important.
1.5 Conclusion
To understand the implications of the option to default on debt payments for public pol-
icy, this chapter has studied optimal monetary and fiscal policy without commitment in
a cash-credit economy with nominal debt and endogenous government default. While a
default allows the government to reduce inflation and distortionary labor taxation by re-
laxing its budget constraint, the default option mainly induces lower rates of inflation by
constraining debt issuance via endogenous default risk premia. This mechanism reduces
the average debt position and the government’s incentive to implement high inflation in
the long-run. Less debt also implies that the income tax becomes more attractive rela-
tive to inflation, resulting in a higher average labor tax rate. Taxes and inflation are more
volatile when the default option is available because the government’s ability to smooth
tax distortions across states is reduced by the presence of default risk. For the case of
Mexico, a counterfactual exercise has demonstrated that the consequences of the option
to default for welfare are negligible.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Derivation of the Implementability Constraint
I will only derive the implementability constraint for the repayment case. The constraint
for the default case is derived similarly. First, take the household optimality conditions
(1.1),(1.6)-(1.7) and rewrite them (in recursive notation) as
τ = 1+
un(n)
u2(c2)
1
ψ(a,0)
,
1+µ
p
= βEa′|a
[
u1(1/p′)
u2(c2)
1
p′
]
,
(1+µ)q
p
= βEa′|a
[
u2(c′2)
u2(c2)
1−d′
p′
]
.
After using these expressions to eliminate the terms on the LHS of these equations in the
government budget constraint
g− τψ(a,0)n+ 1+B
p
= (1+µ)
1+qB′
p
,
one obtains
g−
(
1+
un(n)
u2(c2)
1
ψ(a,0)
)
ψ(a,0)n+1/p+B/p
= βEa′|a
[
u1(1/p′)
u2(c2)
1
p′
]
+βEa′|a
[
u2(c′2)
u2(c2)
1−d′
p′
]
B′,
or
g−ψ(a,0)n− un(n)
u2(c2)
n+1/p+B/p
= βEa′|a
[
u1(1/p′)
u2(c2)
1
p′
]
+βEa′|a
[
u2(c′2)
u2(c2)
1−d′
p′
]
B′.
Now, eliminate ψ(a,0)n via the resource constraint ψ(a,0)n = 1/p+ c2+g,
g− (1/p+ c2+g)− un(n)u2(c2)n+1/p+B/p
= βEa′|a
[
u1(1/p′)
u2(c2)
1
p′
]
+βEa′|a
[
u2(c′2)
u2(c2)
1−d′
p′
]
B′.
34
After multiplying both sides of the equation with u2(c2) and using the policy functions to
replace next period’s variables, one arrives at the implementability constraint
−un(n)n−u2(c2)(c2−B/p)
= βEa′|a
 u1(Pr (B′,a′)−1)1−D(B′,a′)Pr(B′,a′)
+u1(Pd (a′)−1)D(B
′,a′)
Pd(a′)
+βEa′|a[u2(Cr2 (B′,a′))1−D (B′,a′)Pr (B′,a′)
]
B′.
1.A.2 First-Order Conditions for the Policy Problem
Conditional on repayment, the necessary first-order condition for an interior debt choice
B′ is
0 = ξ
(
Rb+
∂Rb
∂B′
B′+
∂Rm
∂B′
)
+β
∫ ∞
aˆ(B′)
∂Vr(B′,a′)
∂B′
fa(a′|a)da′,
with ξ denoting the multiplier on the implementability constraint (1.9).37
When combined with definition
Rb = β
∫ ∞
aˆ(B′)
u2 (c′2)
p′
fa(a′|a)da′,
and envelope condition
∂Vr(B,a)
∂B
=−ξ u2 (c2)
p
,
the first-order condition yields the generalized Euler equation
β
∫ ∞
aˆ(B′)
(
ξ ′−ξ) u2 (c′2)
p′
fa(a′|a)da′ = ξ
(
∂Rb
∂B′
B′+
∂Rm
∂B′
)
.
The first-order conditions for the price index p, credit consumption c2, and labor supply
n are
0 = −p−2 [u1(1/p)−ξu2(c2)B−φ +ϑu11(1/p)] , (1.15)
0 = u2(c2)+ξ [u22(c2)(c2−B/p)+u2(c2)]−φ −ϑu22(c2), (1.16)
0 = un(n)+ξ [unn(n)n+un(n)]+φψ(a,0), (1.17)
where ξ , φ and ϑ are the multipliers related to the constraints (1.9), (1.11) and (1.12). In
addition to these three conditions, the complementary slackness conditions
ϑ ≥ 0,u1(1/p)−u2(c2)≥ 0,ϑ × [u1(1/p)−u2(c2)] = 0, (1.18)
37The derivation of the generalized Euler equation follows Martin (2009) and Arellano and Rama-
narayanan (2012).
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need to be satisfied as well.
1.A.3 Numerical Solution
The task of the numerical solution algorithm is to find the policy and value functions
X r(B,a), X ∈ {B,C2,N ,P,V}, and X d(a), X ∈ {C2,N ,P,V}. Following Hatchondo
et al. (2010), I approximate these functions on discrete grids for debt and productivity,
and use cubic spline interpolation to allow for off-grid values of B and a. The solution
algorithm involves the following steps:
1. Construct discrete grids for debt [B,B] and productivity [a,a].
2. Choose initial values for the policy and value functions X rstart(B,a) and X dstart(a),
X ∈{C2,N ,P,V}, at all grid point combinations.
3. Set X jnext = X jstart , j ∈ {r,d} and fix an error tolerance ε .
4. For each discrete grid point combination (B,a) ∈ [B,B]× [a,a], find the optimal
policiesX rnew(B,a),X ∈ {B,C2,N ,P}, and the associated value of repayment Vrnew(B,a).
For each productivity value a ∈ [a,a], compute the optimal policies X dnew(a), X ∈
{C2,N ,P}, and the value of default Vdnew(a).
5. If |X rnew(B,a)−X rnext(B,a)|< ε and
∣∣X dnew(a)−X dnext(a)∣∣< ε , X ∈ {C2,N ,P,V},
for all grid point combinations, go to step 6, else set X jnext = X jnew, j ∈ {r,d} and
repeat step 4.
6. Use X jnew(·), j ∈ {r,d}, as approximations of the respective equilibrium objects in
the infinite-horizon economy.
The grid points are distributed evenly. Since the asymmetric default cost specification
leads to a kink at a = a˜ in X d (a), X ∈ {C2,N ,P,V}, I partition the productivity grid for
the default case as in Hatchondo et al. (2010) to account for this discontinuity.
As is known in the literature (see e.g. Krusell and Smith, 2003, or Martin, 2009), there
might be multiple Markov-perfect equilibria in models with infinitely-lived agents. In
particular, there could be equilibria with discontinuous policy functions which do not arise
in the infinite-horizon limit of a finite-horizon model version. To avoid such equilibria, I
follow Hatchondo et al. (2010) and solve for the infinite-horizon limit of a finite-horizon
model version.38 In practice, this means that I compute the value and policy functions for
38Martin (2009) also solves for the infinite-horizon limit. As pointed out by him, using a Svensson
(1985)-type beginning-of-period cash-in-advance constraint in a finite-horizon model requires a terminal
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the final period problem where no borrowing takes place and use these objects as initial
values X jstart , j ∈ {r,d}, for step 2.
For a given state (B,a) ∈ [B,B]× [a,a], the objective function of the government is the
sum of two parts, the period utility function u(1/p,c2,n) and (in the repayment case) the
continuation value βEa′|a [Vnext(B′,a′)], with Vnext(B,a)=max
{Vrnext(B,a),Vdnext(a)}. The
optimal policies for step 4 are then computed as follows. I use a sub-routine that calcu-
lates the optimal static policies c2, n, and p for given debt and productivity values (B,a)
∈ [B,B]× [a,a] and an arbitrary, i.e. possibly off-grid, borrowing value Bˆ′. More specif-
ically, I use a non-linear equation solver to find the variables that satisfy the static op-
timality conditions (1.9),(1.11),(1.15)-(1.18).39 Since these conditions involve the com-
plementary slackness conditions (1.18), I follow Brumm and Grill (2014) and use the
trick by Garcia and Zangwill (1981) to transform the set of optimality conditions into
a system of equations.40 Using the static policy sub-routine, (c2,n, p) and thus period
utility u(1/p,c2,n) can be expressed as functions of (B,a, Bˆ′).41 As a result, given (B,a)
∈ [B,B]× [a,a], the government objective can be expressed as a function of Bˆ′ as well:
u(1/p,c2,n)+βEa′|a
[Vnext(Bˆ′,a′)].
For each discrete grid point combination (B,a) ∈ [B,B]× [a,a], the optimal debt pol-
icy Brnew(B,a) then is computed via a global non-linear optimizer, calling the static policy
routine to calculate the objective function for each candidate debt value Bˆ′. More specif-
ically, for each (B,a), I first perform a grid search over a pre-defined grid for Bˆ′ and
then use the solution as an initial guess for the Nelder-Mead algorithm.42 The optimal
policies X r(B,a), X ∈ {C2,N ,P} then are computed by using the static policy routine
for the optimal borrowing value Brnew(B,a). The algorithm iterates on the policy and
value functions until the maximum absolute difference between value and policy func-
tions obtained in two subsequent iterations is below ε = 10−5 for each combination (B,a)
∈ [B,B]× [a,a].43
money value for a monetary equilibrium to exist. Otherwise, households will not be willing to invest in
money in the final period and by backward induction not in any of the previous periods. The impact of the
final-period value of money vanishes over time and does not affect the final results.
39In the default case, condition (1.9) is replaced by condition (1.10)
40Alternatively, one can also use a non-linear constrained optimizer to compute the optimal static policies
for each combination (B,a, Bˆ′). Using a sequential quadratic programming algorithm (see e.g. Nocedal and
Wright, 1999 for details), I found this approach to be both slower and less accurate.
41The routine is also used to obtain the optimal policies in the final period, where Bˆ′ = 0 holds.
42Instead of the Nelder-Mead algorithm, I also solved for the optimal debt policy using Golden section
search and a mesh adaptive direct search algorithm (as implemented by the optimizing routine NOMAD
provided by the OPTI Toolbox), which did not affect the results.
43Using a tighter convergence criterion did not affect the results.
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To evaluate value and policy functions at debt and productivity states that are off-grid,
cubic spline interpolation is used.44 To approximate expected values in an accurate way,
one needs to account for the default threshold. This can be seen by looking at the expected
option value of default:
Ea′|a
[Vnext(B′,a′)]= ∫ aˆ(B′)
0
Vdnext(a′) fa(a′|a)da′+
∫ ∞
aˆ(B′)
Vrnext(B′,a′) fa(a′|a)da′.
Gauss-Legendre quadrature nodes and weights are used to approximate the integrals
above. The default threshold aˆ(B) satisfies Vrnext(B, aˆ(B))−Vdnext(aˆ(B)) = 0 and is com-
puted via bisection method.
44Hatchondo et al. (2010) show that allowing for a continuous state space is crucial for accurate solutions
of models with equilibrium default.
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Chapter 2
Monetary Conservatism and Sovereign
Default
2.1 Introduction
At least since the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983b), it is known that often times, the optimal monetary policy under commitment is
time inconsistent and hence not going to be implemented by a benevolent policy maker
who - quite realistically - is unable to commit to future policy. More specifically, when
monetary policy is set under discretion, it tends to result in an inflation bias, i.e. an infla-
tion rate that is persistently higher than the optimal one under commitment. This result
holds for model environments where monetary policy is tempted to use surprise inflation
to stimulate the economy (see e.g. Barro and Gordon, 1983b, or Clarida et al., 1999) or
relax the government budget by reducing the real value of outstanding nominal public
debt payments (see e.g. Lucas and Stokey, 1983). In doing so, the policy maker does not
internalize that rational agents anticipate the use of such inflationary policies in earlier
periods which (partially) offsets the potentially positive effects of inflation surprises. To
avoid (or at least reduce) this inflation bias, Rogoff (1985) has suggested the delegation of
monetary policy to a monetary conservative central banker who views inflation as more
costly than society. Although he is not benevolent, his appointment makes monetary pol-
icy less tempted to resort to inflationary policies and might thus increase welfare relative
to a scenario with a benevolent policy maker.
In practice, most developed economies have delegated monetary policy to independent
central banks that emphasize low and stable inflation. These reforms have shielded mon-
etary policy from the sequential nature of policy making in democratic societies and have
usually been accompanied by lower inflation rates. Recently, many emerging economies
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have also introduced central bank independence in an attempt to bring down their persis-
tently high inflation rates (see e.g. Carstens and Ja´come, 2005). However, a lot of these
countries are subject to frictions that might undermine the success of such reforms.
This chapter studies the effectiveness and desirability of monetary conservatism in a
model which accounts for three frictions that matter for many emerging economies: (i)
incomplete financial markets, (ii) risk of default, and (iii) political distortions. I study
a model of a small open economy where fiscal and monetary policy is chosen without
commitment. With lack of commitment, the presence of nominal non-state contingent
government debt introduces an incentive to reduce the real debt burden by using surprise
inflation or default and relax the government budget. Fiscal policy is set by a fiscal author-
ity that exhibits a deficit bias due to political economy frictions whereas monetary policy
is controlled by an independent central bank. Reflecting its independence, the central
bank’s objective might differ from that of the fiscal authority and society. In particular,
the central bank might not be subject to political economy constraints and place a higher
value on price stability (see Rogoff, 1985, or Adam and Billi, 2008). The interaction be-
tween the fiscal authority and the central bank is modeled as a stationary Markov-perfect
game. Because this equilibrium concept is a refinement of the subgame-perfect equi-
librium concept, monetary and fiscal policies are ensured to be set in a time-consistent
way, reflecting the policy makers’ lack of commitment. In a Markov-perfect equilibrium,
the strategies chosen by the two authorities are only conditioned on the minimal payoff-
relevant state of the economy, which includes the public debt position. Since the policy
makers re-optimize from period to period, they do not internalize the impact of their de-
cisions on expectations and outcomes in previous periods, and take as given next period’s
monetary and fiscal policies as well as the policies set by the respective other authority in
the current period. Although the fiscal authority and the central bank take future policies
as given, they recognize that they can affect these policies via the amount of debt carried
into the next period.
The frictions (i)-(iii) matter for the implications of monetary conservatism for the fol-
lowing reasons. When the central bank places a higher (utility) weight on inflation than
the fiscal authority and society, it is less tempted to use inflation to reduce the real debt
burden. However, when financial markets are incomplete and only non-state contingent
bonds can be issued, this also implies that the central bank is less willing to use inflation
as a shock absorber and make real debt payments state contingent. As a result, even if
monetary conservatism can bring down inflation, it is not clear that this is welfare en-
hancing. The central bank’s willingness to use inflation might also affect the economy’s
vulnerability to sovereign debt crises (see e.g. Kocherlakota, 2012). The more conser-
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vative the central bank is, the more attractive the default option might become for the
fiscal authority to relax the government budget, potentially increasing the likelihood of a
debt crisis. Finally, political frictions might render a higher credibility for low inflation
costly as well. In the model, the fiscal authority exhibits a deficit bias due to political
disagreement and turnover risk (see Cuadra and Sapriza, 2008, or Aguiar and Amador,
2011). It therefore has a long-run borrowing motive that does not reflect the preferences
of society, leading to debt levels that are higher relative to those accumulated by a benev-
olent fiscal authority. The nominal interest rate reflects expected inflation which tends to
increase with the level of borrowing when there is no commitment. Importantly, the elas-
ticity of the nominal interest rate with respect to future debt affects the fiscal authority’s
incentive to issue nominal bonds (see also Aguiar et al., 2014). When the central bank is
less tempted to raise inflation, this elasticity decreases which tends to encourage the fiscal
authority to borrow even more and might reduce household welfare.
The main finding of this chapter is that an economy with a more conservative central
bank ends up with more debt, more frequent default events and lower inflation. Monetary
conservatism can thus successfully reduce the inflation bias. This success comes how-
ever at a cost. By lowering expected inflation and hence nominal interest rates, it makes
debt accumulation more attractive for the fiscal authority and thereby exposes the econ-
omy more often to sovereign debt crises since the incentive to default increases with debt.
By reducing the time-inconsistency problem related to inflation, it aggravates the time-
inconsistency problem related to sovereign default. The resulting increase in sovereign
risk leads to more sensitive interest rates which in turn make it more costly to smooth
government spending in response to bad fiscal shocks. As a result, fiscal policy becomes
more volatile when the degree of monetary conservatism is increased. A welfare compar-
ison reveals that the benefits of lower and more stable inflation outweigh the welfare costs
of experiencing higher average debt, more frequent debt crises and more volatile fiscal
policy.
This chapter is related to three strands of literature. First, it is related to recent papers
that study central bank independence in the presence of nominal government debt and
lack of commitment. In particular, it relates to Niemann (2011) who studies a Markov-
perfect policy game between a monetary conservative central bank and a myopic fiscal
authority, using the cash-in-advance model of Nicolini (1998). In his model, the fiscal
authority has a lower discount factor than society and does not internalize the effect of
its borrowing decision on future policy. When nominal debt is the only source of the
time-inconsistency problem, he shows that monetary conservatism backfires. While it
lowers average inflation when the degree of monetary conservatism is sufficiently high, it
41
encourages the fiscal authority to borrow more in the long run, decreasing welfare. Other
related papers are Niemann et al. (2013b) and Martin (2014) who also investigate central
bank independence in models with nominal debt and lack of commitment but abstract
from monetary conservatism.1 All of these papers do not consider sovereign default,
micro-founded political distortions and uncertainty.
Second, this chapter is related to the recent literature on sovereign default and in-
complete markets (see e.g. Aguiar and Amador, 2014, for details). Within this growing
literature, the studies that are closest to this chapter are Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), Du
and Schreger (2015) and Nun˜o and Thomas (2015). The former paper introduces polit-
ical polarization and turnover risk into the sovereign default model of Arellano (2008),
showing that such political frictions make policy makers act in a more impatient man-
ner. In this chapter, the economy faces similar political distortions. Du and Schreger
(2015) develop a quantitative sovereign default model in which a government can reduce
the real debt burden by raising inflation (and thereby depreciate the domestic currency)
at the cost of hurting the balance sheet of domestic firms which issue debt denominated
in foreign currency and earn revenues in local currency. Nun˜o and Thomas (2015) study
a continuous-time model in which a policy maker borrows from abroad and monetary
policy is either chosen under discretion or always following a zero-inflation policy that
is not responsive to the state of the economy. In contrast to this chapter, they consider
a benevolent policy maker. As in this chapter, they also find that the economy is better
off when the government is not tempted to reduce the real debt burden via inflation. The
authors also briefly consider the case of delegating monetary policy to a monetary con-
servative central bank but do not allow for political distortions and do not discuss how
disagreement between the fiscal and the monetary authority might affect outcomes.
Third, this chapter is related to Aguiar et al. (2013, 2015). Aguiar et al. (2013) study
a continuous-time model of discretionary monetary and fiscal policy where default events
are self-fulfilling in the spirit of Cole and Kehoe (2000). Building on this paper, Aguiar
et al. (2015) consider a model of a monetary union with a continuum of countries which
independently choose fiscal policy and a common central bank that is in charge of mon-
etary policy. They show the existence of a fiscal externality that encourages countries to
overborrow. In contrast to this chapter, the authors focus on benevolent policy makers and
thus do not allow for political frictions and varying degrees of central bank independence.
In addition, they abstract from fundamental uncertainty and only consider sunspot-driven
default events.2
1Adam and Billi (2008) study the role of monetary conservatism in a sticky price model with endogenous
fiscal policy but without public debt.
2Other recent papers that study the interaction between monetary policy and self-fulfilling sovereign
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model and
Section 2.3 discusses the main policy trade-offs. Section 2.4 presents the quantitative
model analysis. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
In the model, there is a small open economy and a continuum of risk-neutral foreign in-
vestors. The small open economy is inhabited by households and a government. The
government consists of two independent authorities: a central bank and a fiscal authority.
In the economy, there are two political parties that might be in charge of the fiscal au-
thority. These parties randomly enter and leave office, i.e. only one party chooses fiscal
policy in a given period.
2.2.1 Small Open Economy
Consider a small open economy that is inhabited by a unit-mass continuum of house-
holds. Time is discrete, indexed with t = 0,1,2, ... and goes on forever. Households have
preferences over private consumption ct and a public good gt , given by
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β tU˜ (ct ,gt)
]
, 0 < β < 1,
where the period utility function is given by
U˜ (ct ,gt) = ct +u(gt) ,
with ug (·) ,−ugg (·)> 0.3 Households face the period budget constraint
y = ct + τt +ψ(pit),
where y is a constant endowment that they receive in each period, τt are exogenous tax
payments and ψ(pit) are resource losses of inflation as in Calvo and Guidotti (1992) that
satisfy ψpi (·) ,ψpipi (·) > 0.4 The endowment y is in terms of a tradable good that will be
the numeraire in the model. Its international price is normalized to one.
debt crises are Araujo et al. (2013), Da-Rocha et al. (2013), Corsetti and Dedola (2014) and Bachetta et al.
(2015).
3The same quasi-linear household utility function is also used in Cole and Kehoe (2000).
4These resource losses could, for instance, be interpreted as price adjustment costs in the spirit of Rotem-
berg (1982).
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Using the period budget constraint to eliminate private household consumption and
dropping policy-invariant terms, welfare of the average citizen can be written as
U = E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β tU (gt ,pit)
]
,
with
U (gt ,pit) = u(gt)−ψ (pit) .
This welfare measure reflects the preferences of society and will be used to evaluate the
welfare properties of public policy.5
In the economy, a government is in charge of setting monetary and fiscal policy. This
government consists of two separate entities: a fiscal authority and a monetary authority
(from now on referred to as central bank). Both authorities re-optimize in each period
and cannot commit to future policies. Similar to Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), the fiscal
authority is controlled by either one of two political parties. These parties have symmetric
objectives and randomly enter and leave office. The objective of political party i ∈ I ≡
{1,2} is given by
Fi = E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β tUFi (gt ,pit)
]
,
where
UFi (gt ,pit) = θ˜itu(gt)−ψ (pit) ,
with θ˜it = θ > 1 if party i is in office and θ˜it = 1 if it is not.
In each period, the fiscal authority chooses the supply of the public good, trades one-
period bonds with foreign investors and decides on whether to repay outstanding debt
or not. As in Aguiar and Amador (2011), both political parties place a higher weight θ
on the utility derived from the public good when they are in office.6 While the political
parties disagree about the value of the public good, there is no disagreement about the
cost of inflation ψ(pit). However, θ˜it leads to disagreement about the optimal inflation
rate between the two parties since the incumbent party places a lower relative weight on
the cost of inflation ψ(pit).7
As argued by Aguiar and Amador (2011), the weight θ˜it can be interpreted in sev-
5Aguiar et al. (2013, 2015) and Nun˜o and Thomas (2015) directly assume a utility cost of inflation.
6Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) consider a model with two population groups where each group is favored
by one of two potentially ruling parties.
7Aisen and Veiga (2005) document a positive relationship between political instability and average
inflation. The fiscal authority’s lower relative emphasis on price stability compared to society is consistent
with this pattern.
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eral ways. For instance, it can represent disagreement between the two political parties
about the implementation of public policy, leading to a higher marginal utility of public
consumption for the incumbent political party since it can carry out its desired policy. Al-
ternatively, the assumption θ > 1 can be viewed as a shortcut for the incumbent’s ability
to divert public funds into its own pocket via pork-barrel spending (see e.g. Battaglini and
Coate, 2008) or corruption.
For simplicity, I assume that the political parties have completely symmetric objec-
tives. In addition, once in office, the probability of being in office in the next period µ
is the same for both parties.8 These assumptions imply that - for the recursive model
formulation below - there is no need to keep track of which particular party is in office
since they will choose the same policies in a symmetric equilibrium. To smooth public
spending across states, the government can trade nominal and real one-period bonds with
risk-neutral foreign investors. These bonds are non-state contingent and defaultable, i.e.
the fiscal authority can refuse to repay bondholders. Following the recent sovereign de-
fault literature, a default is costly because of direct resource costs and a temporary loss of
access to international financial markets (see e.g. Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006, or Arellano,
2008).
The presence of political disagreement and turnover risk leads the fiscal authority to
exhibit a present bias that makes it behave similarly to a decision maker who discounts
in a quasi-geometric fashion (see Laibson, 1997, Krusell et al., 2002).9 As a result, it is
effectively less patient than a policy maker who does not face the risk of leaving office.
In the context of the model, increased impatience implies that the fiscal authority has an
incentive to front-load public spending by either borrowing more or defaulting on debt
payments. In any period, the costs associated with these policies are (partly) borne in
the future, either through increases in the primary surplus or temporary financial autarky.
When less patient, these costs are discounted more by the fiscal authority, making bor-
rowing and default more attractive policy options. It is important to note that the strength
of the present bias varies with the state of the economy. The present bias of the fiscal
authority in this chapter thus is different from that of a policy maker who simply has a
low discount factor β relative to the lenders (see Niemann, 2011, and Aguiar et al., 2014).
If the fiscal authority repays its debt, the period government budget constraint is
Ptτt +qNtBNt+1+PtqRtbRt+1 ≥ Ptgt +BNt +PtbRt ,
8On average, a newly appointed incumbent thus spends 1/(1−µ) subsequent periods in office.
9Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) were the first to recognize that polit-
ical polarization and turnover risk lead to a present bias. Aguiar and Amador (2011) and Chatterjee and
Eyigungor (2014) show in detail how quasi-geometric discounting can result in such a political economy
model when when µ = 0.5.
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where Pt is the price level, qNt the price of nominal bonds BNt+1 and qRt the price of real
bonds bRt+1. Tax revenues τt are random and follow a first-order Markov process with
continuous support T⊆ R+.10
I consider exogenous tax revenues for three reasons.11 First, for many countries it is
difficult, if not virtually impossible, to quickly change the tax code in the short run. By
contrast, sudden adjustments of public spending tend to be easier to carry out in practice.
Second, since the sovereign default literature mostly considers endowment economies
(see e.g. Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006, or Arellano, 2008), a setting that models public
resources also as an endowment makes it easier to relate the model to this literature.
Third, the numerical solution of the model is quite difficult as it involves solving the
decision problems of two distinct authorities. Abstracting from the tax rate as a decision
variable for the fiscal authority substantially reduces the computational burden.
In real terms, the budget constraint is
τt +qNtbNt+1+qRtbRt+1 ≥ gt +pi−1t bNt +bRt ,
with (gross) inflation pit = Pt/Pt−1 and normalized nominal debt bNt = BNt/Pt−1. The
initial price level P−1 ∈ (0,∞) is taken as given. For tractability reasons, I assume that
nominal debt issuance bNt+1 always accounts for a fixed share λ ∈ [0,1] of total debt
bt+1 = bNt+1 + bRt+1.12 In the repayment case, the government budget constraint then
becomes
τt +(λqNt +(1−λ )qRt)bt+1 ≥ gt +
(
λpi−1t +1−λ
)
bt ,
while in the default case, it is
τt−φ(τt)≥ gt ,
where φ(τt)≥ 0 are (public) resource costs of default. In the sovereign default literature,
such resource costs are standard but modeled in terms of aggregate output and not in terms
of public funds (see e.g. Arellano, 2008). One interpretation for public resource costs is
that they result from the abandonment of public projects which leads to net losses for the
government. Another interpretation is that in the default case, the country experiences
10I will occasionally refer to shocks to tax revenues as fiscal shocks.
11In the context of a real economy without default but with private government information, Halac and
Yared (2014) also look at a fiscal policy maker who exhibits a present bias and finances the supply of a
public good with exogenous tax revenues and borrowing.
12Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) make a similar assumption in a model with long-term debt. They
keep the debt maturity structure fixed and let the sovereign choose the level of debt. In this chapter, it is
the currency composition of debt that is kept constant. I allow for a nominal debt share that is not equal to
one to compare the effects of changing the currency composition of debt with the effects of changing the
monetary policy stance.
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a decline in tax morale which makes it more difficult for the government to collect tax
payments. As a result, it has to spend additional resources on tax enforcement to raise a
given amount of revenues τt .
Monetary policy is controlled by the central bank. I assume that the central bank can
directly choose the inflation rate by setting its policy instruments in an appropriate way.
Reflecting its independence, the central bank’s objective may differ from that of the fiscal
authority:
M= E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β tUM (gt ,pit)
]
,
where
UM (gt ,pit) = u(gt)−αψ (pit) ,
with α ≥ 0.
Following the literature (see Rogoff, 1985, Adam and Billi, 2008, and Niemann,
2011), monetary policy is delegated to a monetary conservative central banker who has
the same preferences as the average citizen, except that he has an inherent distaste for in-
flation: UM (gt ,pit) =U (gt ,pit)− (α−1)ψ (pit). The parameter α is the central banker’s
degree of monetary conservatism.13 For α > 1 (α < 1), the central banker values price
stability more (less) than society. Since the economy (partly) borrows in its own cur-
rency, the central bank can reduce the real debt burden and relax the government budget
by raising inflation. The temptation to do so strongly depends on α . In contrast to the
fiscal policy maker, the central banker is not subject to political risk and remains in power
forever. Importantly, the central banker also does not derive additional utility from the
public good like the incumbent political party. In the economy, the degree of central bank
independence thus is characterized by the central bank’s monetary conservatism and its
independence from political economy considerations. For α = αθ ≡ 1/θ , the central
bank puts the same relative weights on u(g) and ψ(pi) than the fiscal authority. This case
will be a useful benchmark since it implies that the main source of disagreement between
the fiscal and the monetary authority is the fiscal authority’s deficit bias.
The interaction between the political parties, which determines the actions of the fis-
cal authority, and the interaction between the fiscal authority and the central bank is mod-
eled as a Markov-perfect game (see e.g. Niemann et al., 2013b). As is common in the
literature, I restrict attention to stationary equilibria. In a stationary Markov-perfect equi-
librium, the policy functions that characterize the optimal decisions of the two authorities
only depend on the minimal payoff-relevant state, which includes the beginning-of-period
13Aguiar et al. (2013) refer to this parameter as ”inflation credibility” in a model without delegated
monetary policy.
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debt position bt .14 As in Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), I only study symmetric equilibria in
which the two political parties choose the same policies when in power, given the aggre-
gate state. This way, fiscal policy does not depend on which party is in office. Because
the two authorities optimize under discretion, they do not internalize the effect of their ac-
tions on previous periods and have no incentive to honor promises made by policy makers
in the past. As a result, they cannot credibly commit to carry out specific actions in the
future and take the policies set in the subsequent period as given. However, since these
policies will depend on the future aggregate state, the authorities can influence the way
public policy is conducted in the future via the debt position bt+1.
Conditional on entering a period with debt bt , the within-period timing is as follows.
First, the revenue shock τt is realized and the office-holder is determined. Then, the fiscal
authority chooses whether to repay its debt. After this, the central bank sets the inflation
rate, followed by the fiscal authority’s spending and borrowing decisions. Conditional
on the default decision, the two authorities thus play a Stackelberg game with the central
bank acting as the Stackelberg leader. This particular timing is chosen for two reasons.
First, it implies that the central bank is not powerless and can influence the decisions
of the fiscal authority via the inflation rate. If the fiscal authority were the Stackelberg
leader and made all its decisions before the central bank acts, it could effectively also
control the inflation rate since the central bank would have no other choice than to set the
inflation rate that satisfies the budget constraint.15 Second, the value and policy functions
are not generally differentiable due to the discrete default option, which implies that the
intertemporal decisions might not be characterized via Euler equations as in Niemann et
al. (2013b) or Martin (2014). The Stackelberg leadership timing allows to solve the model
numerically by sequentially solving the decision problems of the two authorities in any
period, given the respective aggregate state at the beginning of the period (see Appendix
2.A.2 for details).
2.2.2 International Investors
The small open economy can trade non-state contingent nominal and real bonds with
a continuum of homogeneous risk-neutral foreign investors who can borrow and save
14Since the optimal strategies are only conditioned on the current payoff-relevant (fundamental) state of
the economy, the Markov-perfect equilibrium concept rules out reputational considerations as discussed by
Barro and Gordon (1983a) that rely on trigger strategies which require strategies to exhibit complex history
dependence.
15Alternatively, one could follow Niemann et al. (2013b) and assume that the fiscal authority chooses
public spending but not borrowing. The end-of-period debt position then is determined residually to satisfy
the budget constraint, given the spending and inflation decisions of the fiscal authority and the central bank.
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on international financial markets at the real risk-free rate r f . Although the small open
economy may refuse to repay its debt, investors always honor their obligations. Risk
neutrality and expected profit maximization imply the bond pricing conditions
qN
(
b′,τ
)
=
1
1+ r f
Eτ ′|τ
[
1−D(b′,τ ′)
Πr (b′,τ ′)
]
, (2.1)
qR
(
b′,τ
)
=
1
1+ r f
Eτ ′|τ
[
1−D(b′,τ ′)] . (2.2)
The bond price schedules qN (b′,τ) and qR (b′,τ) reflect rational expectations of future
default and inflation. Given the focus on Markov-perfect public policy, next period’s
default and inflation policies D(·) and Πr(·) depend on end-of-period debt b′ as well
as future tax revenues τ ′. Following the sovereign default literature (see e.g. Arellano,
2008), I assume that the investors act after all public policies have been determined. As a
result, the central bank and the fiscal authority anticipate how their decisions affect bond
prices.
2.2.3 Public Policy
Conditional on having access to financial markets, the beginning-of-period value of the
central bank is denoted asM(s), that of an incumbent as F(s) and that of a party not in
office as F∗(s), where s≡ (b,τ).16
The default decision of the fiscal authority solves
F(b,τ) = max
d∈{0,1}
{
(1−d)F r(b,τ)+dFd(τ)
}
, (2.3)
where F r(b,τ) is the value of repayment and Fd(τ) the value of default.
The beginning-of-period values of the central bank and the political party currently
not in office satisfy
M(b,τ) = (1−D(b,τ))Mr(b,τ)+D(b,τ)Md(τ), (2.4)
F∗(b,τ) = (1−D(b,τ))F∗r(b,τ)+D(b,τ)F∗d(τ), (2.5)
where D(b,τ) characterizes the optimal default decision of the fiscal authority.
16In addition to s = (b,τ), whether the economy is in financial autarky or not also counts as a state
variable in the model. The model formulation below accounts for this by formulating the public policy
problem conditional on the economy’s default/autarky status.
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After the default decision has been made, the central bank acts, solving
Mr(b,τ) = max
pi≥pimin
{Mˆr(pi,b,τ)} , (2.6)
if the fiscal authority repays and
Md(τ) = max
pi≥pimin
{
Mˆd(pi,τ)
}
, (2.7)
if it defaults. The lower bound on the inflation rate pimin = 1/(1+r f ) ensures non-negative
nominal interest rates (qN ≤ 1). The value functions Mˆr(pi,b,τ) and Mˆd(pi,τ) are the
intra-period continuation values for the central bank. They are determined below and
depend on how the fiscal authority sets its policies, given the inflation rate pi .
For the political parties, the repayment and default values satisfy
F r(b,τ) = Fˆ r(Πr (b,τ) ,b,τ), (2.8)
Fd(τ) = Fˆd(Πd (τ) ,τ), (2.9)
F∗r(b,τ) = Fˆ∗r(Πr (b,τ) ,b,τ), (2.10)
F∗d(τ) = Fˆ∗d(Πd (τ) ,τ), (2.11)
where Πr (b,τ) and Πd (τ) denote the policy functions for inflation that solve the central
bank’s decision problem, Fˆ r(pi,b,τ) and Fˆd(pi,τ) the intra-period continuation values for
the incumbent party, and Fˆ∗r(pi,b,τ) and Fˆ∗d(pi,τ) the intra-period continuation values
for the party not in office. When choosing whether to default or repay, the fiscal authority
thus internalizes how its default decision affects the inflation rate.
After the central bank has set the inflation rate, the fiscal authority makes its spending
and borrowing decisions. Its decision problem is given by
Fˆ r(pi,b,τ) = max
g,b′

θu(g)−ψ(pi)
+βEτ ′|τ
[
µF(b′,τ ′)
+(1−µ)F∗(b′,τ ′)
]  (2.12)
subject to 0 ≤ τ−g− (λpi−1+1−λ)b+[ λqN (b′,τ)
+(1−λ )qR (b′,τ)
]
b′,
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in the repayment case and by
Fˆd(pi,τ) = max
g

θu(g)−ψ(pi)
+δβEτ ′|τ
[
µF(0,τ ′)
+(1−µ)F∗(0,τ ′)
]
+(1−δ )βEτ ′|τ
[
µFd(τ ′)
+(1−µ)F∗d(τ ′)
]

(2.13)
subject to 0 ≤ τ−g−φ(τ),
in the default case.
If the fiscal authority reneges on debt payments, it is excluded from international
financial markets for the current period. Conditional on being in autarky, the economy re-
gains access to international financial markets with probability δ in the following period.
The average duration of financial autarky hence is 1/δ periods. Regardless of whether
the party currently in charge of fiscal policy defaults or repays, it remains in office in
the subsequent period with probability µ and is replaced by the opposite party with the
counter-probability 1−µ .
For the central bank, the intra-period continuation values Mˆr(pi,b,τ) and Mˆd(pi,τ)
satisfy
Mˆr(pi,b,τ) =
{
u(Gˆr(pi,b,τ))−αψ(pi)
+βEτ ′|τ
[M(Bˆr(pi,b,τ),τ ′)]
}
, (2.14)
and
Mˆd(pi,τ) =
{
u(Gˆd(pi,τ))−αψ(pi)
+βEτ ′|τ
[
δM(0,τ ′)+(1−δ )Md(τ ′)]
}
, (2.15)
and for the party not in office, the continuation values Fˆ∗r(pi,b,τ) and Fˆ∗d(pi,τ) satsify
Fˆ∗r(pi,b,τ) =

u(Gˆr(pi,b,τ))−ψ(pi)
+βEτ ′|τ
[
µF∗(Bˆr(pi,b,τ),τ ′)
+(1−µ)F(Bˆr(pi,b,τ),τ ′)
]  , (2.16)
and
Fˆ∗d(pi,τ) =

u(Gˆd(pi,τ))−ψ(pi)
+δβEτ ′|τ
[
µF∗(0,τ ′)
(1−µ)F(0,τ ′)
]
+(1−δ )βEτ ′|τ
[
µF∗d(τ ′)
(1−µ)Fd(τ ′)
]

, (2.17)
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where Bˆr(pi,b,τ), Gˆr(pi,b,τ) and Gˆd(pi,τ) denote the policy functions for borrowing and
government spending that solve the fiscal authority’s decision problems (2.12) and (2.13).
These functions characterize the fiscal authority’s optimal response to the inflation rate pi
set by the central bank. The probabilities µ and 1−µ do not enter the continuation values
of the central bank Mˆr and Mˆd since future fiscal policy does not depend on which of
the political parties will be in office. The objective of the central bank does not vary with
the office-holder of the fiscal authority either.
Equations (2.14) and (2.15) illustrate that inflation affects the objective of the central
bank in two ways. First, there is a direct effect of pi on the cost of inflation ψ(pi). Second,
there is an indirect effect that operates through the optimal response functions of the
fiscal authority. When solving the decision problems (2.6) and (2.7), the central bank
internalizes both of these effects.
The policy functions for inflation Πr (b,τ) and Πd (τ) then determine
Br(b,τ) = Bˆr(Πr (b,τ) ,b,τ), (2.18)
Gr(b,τ) = Gˆr(Πr (b,τ) ,b,τ), (2.19)
Gd(τ) = Gˆd(Πd (τ) ,τ), (2.20)
such that in the repayment case, the equilibrium policies will only depend on (b,τ) and in
the default/autarky case on τ , since the inflation choices are conditioned on these states
as well.
Conditional on having access to financial markets, the equilibrium policies are ulti-
mately pinned down by the fiscal authority’s default decision, such that
Π(b,τ) = (1−D(b,τ))Πr(b,τ)+D(b,τ)Πd(τ), (2.21)
B(b,τ) = (1−D(b,τ))Br(b,τ), (2.22)
G(b,τ) = (1−D(b,τ))Gr(b,τ)+D(b,τ)Gd(τ). (2.23)
The Markov-perfect equilibrium for the model is then defined as follows:
Definition 2. A stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium is given by bond pricing func-
tions qN and qR that satisfy the zero-expected profit conditions (2.1)-(2.2), value functions{F ,F r,Fd, Fˆ r, Fˆd,F∗,F∗r,F∗d, Fˆ∗r, Fˆ∗d,M,Mr,Md,Mˆr,Mˆd} that satisfy the equa-
tions (2.3)-(2.17) and policy functions
{
Π,Πr,Πd,B,Br, Bˆr,D,G,Gr,Gd, Gˆr, Gˆd} that sat-
isfy the conditions (2.1)-(2.2), (2.4)-(2.5), (2.8)-(2.11), (2.14)-(2.17) and (2.18)-(2.23).
The functions
{
Πr,Πd
}
furthermore solve the policy problems of the central bank (2.6)-
(2.7) and the functions
{Bˆr,D, Gˆr, Gˆd} solve the policy problems of the fiscal authority
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(2.3), (2.12)-(2.13).
2.3 Policy Trade-Offs
Before moving to the quantitative analysis, it is helpful to first take a look at the first-order
conditions for the fiscal authority and the central bank to understand the forces that drive
policy making in the model. In this section, I will abstract from default and consider a
model version where the fiscal authority always repays. The quantitative evaluation in
Section 2.4 will then consider the full model of the previous section with default. Without
default, the policy and value functions do not need to carry an index d or r since the fiscal
authority always repays
Interior solutions to the public policy problems then satisfy the generalized Euler
equations (GEEs)
0 = θug (g)∆q (2.24)
−µβEτ ′|τ
[
θug
(
g′
)
∆′λ −∆′θ
∂Π(b′,τ ′)
∂b′
]
+(1−µ)βEτ ′|τ
[
ug
(
g′
) ∂G(b′,τ ′)
∂b′
−ψpi(pi ′)∂Π(b
′,τ ′)
∂b′
]
−µβEτ ′|τ
[
θug
(
g′
)
∆′q
∂B(b′,τ ′)
∂b′
]
+(2µ−1)βEτ ′|τ
[
βEτ ′′|τ ′
[
θug
(
g′′
)
∆′′λ −∆′′θ
∂Π(b′′,τ ′′)
∂b′′
]
∂B(b′,τ ′)
∂b′
]
,
and
0 = ug (g)∆q
∂ Bˆ(pi,b,τ)
∂pi
+∆α (2.25)
−βEτ ′|τ
ug (g′)∆′λ −∆′α
∂Π(b′,τ ′)
∂b′
−
∂B(b′,τ ′)
∂b′
∂ Bˆ(pi ′,b′,τ ′)
∂pi ′
 ∂ Bˆ(pi,b,τ)
∂pi
,
with
∆λ ≡ λpi−1+1−λ ,
∆q ≡ λqN
(
b′,τ
)
+(1−λ )qR
(
b′,τ
)
+
(
λ
∂qN (b′,τ)
∂b′
+(1−λ ) ∂qR (b
′,τ)
∂b′
)
b′,
∆θ ≡ θug (g)λpi−2b−ψpi(pi),
∆α ≡ ug (g)λpi−2b−αψpi(pi).
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Condition (2.24) characterizes the optimal borrowing decision of the fiscal authority,
whereas (2.25) is the optimality condition for the inflation rate set by the central bank.17
As a benchmark, it is useful to first look at the optimality conditions
ug (g)∆q = βEτ ′|τ
[
ug
(
g′
)
∆′λ
]
, (2.26)
ug (g)λpi−2b = ψpi(pi), (2.27)
which characterize the optimal borrowing and inflation decisions for a benevolent govern-
ment that also lacks commitment and is in charge of setting monetary and fiscal policy.
These conditions also apply when the fiscal authority and the central bank both are benev-
olent and jointly choose fiscal and monetary policy.
The government wants to trade non-state contingent bonds to smooth the impact of
fiscal shocks on public consumption (see condition (2.26)). The marginal revenues ob-
tained by borrowing more today are given by ∆q. Due to lack of commitment, they do
not equal average revenues λqN (b′,τ)+(1−λ )qR (b′,τ). The reason for this is that bond
prices respond to the amount of borrowing because expected inflation depends on next
period’s debt position b′. This effect is captured by the derivatives ∂qN (b′,τ)/∂b′ and
∂qR (b′,τ)/∂b′ and is internalized by the fiscal authority when choosing end-of-period
debt b′. Note that without default, ∂qR (b′,τ)/∂b′ = 0 holds.
In a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium, current and future inflation rates are gov-
erned by the same policy functions, reflecting that, in each period, inflation is chosen
in the same way, given the aggregate state. For the current period, condition (2.27) de-
picts the trade-off involved when setting the optimal inflation rate without commitment.
When the government inherits positive nominal debt λb, it wants to reduce real debt pay-
ments to free resources for public spending (LHS). The optimal inflation rate equates
these marginal benefits of inflation to the marginal costs of inflation ψpi(pi). Since the
government optimizes sequentially, it does not internalize that an increase in pi addition-
ally affects the nominal bond price in the previous period in an adverse way. The failure to
internalize this effect is the source of the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy
in the model. As the temptation to raise inflation increases with the nominal debt position
λb, expected inflation is an increasing function of end-of-period debt b′. This implies
that the elasticity of the nominal bond price schedule with respect to b′ is negative, which
tends to discourage the government from borrowing and impedes its ability to respond to
(adverse) fiscal shocks by issuing bonds.
While nominal debt introduces a time-inconsistency problem that can increase the cost
17The derivation of these conditions can be found in Appendix 2.A.1.
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of borrowing, it also has potential benefits. When only non-state contingent bonds can
be issued, the debt contract does not specify future debt payments conditional on future
fiscal shocks. Inflation offers a very flexible way of adjusting payments in response to
fluctuating tax revenues, making nominal debt a potentially useful hedge against bad fiscal
shocks.18 This hedging property of nominal government debt is captured by the RHS of
the Euler equation (2.26). When only real debt is issued (λ = 0), the (marginal) debt
payment that the government will have to make in the next period ∆′λ does not change with
the realization of τ ′. By contrast, when the public debt portfolio involves nominal debt
(λ > 0), real payments (negatively) depend on future inflation pi ′. Since the government
will tend to increase inflation in response to adverse fiscal shocks, i.e. when τ is low
and ug(g) is high, the effective debt payment will decline exactly when public resources
are scarce. Of course, this state-contingency of real debt payments will be anticipated by
rational investors, who demand to be compensated for this inflation risk, and therefore
comes at a cost.
Now consider the case without political frictions (θ = µ = 1) but with disagreement
between the fiscal authority and the central bank (α 6= 1). In this case, the first-order
condition for the fiscal authority is given by
ug (g)∆q = βEτ ′|τ
[
ug
(
g′
)
∆′λ −∆′θ
∂Π(b′,τ ′)
∂b′
]
, (2.28)
whereas the optimality condition for the central bank is given by (2.25).
The expressions ∆α and ∆θ measure the net marginal gains of inflation from the per-
spective of the central bank and the fiscal authority, respectively. If the fiscal authority and
the central bank agree on the optimal inflation rate (α = 1/θ = 1), ∆α = ∆θ = 0 as well as
(2.27) hold. If there is however disagreement about the optimal inflation rate (α 6= 1/θ ),
∆α 6= ∆θ holds and the two authorities use their policy instruments to strategically ma-
nipulate the policies chosen by the other authority. By comparing (2.28) to (2.26), one
can see that disagreement about future inflation - as measured by ∆′θ - introduces a wedge
into the first-order condition (2.26), distorting public consumption smoothing.19 The size
of this wedge depends on ∂Π(b′,τ ′)/∂b′, i.e. on the response of future inflation to an
increase in borrowing. As argued above, this derivative tends to be positive which implies
that if, from the perspective of the fiscal authority, the expected marginal benefits of infla-
tion exceed the respective marginal costs (∆′θ > 0), the fiscal authority has an incentive to
18The hedging benefit of nominal government debt is discussed in detail by Bohn (1988). The hedging
benefit of long-term debt relative to short-term debt is highlighted by Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012)
for a sovereign default model with real debt only.
19Similar wedges can be found in Niemann (2011) and Martin (2014).
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increase borrowing to reduce the gap ∆′θ . Similarly, the central bank has an incentive to
use inflation to distort the borrowing decision of the fiscal authority (see condition (2.25)).
In contrast to (2.27), the inflation choice now also involves intertemporal considerations
because the central bank has an incentive to influence the borrowing decision of the fiscal
authority in the current period via the inflation rate.
If, in addition to disagreement between the fiscal authority and the central bank (α 6=
1/θ ), there are also political frictions (θ > 1, µ < 1), the first-order condition for the
fiscal authority changes from (2.28) to (2.24). It can be thought of as a version of the GEE
derived in Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) for the case with default, extended to incorporate
monetary-fiscal policy interactions as in Niemann (2011) or Martin (2014). As in Cuadra
and Sapriza (2008), the existence of political disagreement (θ > 1) and turnover risk
(µ < 1) affects the borrowing decision of the fiscal authority via three effects.20 The first
effect is captured by the second term on the RHS of (2.24) and is referred to as ”impatience
effect” by Cuadra and Sapriza (2008). Because the incumbent party only stays in office
with probability µ , it discounts the expected marginal costs of debt repayment more than
without turnover risk. As a result, it is encouraged to front-load public consumption by
borrowing more in the current period.
The third term on the RHS of (2.24) displays what Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) call the
”disagreement effect”. With probability 1−µ , the opposite party takes over office in the
subsequent period. In this case, the implemented fiscal policy will be different from what
the party currently in office would prefer since it will have a lower marginal valuation of
the public good when it is not in power anymore. In the current period, the incumbent
party then uses borrowing as a strategic device to manipulate future fiscal policy set by
the opposite political party in case there is a change in power. More specifically, the
incumbent party increases borrowing (or reduces savings) to leave less financial resources
for the other party to spend on public spending in the next period.
The last two terms on the RHS of (2.24) capture the third effect by which political
frictions affect the fiscal authority’s borrowing decision. It shows that there is not only
disagreement about future public spending - as captured by the ”disagreement effect”
above - but also about future borrowing. While the role of this effect for the borrowing
decision of today’s incumbent party is not clear ex ante, the two other effects tend to lead
the fiscal authority to borrow more relative to a scenario without political frictions.
Having nominal and real debt in the model allows me to highlight the different im-
plications that a more conservative central bank and a lower nominal debt share have for
public policy. Although both of these changes tend to reduce the temptation to lower the
20The description of these effects follows Cuadra and Sapriza (2008, p. 84).
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real debt burden via inflation, they do so in different ways. Whereas λ affects the gains of
inflation, α impacts on the costs of inflation as perceived by the central bank. Obviously,
setting α → ∞ or λ = 0 delivers the same allocation with full price stability since mone-
tary policy does not respond to the debt position at all. For the remaining cases λ ∈ (0,1]
and α ∈ [0,∞) however, public policy is affected differently.
To see this, consider the optimality conditions (2.26) and (2.27) associated with the
benevolent government as the starting point. If monetary policy is delegated and α > 1
holds, the temptation to use inflation for a given debt position declines. This effect comes
however at the expense of disagreement between the (benevolent) fiscal authority and the
monetary conservative central bank about the cost of inflation and thus about the optimal
inflation rate, i.e. ∆θ > ∆α . This disagreement distorts the borrowing decision of the
fiscal authority (see condition (2.28)) which then feeds back into decision of the central
bank (see condition (2.25)). By contrast, a reduction in the nominal debt share λ reduces
the incentive to resort to inflation by reducing the gains of inflation as perceived by both
authorities, ug (g)λpi−2b. As a result, a reduction in λ does not have the negative side
effects associated with an increase in α . With political frictions (θ > 1), there always is
disagreement between the fiscal authority and the central bank about the inflation rate for
α 6= αθ such that the differences between an increase in α and a decrease in λ are not as
clear.
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
After having discussed the main forces of the model in the previous section, this sec-
tion presents a quantitative analysis of the model’s properties when the fiscal authority
may default on its debt. Section 2.4.1 is concerned with model specification. Section
2.4.2 presents simulation results for different model versions. Section 2.4.3 evaluates the
welfare properties of different monetary policy regimes. Appendix 2.A.2 provides com-
putational details about the numerical solution of the model.
2.4.1 Model Specification
This section discusses how the model is specified.
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Functional Forms
For the objective functions, an iso-elastic utility function
u(g) =
{
g1−γ
1−γ if γ 6= 1
lng if γ = 1
and quadratic inflation costs
ψ(pi) =
χ
2
(pi−1)2 , χ > 0,
are used.21
Following Arellano (2008), I adopt an asymmetric specification for the resource costs
of default:
φ(τ) = max{0,τ− τ˜} .
This default cost specification implies that the resource costs of default increase overpro-
portionally with tax revenues. As a result, default is particularly attractive in bad states,
i.e. when tax revenues are low, which is a feature that is both intuitive and empirically
plausible (see Tomz and Wright, 2007).
Finally, tax revenues follow a log-normal AR(1)-process:
τt = τ
ρ
t−1 exp(σεt) , εt
i.i.d.∼ N (0,1).
Parameters
The model is calibrated under the assumption that there is no central bank independence
and monetary policy is directly set by the party currently in office, which is not benevolent
due to θ > 1 and µ < 1. Section 2.4.2 will then look at how different monetary policy
regimes affect public policy relative to this scenario. In particular, I will consider α-values
relative to α¯ = 1/θ . If α = αθ , the central bank and the fiscal authority put the same
relative weights on u(g) and ψ(pi), such that the main source of disagreement between
the two authorities is the present bias of the fiscal authority.
One model period corresponds to one quarter. The parameters are set as follows. For
γ , a standard value of 2 is used. The value for the real risk-free rate r f = 0.017 is taken
from Arellano (2008). The probability of reentry δ is set to 0.1 as in Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006). Following Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), the probability of remaining in power µ
21This inflation cost function implies that positive (pi > 1) and negative (pi < 1) deviations from full price
stability are costly.
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is set to 0.9. For the inflation cost parameter χ , the default cost parameter τ˜ and the
disagreement parameter θ , I use values of 1.53, 0.988 and 2.75 to match an annual de-
fault probability of roughly 1% and an average annual inflation rate of 20.68%. Loungani
and Swagel (2001) list average annual inflation rates for 53 developing economies for
the time period 1964-1998, documenting an average inflation rate of 16.4%. The focus
of this chapter is on economies that experience persistently high inflation rates. When
only economies that experienced inflation rates above 10 percent and below 50 percent
are considered, the average inflation rate goes up to 20.68% for the sample.22 An average
annual default probability of 1% means that the economy defaults once in 100 years. This
value implies that the government is not a notorious serial defaulter but that it defaults
frequently enough for sovereign risk to matter for the public borrowing conditions. For
the nominal debt share, I use an empirically plausible value of λ = 0.58.23 For the tax rev-
enue process, I set the persistence parameter ρ to 0.9 and calibrate the shock variance to
match the volatility of log-government spending for Mexico, which is a typical emerging
economy, resulting in the parameter value σ = 0.022.24
The household discount factor β is set to the investor discount factor 1/(1+ r f ), im-
plying that there is no long-run borrowing motive for the economy that is driven by its
impatience relative to foreign investors. Most quantitative sovereign default models use
discount factors that are much lower than 1/(1+ r f ).25 In these models, a high degree of
impatience is needed to make the government accumulate debt levels that are sufficiently
high to render default an attractive policy option. Such low discount factors can be mo-
tivated by referring to political economy distortions as modeled by Cuadra and Sapriza
(2008). For a strictly positive analysis, it might not be of first-order importance to explic-
itly model the source of the government’s impatience. A welfare analysis as performed
in this chapter should however consider the possibility that a government borrows due
to political frictions and not simply because its citizens are more impatient than foreign
investors.
22There are 21 countries left in their sample that fit these criteria. Only Argentina (78.4%), Brazil
(142.2%) and Peru (60.4%) experienced inflation rates above 50%.
23Du and Schreger (2015) list the share of external government debt that is issued in local currency for
14 emerging economies. In 2012, the average share for these economies was 57.99%.
24I use the quarterly time series for log real government expenditure provided Cuadra et al. (2010).
The time series have been seasonally adjusted via EViews’ multiplicative X-12 routine and filtered via
the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. The calculated standard deviation for
government expenditure is 0.03.
25For instance, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) consider a quarterly discount factor of 0.8.
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2.4.2 Simulation Results
The simulation results are shown in Table 2.1. It presents average statistics calculated
for a panel of 2500 simulated economies with 2000 periods each, where the first 500
observations of each sample were discarded to eliminate the impact of initial conditions.
The time series are filtered using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and a smoothing parameter
of 1600. The baseline scenario corresponds to the model version without central bank
independence. The main observations are that a higher degree of monetary conservatism
α is associated with an increase in average debt and the default probability as well as a
decline in inflation.
In a Markov-perfect equilibrium, the borrowing decision of the fiscal authority cru-
cially depends on how elastic the bond price schedules qN(b′,τ) and qR(b′,τ) respond to
changes in the level of future debt b′ (see Figure 2.1). This bond price elasticity reflects
the incentive to use inflation or default to reduce the real debt burden. As in Arellano
(2008), a default is more attractive in adverse states, i.e. when tax revenues are low
and/or debt is high. As a result, for such combinations the bond price schedules are lower
and more responsive to debt issuance, reflecting an increase in the probability of default.
Expected inflation is also higher in this case but default risk is the dominant force for
bond pricing and therefore the borrowing decision. This changes when tax revenues are
high and sovereign risk is low. Now, the nominal bond price schedule mostly reflects in-
flation risk while the real bond price hardly responds to b′ at all (for low and intermediate
borrowing levels). As debt increases, monetary policy will increase inflation to reduce
the real debt burden, not internalizing how this choice affects borrowing costs in the pre-
vious period. When the degree of monetary conservatism is increased, the central bank
is less tempted to use inflation to adjust debt payments which translates into a nominal
bond price schedule that is less responsive to the level of borrowing. This in turn encour-
ages the fiscal authority to borrow more in good times, leading to higher average debt, a
decline in average inflation and an increase in the default frequency since the incentive
to default increases with debt.26 As discussed in Section 2.3, disagreement between the
fiscal authority and the central bank about the marginal gains and costs of inflation might
also matter for the fiscal authority’s borrowing behavior. However, the contribution of
this channel is difficult to assess quantitatively in the presence of lack of commitment to
26Aguiar et al. (2014) make a related argument in a model of a small open (endowment) economy without
policy interaction between a fiscal and a monetary authority and (equilibrium) default. They also highlight
the link between the incentive to use inflation, the elasticity of the nominal interest rate and the evolution of
debt. Niemann (2011) also finds that increased monetary conservatism leads to increased debt accumulation
in a model where the fiscal authority is myopic and does not internalize its effect on future policies. He also
abstracts from sovereign default
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Baseline α = αθ α = 2αθ α = 3αθ α = 10αθ
Avg. default prob. (annual) 0.0087 0.0085 0.0155 0.0175 0.0192
Mean(b/τ) 0.0531 0.0519 0.0654 0.0684 0.0708
Mean(pi−1) (annual) 0.2095 0.2116 0.1322 0.0930 0.0291
Std(g)/Std(τ) 1.1041 1.0957 1.1956 1.2262 1.2614
Std(pi)/Std(τ) 1.3399 1.3118 1.2152 0.9516 0.3263
Welfare measure ω (in %) - 0.0005 0.0523 0.0789 0.1051
Table 2.1: Selected model statistics
debt repayment.
How does monetary conservatism affect the economy’s vulnerability to a sovereign
debt crisis? When the central bank is more conservative, one might expect that - for a
given state (b,τ) - it will be more attractive for the fiscal authority to default since the
central bank is less willing to reduce the real debt burden via inflation. However, this
reasoning ignores that the fiscal authority will also face lower nominal interest rates for a
given amount of debt issuance because the central bank’s tougher monetary policy stance
reduces expected inflation. These improved borrowing conditions might then encourage
the fiscal authority not to default, reducing the likelihood of such an event for a given
amount of debt. Figure 2.2 shows that the improvement in borrowing conditions indeed
reduces the attractiveness of default. It depicts the bond price schedules as well as the
inflation and borrowing policy functions for different degrees of monetary conservatism,
given that tax revenues are at their unconditional mean. The changes in the probability of
default can be observed by looking at the real bond price schedule which increases when
the degree of monetary conservatism goes up. While monetary conservatism reduces the
incentive to default for a given amount of debt, the economy still experiences more fre-
quent default events because of the bond price elasticity channel described in the previous
paragraph, which increases the average debt burden and as a result the fiscal authority’s
incentive to default.
When the central bank places the same relative weights on u(g) and ψ(pi) as the
fiscal authority (α = αθ ), its main incentive to deviate from the policy chosen in the
baseline scenario without central bank independence is to correct the deficit bias of the
fiscal authority. To do so, it chooses a higher inflation rate for a given debt and tax revenue
combination relative to the baseline scenario. This policy disciplines the fiscal authority’s
deficit bias in two ways. First, by reducing the real value of outstanding debt, the central
bank reduces the fiscal authority’s incentive to borrow by relaxing the government budget
constraint. Second, since this policy implies a tighter link between the debt position and
the inflation rate, the nominal bond price becomes more responsive to the debt position
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Figure 2.1: Bond price schedules and policy functions for inflation and borrowing in the
repayment case (α = αθ )
which additionally discourages the fiscal authority from issuing debt. Note that only the
first effect is internalized by the central bank, whereas the second effect is unintended.
As shown by Table 2.1, for α = αθ , the policy outcomes hardly differ compared to the
baseline scenario. Inflation slightly increases and debt accumulation declines a little bit,
leading to a small drop in the average default probability.
The degree of monetary conservatism also has important implications for the fiscal
authority’s ability to smooth government spending across states. When α is higher, a less
responsive nominal bond price leads to a higher average debt burden, which in turn in-
creases the likelihood of a debt crisis by making default more attractive. The increase in
sovereign risk raises the volatility of fiscal policy since borrowing becomes more expen-
sive in response to adverse shocks. The volatility of inflation can however successfully be
reduced.
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Figure 2.2: Bond price schedules and policy functions for inflation and borrowing in the
repayment case for different degrees of monetary conservatism (τ = E[τ])
Are the model implications presented in this section consistent with real world expe-
riences? An extreme but useful example which suggests that it might be is offered by the
recent Greek sovereign debt crisis that started in late 2009 (see Lane, 2012, for details).
By joining the European Monetary Union, Greece has adopted an extreme version of
central bank independence by delegating the control of monetary policy to the European
Central Bank. In doing so, it has gained access to improved borrowing conditions since
investors did not need to worry about inflation risk as much as before (see Aguiar et al.,
2014). The Greek government then has taken advantage of the low nominal interest rate
environment and experienced an increase in borrowing.27 Eventually, this development
27As emphasized by Buiter and Sibert (2005), low sovereign bond yields might also have been the result
of the European Central Bank’s willingness to accept Greek government bonds as risk-free collateral for
loans.
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came to an end after bad fiscal shocks led to solvency problems in the aftermath of the
financial crisis of 2008/09. While Greece is not an emerging economy, its recent history
still suggests that the mechanism described in this chapter is an empirically plausible one.
2.4.3 Welfare Analysis
Given the results of the previous section, the welfare effects of increasing the degree
of monetary conservatism are not obvious. While a higher value for α has the benefit
of lowering the mean and variance of inflation, it also leads to a higher average debt
burden and more frequent default events that are associated with temporary periods of
costly autarky. In addition, the increased volatility of public spending will tend to have an
adverse impact on household welfare as well.
To quantify the welfare implications of central bank independence, I calculate the
welfare measure ω . It is the percentage increase in public consumption that households
in an economy without central bank independence need to be given in each period to
achieve the same welfare as in the respective economy with monetary conservatism of
degree α , where household welfare is given by
U = E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β tU (gt ,pit)
]
,
with
U (gt ,pit) = u(gt)−ψ (pit) .
Table 2.1 shows that the computed values for ω are positive and increasing in α , with
values ranging from almost zero (α = αθ ) to 0.1% (α = 10αθ ).28 The benefits of mon-
etary conservatism (lower and more stable inflation) thus outweigh the associated costs
(more average debt, less average supply of the public good, more volatile fiscal policy),
leading to a small net welfare gain. The welfare analysis implies that the optimal degree
of monetary conservatism involves a central bank that does not respond to the state of the
economy and implements a constant inflation rate (α→ ∞). This result is consistent with
the findings of Nun˜o and Thomas (2015) who also show that the gains of eliminating the
time-inconsistency problem related to inflation dominate the costs of having a less flexible
monetary policy. However, this chapter shows that the superiority of such an unrespon-
sive monetary policy regime holds even when the fiscal authority is not benevolent and
28The unconditional expectation of discounted life-time utility U is calculated by computing the sum of
discounted simulated utilities for 2000 periods and taking the average value over 2500 samples, where the
first 500 observations are discarded for each sample to reduce the role of initial conditions.
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subject to political economy considerations.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has studied the effectiveness and desirability of monetary conservatism in a
quantitative model that accounts for three frictions that are important for many emerging
economies: (i) incomplete financial markets, (ii) default risk, and (iii) political distortions.
In the model, fiscal policy is set by a fiscal authority that cannot commit to future policy
and exhibits a deficit bias. Monetary policy is chosen by a central bank that also lacks
commitment and might care more about inflation than the fiscal authority and society. The
chapter has shown that the delegation of monetary policy to an inflation-averse central
bank successfully reduces average inflation but is associated with a higher average debt
burden, more frequent debt crises and more volatile fiscal policy. A welfare analysis has
shown that the costs associated with these adverse effects are outweighed by the benefits
of lower and more stable inflation.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 First-Order Conditions for the Policy Problems
I will first cover the decision problem of the central bank and then derive the first-order
condition associated with the fiscal policy problem.29 Before doing so, I introduce the
notation s≡ (b,τ) and sˆ≡ (pi,s).
GEE for the Central Bank
For an interior solution, the first-order condition for the central bank’s problem is
∂Mˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
= 0,
or
ug (g)
∂ Gˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
−αψpi(pi)+βEτ ′|τ
[
∂M(s′)
∂b′
]
∂ Bˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
= 0. (2.29)
For the central bank, the valueM(s) satisfies
M(s) = u(G(s))−αψ(Π(s))+βEτ ′|τ
[M(B(s),τ ′)] .
DifferentiatingM(s) with respect to b yields
∂M(s)
∂b
= ug (g)
∂G(s)
∂b
−αψpi(pi)∂Π(s)∂b +βEτ ′|τ
[
∂M(s′)
∂b′
]
∂B(s)
∂b
. (2.30)
By using the first-order condition (2.29) to replace βEτ ′|τ [∂M(s′)/∂b′] in condition
(2.30), one obtains
∂M(s)
∂b
= ug (g)
∂G(s)
∂b
−αψpi(pi)∂Π(s)∂b −
(
ug (g)
∂ Gˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
−αψpi(pi)
) ∂B(s)
∂b
∂ Bˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
.
By using the conditions
∂ Gˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
= λpi−2b+∆q
∂ Bˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
, (2.31)
∂G(s)
∂b
= λpi−2b
∂Π(s)
∂b
−∆λ +∆q
∂B(s)
∂b
, (2.32)
29The derivations are similar as in Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) and Niemann et al. (2013b) who derive
GEEs for related models with political frictions or monetary-fiscal policy interactions (see Section 2.1 for
details).
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which are derived by differentiating the government budget constraint with respect to pi
and b, this condition can further be rewritten as
∂M(s)
∂b
= ug (g)
(
λpi−2b
∂Π(s)
∂b
−∆λ +∆q
∂B(s)
∂b
)
−αψpi(pi)∂Π(s)∂b
−
(
ug (g)
(
λpi−2b+∆q
∂ Bˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
)
−αψpi(pi)
) ∂B(s)
∂b
∂ Bˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
,
or
∂M(s)
∂b
=−ug (g)∆λ +∆α
∂Π(s)
∂b
−
∂B(s)
∂b
∂ Bˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
 . (2.33)
As in Section 2.3, I use the definitions
∆α ≡ ug (g)λpi−2b−αψpi(pi),
∆λ ≡ λpi−1+1−λ ,
∆q ≡ λqN
(
b′,τ
)
+(1−λ )qR
(
b′,τ
)
+
(
λ
∂qN (b′,τ)
∂b′
+(1−λ ) ∂qR (b
′,τ)
∂b′
)
b′.
By eliminating ∂ Gˆ(sˆ)/∂pi in (2.29) via (2.31), one obtains
∆α +ug (g)∆q
∂ Bˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
+βEτ ′|τ
[
∂M(s′)
∂b′
]
∂ Bˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
= 0. (2.34)
After updating (2.33) one period ahead and using it to eliminate ∂M(s′)/∂b′ in (2.34),
one arrives at
0 = ug (g)∆q
∂ Bˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
+∆α −βEτ ′|τ
ug (g′)∆′λ −∆′α
∂Π(s′)
∂b′
−
∂B(s′)
∂b′
∂ Bˆ(sˆ′)
∂pi ′
 ∂ Bˆ(sˆ)
∂pi
,
which is the generalized Euler equation for the central bank presented in Section 2.3.
GEE for the Fiscal Authority
The first-order condition for the fiscal policy problem is given by
0 = θug (g)∆q+βEτ ′|τ
[
µ
∂F(s′)
∂b′
+(1−µ) ∂F
∗(s′)
∂b′
]
. (2.35)
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The value F(s) satisfies
F(s) = θu(G(s))−ψ(Π(s))+βEτ ′|τ
[
µF(B(s),τ ′)
+(1−µ)F∗(B(s),τ ′)
]
.
Differentiating F(s) with respect to b yields
∂F(s)
∂b
= θug (g)
∂G(s)
∂b
−ψpi(pi)∂Π(s)∂b +βEτ ′|τ
[
µ ∂F(s
′)
∂b′
+(1−µ) ∂F∗(s′)∂b′
]
∂B(s)
∂b
. (2.36)
Using the first-order condition (2.35), (2.36) can be written as
∂F(s)
∂b
= θug (g)
∂G(s)
∂b
−ψpi(pi)∂Π(s)∂b −θug (g)∆q
∂B(s)
∂b
.
When combined with (2.32), this expression can be written as
∂F(s)
∂b
= θug (g)
(
λpi−2b
∂Π(s)
∂b
−∆λ +∆q
∂B(s)
∂b
)
−ψpi(pi)∂Π(s)∂b −θug (g)∆q
∂B(s)
∂b
,
which reduces to
∂F(s)
∂b
= ∆θ
∂Π(s)
∂b
−θug (g)∆λ , (2.37)
when using the definition ∆θ ≡ θug (g)λpi−2b−ψpi(pi) from Section 2.3. For the party
currently not in office, the value F∗(s) satisfies
F∗(s) = u(G(s))−ψ(Π(s))+βEτ ′|τ
[
µF∗(B(s),τ ′)
+(1−µ)F(B(s),τ ′)
]
.
Differentiating F∗(s) with respect to b yields
∂F∗(s)
∂b
= ug (g)
∂G(s)
∂b
−ψpi(pi)∂Π(s)∂b +βEτ ′|τ
[
µ ∂F
∗(s′)
∂b′
+(1−µ) ∂F(s′)∂b′
]
∂B(s)
∂b
. (2.38)
By rewriting the first-order condition (2.35), one obtains the expression
βEτ ′|τ
[
∂F∗(s′)
∂b′
]
=
1
1−µ
[
−θug (g)∆q−βµEτ ′|τ
[
∂F(s′)
∂b′
]]
. (2.39)
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Inserting (2.39) into (2.38) yields
∂F∗(s)
∂b
= ug (g)
∂G(s)
∂b
−ψpi(pi)∂Π(s)∂b
+
 µ1−µ [−θug (g)∆q−βµEτ ′|τ [∂F(s′)∂b′ ]]
+(1−µ)βEτ ′|τ
[
∂F(s′)
∂b′
]  ∂B(s)
∂b
= ug (g)
∂G(s)
∂b
−ψpi(pi)∂Π(s)∂b −µ
θug (g)
1−µ ∆q
∂B(s)
∂b
+β
1−2µ
1−µ Eτ ′|τ
[
∂F(s′)
∂b′
]
∂B(s)
∂b
.
With (2.37), this expression can be written as
∂F∗(s)
∂b
= ug (g)
∂G(s)
∂b
−ψpi(pi)∂Π(s)∂b −µ
θug (g)
1−µ ∆q
∂B(s)
∂b
(2.40)
+β
1−2µ
1−µ Eτ ′|τ
[
∆′θ
∂Π(s′)
∂b′
−θug
(
g′
)
∆′λ
]
∂B(s)
∂b
.
Updating (2.37) and (2.40) one period ahead and inserting the resulting expressions into
the first-order condition (2.35) leads to
0 = θug (g)∆q+βµEτ ′|τ
[
∆′θ
∂Π(s′)
∂b′
−θug
(
g′
)
∆′λ
]
+β (1−µ)Eτ ′|τ
 ug (g′) ∂G(s′)∂b′ −ψpi(pi ′)∂Π(s′)∂b′ −µ θug(g′)1−µ ∆′q ∂B(s′)∂b′
+β 1−2µ1−µ Eτ ′′|τ ′
[
∆′′θ
∂Π(s′′)
∂b′′ −θug (g′′)∆′′λ
]
∂B(s′)
∂b′
 .
After rearranging this condition a little bit, one finally arrives at the generalized Euler
equation for the fiscal authority:
0 = θug (g)∆q
−µβEτ ′|τ
[
θug
(
g′
)
∆′λ −∆′θ
∂Π(s′)
∂b′
]
+(1−µ)βEτ ′|τ
[
ug
(
g′
) ∂G(s′)
∂b′
−ψpi(pi ′)∂Π(s
′)
∂b′
]
−µβEτ ′|τ
[
θug
(
g′
)
∆′q
∂B(s′)
∂b′
]
+(2µ−1)βEτ ′|τ
[
βEτ ′′|τ ′
[
θug
(
g′′
)
∆′′λ −∆′′θ
∂Π(s′′)
∂b′′
]
∂B(s′)
∂b′
]
.
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2.A.2 Numerical Solution
The numerical solution algorithm extends the algorithm proposed by Hatchondo et al.
(2010) for a standard sovereign default model as in Arellano (2008) to a setting with two
optimizing authorities. The algorithm computes the policy and value functions X r(b,τ),
X ∈ {F ,F∗,M,B,G,Π}, and X d(τ), X ∈ {F ,F∗,M,G,Π}. As in Hatchondo et al.
(2010), I approximate these functions on discrete grids for debt and tax revenues, using
cubic spline interpolation to allow for off-grid values of b and τ . To reduce the com-
putational burden, I exploit the additive separability of the period objective function and
reformulate the within-period interaction between the fiscal authority and the central bank
without changing equilibrium outcomes.
Reformulated Model
Conditional on repayment, the problem of the central bank can also be written as
Mr(b,τ) = max
pi≥pimin
{−αψ(pi)+M˜r(a,τ)} s.t. a = (λpi−1+1−λ)b.
The variable a combines the inflation rate pi and the debt position b to a single intra-period
state variable.30 In equilibrium, the value functions for the repayment case then satisfy
Mr(b,τ) = −αψ(Πr (b,τ))+M˜r(Ar (b,τ) ,τ),
F r(b,τ) = −ψ(Πr (b,τ))+ F˜ r(Ar (b,τ) ,τ),
F∗r(b,τ) = −ψ(Πr (b,τ))+ F˜∗r(Ar (b,τ) ,τ),
with
Ar (b,τ) =
(
λΠr (b,τ)−1+1−λ
)
b.
The fiscal policy problem now is given by
F˜ r(a,τ) = max
b′

θu(τ−a+[λqN (b′,τ)+(1−λ )qR (b′,τ)]b′)
+βEτ ′|τ
[
µF(b′,τ ′)
+(1−µ)F∗(b′,τ ′)
]  .
30For the case of i.i.d. tax revenues, a could also include τ . For persistent tax revenues however, the
current value τ will be needed to form expectations about τ ′.
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The intra-period continuation values for the central bank and the political party not in
office satisfy
M˜r(a,τ) = {u(G˜r (a,τ))+βEτ ′|τ [M(B˜r (a,τ) ,τ ′)]} ,
and
F˜∗r(a,τ) =
{
u(G˜r (a,τ))+βEτ ′|τ
[
µF∗(B˜r (a,τ) ,τ ′)
+(1−µ)F(B˜r (a,τ) ,τ ′)
]}
.
In the default case, the central bank solves
Md(τ) = max
pi≥pimin
{
−αψ(pi)+M˜d(τ)
}
.
It is obvious that the central bank is not able to affect the behavior of the fiscal authority in
the default case since the inflation rate does not have an impact on the government budget
constraint. Regardless of the state τ , the inflation policy then satisfies αψpi(Πd (τ)) = 0.
Government spending is given as Gd (τ) = τ−φ(τ). The value functions satisfy
Md(τ) =
{
u(Gd (τ))−αψ(Πd (τ))
+βEτ ′|τ
[
δM(0,τ ′)+(1−δ )Md(τ ′)]
}
,
Fd(τ) =

θu(Gd(τ))−ψ(Πd (τ))
+δβEτ ′|τ
[
µF(0,τ ′)
(1−µ)F∗(0,τ ′)
]
+(1−δ )βEτ ′|τ
[
µFd(τ ′)
(1−µ)F∗d(τ ′)
]

,
and
F∗d(τ) =

u(Gd(τ))−ψ(Πd (τ))
+δβEτ ′|τ
[
µF∗(0,τ ′)
(1−µ)F(0,τ ′)
]
+(1−δ )βEτ ′|τ
[
µF∗d(τ ′)
(1−µ)Fd(τ ′)
]

.
Solution Algorithm
The numerical solution algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Construct discrete grids for debt [b,b], tax revenues [τ,τ] and the intra-period state
variable [a,a].
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2. Choose initial values for the policy and value functions X rstart(b,τ) and X dstart(τ),
X ∈{F ,F∗,M,G,Π}, at all grid points (b,τ) ∈ [b,b]× [τ,τ].
3. Set X jnext = X jstart , j ∈ {r,d} and fix an error tolerance ε .
(a) For each grid point combination (a,τ) ∈ [a,a]× [τ,τ], compute the policies
B˜r(a,τ) and G˜r(a,τ) that solve the fiscal policy problem, and calculate the
associated values X˜ r(a,τ), X ∈ {F ,F∗,M}.
(b) For each grid point combination (b,τ) ∈ [b,b]× [τ,τ], compute the inflation
rate Πrnew(b,τ) that solves the monetary policy problem, and calculate the
associated fiscal policies and values X rnew(b,τ), X ∈ {F ,F∗,M,B,G}.
(c) For each revenue value τ ∈ [τ,τ], compute the policies Gdnew(τ) and Πdnew(τ)
that satisfy αψpi(Πdnew (τ)) = 0 and Gdnew (τ) = τ −φ(τ), as well as the asso-
ciated values X dnew(τ), X ∈ {F ,F∗,M}.
(d) If |X rnew(b,τ)−X rnext(b,τ)| < ε and
∣∣X dnew(τ)−X dnext(τ)∣∣ < ε , X ∈ {F , F∗,
M, G, Π}, for all grid point combinations, go to step 4, else set X jnext =X jnew,
j ∈ {r,d} and repeat step 3.
4. Take X jnew(·), j ∈ {r,d}, as approximations of the respective equilibrium objects in
the infinite-horizon economy.
I use discrete grids with equidistant grid points. Since the grid for the intra-period state
variable a is directly related to the debt grid, I set [a,a] = [b,b]. The asymmetric default
costs lead to a kink at τ = τ˜ in X d (τ), X ∈ {F ,F∗,M,G,Π}. To address this disconti-
nuity in an approriate way, I partition the τ-grid for the default case into two parts as in
Hatchondo et al. (2010). I choose an error tolerance of ε = 10−5.
Following Hatchondo et al. (2010), I solve for the infinite-horizon limit of a finite-
horizon model version. I thus first compute the value and policy functions for the final
period problem where no borrowing decision is made and use the resulting objects as
initial values X jstart , j ∈ {r,d}, for step 2. Note that in the final period, the central bank
can effectively choose government spending g via the government budget constraint: g =
τ− (λpi−1+1−λ)b.
For step 3a, the debt policy B˜r(a,τ) is computed via a global non-linear optimizer.
First, the algorithm performs a grid search over a pre-defined grid for b′. Then, the so-
lution to this grid search is used as an initial guess for the Nelder-Mead algorithm. The
optimization step delivers values for M˜r (·), F˜ r (·) and F˜∗r (·) that are associated with
the optimal debt and government spending response functions G˜r (·) and B˜r (·).
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Given the response functions and continuation values obtained in step 3a, step 3b
computes the inflation policyΠrnew(b,τ) that solves the central bank problem for each grid
point combination (b,τ) ∈ [b,b]× [τ,τ]. Using the calculated inflation policy Πrnew (b,τ),
the equilibrium fiscal policies and continuation values are computed by evaluating the
functions X˜ r(a,τ), X ∈ {F ,F∗,M,B,G}, at a =
(
λΠrnew (b,τ)
−1+1−λ
)
b.
To accurately compute expected values for the optimization in step 3a, it is important
to account for the discontinuity generated by the discrete default decision. To illustrate
this, take a look at the continuation value for the central bank in the repayment case:
Eτ ′|τ
[Mnext(b′,τ ′)]= ∫ τˆ(b′)
0
Mdnext(τ ′) fτ(τ ′|τ)dτ ′+
∫ ∞
τˆ(b′)
Mrnext(b′,τ ′) fτ(τ ′|τ)dτ ′,
where fτ(·) is the conditional probability density function for future tax revenues τ ′. One
can characterize the default decision of the fiscal authority via a threshold τˆ(b) for tax
revenues that satisfies F r(b, τˆ(b))−Fd(τˆ(b)) = 0. Given the debt position b, τˆ(b) is
the lowest τ-value for which the fiscal authority prefers to repay its debt. For τ < τˆ(b′),
the fiscal authority finds it optimal to default. I compute the default threshold τˆ(b) via
bisection method. Following Hatchondo et al. (2010), I use Gauss-Legendre quadrature
nodes and weights to approximate the integrals above.
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Chapter 3
Markovian Households
3.1 Introduction
During the last three decades, a large empirical and theoretical literature has evolved that
stresses the importance of analyzing household decision making not just at the aggregate
household level but also at the intra-household level.1 Within this literature, several model
environments have been developed that allow to study how the interaction between dif-
ferent household members shapes the allocation of household resources. Broadly, these
models can be divided into two categories: cooperative and non-cooperative models. In
both categories, the household decision process has mostly been studied in static environ-
ments. While there a few recent papers that consider cooperative households in a dynamic
context, dynamic non-cooperative models of the household are still the exception.2
The contribution of this chapter is to develop a framework that allows to understand
how cooperation and lack thereof affects the decision making of a two-person household
(a couple) in a dynamic environment with endogenous labor supply (and uncertainty).
More specifically, the model studies the consumption-savings problem of a household
whose individual members cannot commit to future actions and might not cooperate.
First, I characterize the basic properties of household decision making with and without
cooperation. Then, I use a calibrated model version with incomplete financial markets
and idiosyncratic income risk to explore the implications of lack of cooperation for pre-
cautionary savings, intra-household risk sharing and welfare.
1See Chiappori and Donni (2011), Chiappori and Mazzocco (2014) and Chiappori and Meghir (2015)
for recent surveys of this literature.
2Examples of dynamic models that use a cooperative framework are Mazzocco (2007, 2008), Ligon
(2011), Ortigueira and Siassi (2013). Examples of non-cooperative household models that study dynamic
decision problems are Browning (2000), Konrad and Lommerud (2000) and Hertzberg (2012). This chapter
is particularly related to the latter study. Details can be found at the end of this section.
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In the model, both household members consume a (private) consumption good and
supply labor, subject to a single joint household budget constraint. The household has
access to a risk-less one-period bond that allows the transfer of resources across periods.
The individual household members are infinitely-lived and exhibit spousal altruism, i.e.
they care about the utility that their spouse derives from its own consumption and leisure.
The household members may differ with respect to the wage rate that they earn on the
labor market, their utility function and their degree of spousal altruism. The interaction
between the household members is modeled as a Markov-perfect game (see Maskin and
Tirole, 2001) with the household’s asset position as the single endogenous state variable.
In each period, the equilibrium choices of the household members are hence character-
ized by policy functions that only depend on the joint asset position. Since the Markov-
perfect equilibrium concept is a refinement of the subgame-perfect equilibrium concept,
it guarantees that the decisions of the household members are time consistent.3 While the
household members take the allocation of future consumption and working time as given,
they fully understand that these actions will depend on future household asset holdings
which they can affect via their current consumption and labor supply decisions.
I consider two cases for the household problem. In the first case, the household mem-
bers agree on a joint household objective function that reflects their relative degree of
altruism. Based on this objective, the two individuals cooperate and jointly decide about
the intra-household allocation of consumption and working time, as well as savings. In the
second case, the household members do not cooperate. Instead, the allocation of house-
hold resources is determined in a non-cooperative game played by the two individuals.
More specifically, the household members choose their consumption and labor supply to
maximize their own objective function, taking as given the decisions of the spouse.
For both cases, the equilibrium can be characterized by a set of intuitive optimality
conditions. While the optimal labor supply conditions are standard and do not differ for
the cooperative and non-cooperative household, the allocation of consumption within the
household and over time is chosen differently. In the cooperative case, these decisions
are associated with a sharing rule and a standard Euler equation. For a given level of
savings, the sharing rule states that the ratio of the household members’ marginal utilities
of consumption is equal to the inverse of the ratio of their respective weights in the joint
household objective. As in the collective model of the household proposed by Chiappori
(1988, 1992), this sharing rule guarantees the efficient distribution of income within the
household. The non-cooperative solution to the household problem does not involve an
3By requiring household members to only condition their decisions on the minimal payoff-relevant
state, equilibria that involve reputational considerations based on trigger strategies with complex history-
dependence are ruled out by construction.
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explicit sharing rule but an additional Euler equation instead. There are therefore two
Euler equations in this case, one for each of the two household members. Relative to the
Euler equation associated with the cooperative household, these two Euler equations fea-
ture an additional term which can be interpreted as a wedge that distorts the consumption-
savings trade-off. More specifically, this wedge reflects the household members’ inability
to control the decisions of their spouse as well as their lack of commitment and disagree-
ment about the valuation of spousal consumption and labor supply.
Under the assumption that household members are homogeneous, i.e. they have the
same preferences with respect to their own consumption and leisure, face the same wage
rate and exhibit the same degree of altruism, I show analytically that the cooperative
and the non-cooperative solutions to the household problem coincide when the house-
hold members are perfectly altruistic, i.e. when they place the same weight on their own
utility and spousal utility. When the household members are imperfectly altruistic and
place a lower weight on spousal utility than on their own, the non-cooperative household
exhibits an undersaving (or overborrowing) bias relative to the cooperative case, which is
captured by the wedge in the Euler equation. For a household member, saving increases
the amount of resources available to the household in the next period. However, these
additional resources will encourage the spouse to consume more and work less in the next
period, leaving less resources for the saving household member to consume. When im-
perfectly altruistic, the household member thus has an incentive to save less and consume
more in the current period. This savings distortion that is due to imperfect spousal altru-
ism is very similar to the intertemporal distortion found in models with quasi-geometric
discounting (see e.g. Laibson, 1997). In fact, as in previous work by Hertzberg (2012), I
show that there is a direct relationship between the behavior of the non-cooperative house-
hold and that of a representative quasi-geometric household. More specifically, I show a
direct link between the degree of spousal altruism and the short-run discount factor of
the quasi-geometric household (see e.g. Laibson, 1997).4 Using numerical examples, I
show that the savings distortion remains when household members are heterogeneous and
investigate how outcomes vary with the exact type of heterogeneity.
Given that lack of cooperation leads to undersaving when imperfectly altruistic house-
hold members do not cooperate, it is interesting to ask how costly the savings distortion
is in terms of welfare. To answer this question in a quantitatively meaningful way, I study
a version of the household problem with incomplete financial markets in which the two
household members are both subject to idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks. When
4The relation between the results of this chapter and the ones obtained by Hertzberg (2012) will be
discussed at the end of this section.
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financial markets only provide partial insurance against idiosyncratic labor income risk,
a role for precautionary savings emerges. In addition, when the household members’
idiosyncratic income risks are not perfectly positively correlated, spousal labor supply
adjustments are a useful instrument to share risks within the household and reduce the im-
pact of adverse shocks on household consumption (see e.g. Ortigueira and Siassi, 2013).
The main finding is that the savings distortion can substantially reduce precautionary
savings of non-cooperative households relative to cooperative ones when the individual
members are imperfectly altruistic. As a result, non-cooperative households rely more
on labor supply adjustments to smooth consumption in response to bad shocks, making
intra-household risk-sharing more important for these types of households relative to co-
operative ones. However, non-cooperative households not only experience more volatile
labor supply but also more volatile consumption compared to cooperative households
since they have lower buffer stock savings. A welfare exercise reveals that the welfare
costs of lack of cooperation are sizable for even modest deviations from perfect spousal
altruism.
This chapter is related to the large and growing literature on multi-person households
(see e.g. Chiappori and Donni, 2011). As mentioned earlier, despite its size, there are
relatively few papers that study such households in a dynamic context (see Chiappori
and Mazzocco, 2014, for details). Two exceptions that use an intertemporal version of
the collective household model to study consumption-savings problems with endogenous
labor supply as in this chapter are Mazzocco (2008), who estimates the preferences of
the household members, and Ortigueira and Siassi (2013), who study the importance of
intra-household risk sharing in a general equilibrium incomplete markets model.
Examples of non-cooperative two-person households in a dynamic context are Brown-
ing (2000), Konrad and Lommerud (2000) and Doepke and Tertilt (2014).5 Browning
(2000) studies a non-cooperative savings problem in a two-period model with two house-
hold members where the husband might not live as long as the wife. Konrad and Lom-
merud (2000) use an intertemporal model to study investment in human capital. In their
two-stage model, the within-household allocation is determined non-cooperatively at the
first stage and via Nash-bargaining at the second stage, with the non-cooperative outcome
as the threat point. Doepke and Tertilt (2014) build a non-cooperative household model
with human capital investment to study the impact of transfers to females on growth.
Another paper that develops a non-cooperative dynamic model is Hertzberg (2012),
which is closely related to this chapter. The author also studies the consumption-savings
5Examples of studies that look at non-cooperative decision making in a static context are Lundberg and
Pollak (1993), Konrad and Lommerud (1995), Chen and Woolley (2001), Lechene and Preston (2011) and
Del Boca and Flinn (2012).
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problem of a non-cooperative household with two (potentially) imperfectly altruistic in-
dividual members that lack commitment and relates it to the cooperative case with perfect
commitment. However, there are several differences between our studies. First, his model
environment is a deterministic one with a finite time horizon and exogenous labor income,
whereas the one in this chapter features an infinite time horizon, endogenous labor sup-
ply and (for an application) uncertainty. Second, to analyze his model, he studies the
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the non-cooperative game between the household mem-
bers, while I study the interaction as a stationary Markov-perfect game. More specifically,
he derives closed form solutions for the model that show how imperfect altruism leads to
an undersaving bias. To derive these solutions, Hertzberg (2012) relies on specific func-
tional forms for the utility functions of the household members. By contrast, I analyze the
equilibrium of the non-cooperative game via time-invariant first-order conditions. In par-
ticular, I derive generalized Euler equations for the household members similar to Krusell
et al. (2002), which demonstrate the existence of a savings wedge that distorts intertem-
poral decisions making. These Euler equations admit a very intuitive interpretation and
allow me to illustrate the determinants of the savings distortion. In addition, I do not have
to assume specific functional forms to show that non-cooperative households save less
than cooperative ones when the household members are imperfectly altruistic. Method-
ologically, our two studies can thus be seen as complementary. Third, as in his paper, a
direct link between the behavior of the non-cooperative household and a quasi-geometric
representative household is established. Again, I do not need to assume specific functional
forms for the utility functions to obtain this finding. A further difference between our stud-
ies is that I perform a welfare analysis of the costs of lack of cooperation in the absence
of commitment by using a calibrated model with uncertainty, whereas he uses numerical
examples to illustrate the welfare properties of his deterministic life-cycle model. These
welfare comparisons can be viewed as complementary since Hertzberg (2012) highlights
a life-cycle savings motive for the household, whereas I consider a precautionary savings
motive.
Due to the link between non-cooperative two-person households and quasi-geometric
representative households, this chapter is also related to the literature on quasi-geometric
discounting. In particular, it relates to Harris and Laibson (2001), Krusell et al. (2002)
and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2014) who study the decision problem of an infinitely-
lived representative household with quasi-geometric preferences.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I present the
model and discuss the implications of lack of cooperation for household decision making.
Section 3.3 introduces labor income risk into the model of Section 3.2 and investigates
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how non-cooperative interaction between the household members affects precautionary
savings, intra-household risk sharing and welfare. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Model
The model considers the dynamic decision problem of a two-person household. Time
is discrete, starts in t = 0 and goes on forever. A household consists of two infinitely-
lived individuals, one male (M) and one female (F), and will be interpreted as a married
couple. Throughout the paper, I will not model household dissolution and assume that the
individuals form a couple at period t = 0 and never break up. The objective of household
member i ∈ {F,M} is given by
∞
∑
t=0
β tUi(cit ,c−it ,nit ,n−it),
where
Ui(cit ,c−it ,nit ,n−it) = ui(cit ,nit)+θiu−i(c−it ,n−it).
The period objective function Ui is the sum of two parts.6 The first part, ui, is the util-
ity that household member i derives from its own consumption ci and labor supply ni.
This function satisfies uc,i,−un,i > 0 and ucc,i,unn,i < 0, where ux,i (uxx,i) denotes the first
(second) derivative of ui with respect to the argument x ∈ {c,n}. The second part, θiu−i,
reflects household member i’s altruism towards household member−i≡{F,M}\i, where
the parameter θi > 0 measures the degree of altruism.7 For θi = 1, i is perfectly altruistic
and places the same weight on its ”private” utility ui and the utility u−i that its spouse
derives from consuming c−i and working n−i. For θi < 1 (θi > 1), individual i places a
lower (higher) weight on the utility that its spouse −i derives from its consumption and
leisure than on its own private utility ui. The two household members might differ from
each other with respect to their wage rate wi > 0, utility function ui and altruism θi.8 The
wage rates wi are exogenous and constant, i.e. the model is a partial equilibrium one. The
6Mazzocco (2008) uses the same preferences in the context of an intertemporal collective household
model.
7In the literature, individual preferences that involve this type of altruism are sometimes also referred to
as ”caring preferences” (see e.g. Chiappori, 1992, or Chen and Woolley, 2001).
8I abstract from heterogeneity in discount factors since this case has already received a lot of attention
in the literature (see e.g. Hertzberg, 2013, Jackson and Yariv, 2014, Schaner, 2015, and references therein)
and is well understood. In particular, it is known that heterogeneous time preferences lead to a time-
inconsistency problem even when a group of individuals decides collectively, i.e. under cooperation. In this
chapter, I want to highlight a time-inconsistency problem that arises due to other factors and explore how it
depends on household cooperation.
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household does not face any uncertainty about the future.9
The household faces the joint period budget constraint
wFnFt +wMnMt +at (1+ rt) = cFt + cMt +at+1. (3.1)
It has access to a one-period bond at+1 that yields a net return of rt+1 in the subsequent pe-
riod. A negative asset position means that the household is in debt. As noted by Hertzberg
(2012), for 2002, the General Social Survey documents that the majority of married cou-
ples in the United States (53.35%) share their financial resources (see Smith et al., 2011).
The assumption of a joint household budget thus is an empirically plausible one. In addi-
tion, it is also an assumption that is common in the literature (see e.g. Mazzocco, 2008,
and Ortigueira and Siassi, 2013).
I assume that the interest rate rt+1 = r(at+1) can vary with the savings position:
∂ r(at+1)/∂at+1 ≤ 0. In particular, r(at+1) may decrease with at+1 for negative asset
values values, i.e. the interest rate increases with the size of the credit. The relationship
between the interest rate and the asset position is exogenously imposed and might reflect
e.g. the lender’s marginal costs of monitoring and enforcing a loan. When making their
decisions, the household members internalize that the interest rate changes with savings
at+1. The debt-elastic interest rate schedule is introduced for two reasons. First, since
I analyze a partial equilibrium model with exogenous prices, an interior and unique so-
lution for the steady state asset level is not generally assured.10 The debt-elasticity of
the interest rate r(at+1) provides a mechanism that induces an interior and unique steady
state even for given prices.11 Second, for analytical and computational tractability, it is
not feasible to introduce a standard debt limit at+1 ≥ a into the model. More specifically,
I will need differentiability of the equilibrium objects for the analysis which does not
necessarily hold when a debt limit is imposed. As will be shown in greater detail below,
the debt-elastic interest rate will have very similar implications for the household savings
decision as an ad hoc debt limit.
The interaction between the household members is modeled as a dynamic game. I as-
sume that the household members act in a time consistent way and are not able to commit
to actions beyond the current period. I follow Krusell et al. (2002) and restrict atten-
tion to stationary Markov-perfect equilibria. The strategies of the household members are
thus assumed to be Markov, i.e. they are only conditioned on the minimal payoff-relevant
9Section 3.3 will introduce uncertainty about the household members’ future labor productivities.
10This will even be true when rt+1 = r¯ and β = 1/(1+ r¯), where r¯ is a positive constant.
11Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) also consider a debt-elastic interest rate to induce stationarity in a
model of a small open economy with a constant world interest rate.
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state (see Maskin and Tirole, 2001), which is the joint asset position at in this case. The
Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a refinement of the subgame-perfect (Nash) equi-
librium and therefore ensures that the equilibrium strategies are time consistent. It also
rules out the possibility of reputational considerations that are based on the use of trigger
strategies. As already mentioned above, I follow Krusell et al. (2002) and restrict atten-
tion to stationary equilibria with differentiable policy and value functions. This restriction
is made to facilitate the analysis by allowing the derivation of first-order conditions that
intuitively highlight the main forces of the model. Since the game may in principle still
feature many equilibria, I follow Krusell et al. (2002) and additionally restrict attention to
the equilibrium that is the infinite-horizon limit of a finite-horizon version of the house-
hold problem.12 Uniqueness of this particular equilibrium follows from a standard back-
ward induction argument. I will first look at a household whose members optimize under
full cooperation, and then consider the case of non-cooperative household members.
3.2.1 Household Problem under Cooperation
Under cooperation, the household members agree on an objective function for the house-
hold and jointly decide about current consumption and labor supply of both household
members as well as savings without commitment. The literature on multi-person house-
holds typically refers to this case as the ”collective model of the household” (see e.g.
Chiappori, 1988, 1992). In the cooperative case, the household objective is given as
∞
∑
t=0
β tU (cFt ,cMt ,nFt ,nMt) ,
with period objective function
U (cFt ,cMt ,nFt ,nMt) =UF (cFt ,cMt ,nFt ,nMt)+µUM (cFt ,cMt ,nFt ,nMt) ,
where µ > 0 is a constant relative Pareto weight. As in Browning et al. (2006), the period
objective can be rewritten as
U (cFt ,cMt ,nFt ,nMt) = (1+µθM)uF(cFt ,nFt)+(µ+θF)uM(cMt ,nMt).
When the household members agree on how to evaluate intra-household allocations, the
household decision problem is equivalent to that of a utilitarian planner who assigns con-
stant weights 1+µθM and µ+θF to the utility functions uF and uM and chooses consump-
12Details about the (static) household problem in the final period are given in Appendix 3.A.3.
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tion and labor supply of the household members without commitment. In the remainder,
I will assume that µ = 1, i.e. the weights placed on uF and uM only reflect the relative al-
truism of the household members. If e.g. θM > θF holds, the household objective assigns
a higher weight to uF compared to uM.
Given the focus on MPE, the household problem is formulated recursively.13 In each
period, the household solves
max
cF ,cM ,nF ,nM
∑i∈{F,M} (1+θ−i)ui(ci,ni)+βV(a′(a,cF ,cM,nF ,nM)),
where savings a′ are given by the period budget constraint
a′ = wFnF +wMnM +a(1+ r(a))− cF − cM.
The continuation value V satisfies
V(a) =∑i∈{F,M} (1+θ−i)ui(Ci(a),Ni(a))+βV(A(a)),
where CF (a), CM (a), NF (a), NM (a) and A(a) are the policy functions that determine
consumption, labor supply and savings in the subsequent period.14 These functions only
depend on the beginning-of-period asset position. Since the household members cannot
commit to future actions, they take these policies as given. However, they recognize that
they can affect the future allocation via the asset position a′. In a stationary equilibrium,
ci = Ci (a) and ni =Ni (a), i∈{F,M}, as well as a′=A(a) hold. The policy functions that
govern future decisions thus coincide with the policy functions that determine the optimal
decisions in the current period. The MPE for the household problem under cooperation is
formally defined as follows15:
Definition 3. A stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium for the household problem under
cooperation is given by a set of functions {A,CF ,CM,NF ,NM,V} such that for all a,
(i) {X (a)}X∈{CF ,CM ,NF ,NM} = argmaxcF ,cM ,nF ,nM
{
∑i∈{F,M} (1+θ−i)ui(ci,ni)
+βV(a′(a,cF ,cM,nF ,nM))
}
,
(ii) V(a) = ∑i∈{F,M} (1+θ−i)ui(Ci(a),Ni(a))+βV(A(a)),
(iii) a′(a,cF ,cM,nF ,nM) = wFnF +wMnM +a(1+ r(a))− cF − cM,
13The time indices are hence dropped and a prime is used to denote variables of the next period.
14Note that the continuation value V of the household can only be written as a single value for the whole
household since the individual members share the same discount factor.
15The definition of the equilibrium is formulated by using notation similar to that used in Niemann et al.
(2013b) for a public policy problem.
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(iv) A(a) = a′(a,CF(a),CM(a),NF(a),NM(a)).
The equilibrium for the household decision problem under full cooperation between the
two household members can be characterized by the conditions stated in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. The Markov-perfect equilibrium for the household decision problem under
cooperation satisfies the conditions
uc,F(CF (a) ,NF (a))
uc,M(CM (a) ,NM (a)) =
1+θF
1+θM
, (3.2)
−un,i(Ci (a) ,Ni (a)) = uc,i(Ci (a) ,Ni (a))wi, i ∈ {F,M} , (3.3)
uc,F(CF(a),NF(a)) = βuc,F (CF(A(a)),NF(A(a))) (3.4)
×
(
1+ r(A(a))+A(a)∂ r(a
′)
∂a′
)
,
A(a)+CF (a)+CM (a) = wFNF (a)+wMNM (a)+a(1+ r(a)) , (3.5)
for all a.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.1.
Condition (3.2) states that the cooperative solution to the household problem allocates
consumption and working time of the household members such that the ratio of the house-
hold members’ marginal utility of consumption uc,F/uc,M equals the inverse of the ratio
of the respective utility weights (1+ θF)/(1+ θM). In the literature, this condition is
often referred to as a ”sharing rule” (see e.g. Chiappori, 1992). If θi > θ−i, the opti-
mal intra-household allocation implies that the marginal utility of consumption is higher
for i relative to −i. Condition (3.3) is a standard labor supply condition which requires
that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor supply of house-
hold member i equals the respective wage rate wi. Condition (3.4) is the Euler equation
for the household that governs how resources are allocated intertemporally. In principle,
the set of equilibrium conditions also involves an Euler equation for household mem-
ber M. However, this condition is redundant here since the sharing rule (3.2) implies
that the growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption is equalized across house-
hold members. Condition (3.5) is simply the household budget constraint evaluated at the
equilibrium policies. Given consumption and labor supply of the household members,
this budget constraint determines equilibrium savings a′ =A(a). Note that the exact val-
ues for the degree of altruism of the household members do not matter for the household
allocation if θF = θM.
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The equilibrium conditions (3.2)-(3.5) are standard in the literature that uses the col-
lective household model in a dynamic context (see e.g. Mazzocco, 2008, or Ortigueira
and Siassi, 2013). One exception is the term r(a′)+a′× (∂ r(a′)/∂a′) that appears in the
Euler equation (3.4), measuring the (assumed) marginal effect of a′ on borrowing costs.16
However, the debt-elastic interest rate has a very similar effect on the saving behavior of
the household as an ad hoc borrowing constraint a′ ≥ a that prevents the household from
reducing its asset position below the level a. Define the ”risk-free rate” r¯ = r(0). Just like
the debt-elastic interest rate, a binding borrowing constraint a′ = a would also imply that
uc,i ≥ βu′c,i (1+ r¯) holds (see Ortigueira and Siassi, 2013). In both cases, the household
will not borrow beyond a certain level, either because of being outright rationed or due to
an interest rate schedule that increases with debt.
When the household members agree on a joint household objective function and col-
lectively make their decisions based on it, the implemented outcome does not depend on
whether the household can commit to future actions or not, i.e. the optimal cooperative
household allocation under commitment is time consistent (see Appendix 3.A.2). Since
the optimal household allocation under commitment is Pareto optimal with respective to
the joint household objective function, the cooperative solution without commitment is
Pareto optimal as well, making the cooperative household solution a useful benchmark
for the non-cooperative case.
3.2.2 Household Problem without Cooperation
Now assume that the individual household members do not cooperate. The interaction be-
tween the household members is modeled as a non-cooperative simultaneous-move game.
In each period, the household members F and M simultaneously choose consumption ci
and labor supply ni, taking as given the decisions of their spouse c−i and n−i. In addition,
they also take as given the policy functions that determine the allocation of household
resources in the next period X (a′), X ∈ {A,CF ,NF ,CM,NM}, given savings a′.
From the perspective of household member i, the joint household budget constraint is
a′ = wini+w−in−i+a(1+ r(a))− ci− c−i. (3.6)
Given the consumption and labor supply decisions of both household members, savings
a′ are determined residually to satisfy the budget constraint. The household members
however internalize the impact of their own decisions on household savings. The decision
16To economize on notation, I will occasionally exploit stationarity and write a′ instead of A(a).
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problem of household member i ∈ {F,M} is given by
max
ci,ni
ui(ci,ni)+θiu−i(c−i,n−i)+βVi(a′(a,ci,c−i,ni,n−i)), (3.7)
where spousal consumption c−i and labor supply n−i are taken as given, and savings a′
are given by the budget constraint (3.6).
The continuation value Vi is defined recursively as
Vi(a) = ui(Ci(a),Ni(a))+θiu−i(C−i(a),N−i(a))+βVi(A(a)). (3.8)
The definition of the MPE for the non-cooperative household problem is as follows:
Definition 4. A stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium for the household problem without
cooperation is given by a set of functions {A,CF ,CM,NF ,NM,VF ,VM} such that for all
a,
(i) {X (a)}X∈{Ci,Ni} = argmaxci,ni
{
ui(ci,ni)+θiu−i(C−i (a) ,N−i (a))
+βVi(a′(a,ci,C−i (a) ,ni,N−i (a)))
}
, i ∈ {F,M} ,
(ii) Vi(a) = ui(Ci(a),Ni(a))+θiu−i(C−i(a),N−i(a))+βVi(A(a)), i ∈ {F,M} ,
(iii) a′(a,cF ,cM,nF ,nM) = wFnF +wMnM +a(1+ r(a))− cF − cM,
(iv) A(a) = a′(a,CF(a),CM(a),NF(a),NM(a)).
The key difference relative to Definition 3 is that the two household members now in-
dependently make their consumption and working decisions based on their own objec-
tive, with the joint household budget constraint providing the link between the individ-
ual household members’ actions. Condition (i) requires that the strategies chosen by
the household members in equilibrium are indeed optimal responses to each other, i.e.
the policy functions form a Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium conditions for the non-
cooperative household problem are given by the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The Markov-perfect equilibrium for the household decision problem with-
out cooperation satisfies the conditions (3.3),(3.5), and
uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a)) = βuc,i (Ci(A(a)),Ni(A(a))) (3.9)
×
(
1+ r(A(a))+A(a)∂ r(a
′)
∂a′
+Γi(A(a))
)
, i ∈ {F,M} ,
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with
Γi(a) =
(
θi
uc,−i (C−i(a),N−i(a))
uc,i (Ci(a),Ni(a)) −1
)[
∂C−i(a)
∂a
−w−i∂N−i(a)∂a
]
, (3.10)
for all a.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.1.
The optimal labor supply conditions are the same for the non-cooperative and the cooper-
ative household problem. The important difference is that the ratio uc,F/uc,M now is not
pinned down by a sharing rule (see condition (3.2)) but by two generalized Euler equations
instead. In contrast to the cooperative case, two intertemporal optimality conditions thus
matter for the equilibrium outcome. Following Krusell et al. (2002), the Euler equations
are called generalized due to the presence of the function Γi which involves derivatives of
the policy functions C−i and N−i with respect to the asset position.
As shown in Appendix 3.A.2, the non-cooperative solution to the household prob-
lem under commitment features the same equilibrium conditions as in the case without
commitment given by Proposition 2, except that Γi does not appear in the Euler equa-
tions for the commitment case. The function Γi can thus be interpreted as a wedge that
distorts the optimal consumption-savings decision of household member i relative to the
commitment case. In contrast to the cooperative household problem, lack of commitment
therefore matters when the household members do not cooperate.
The wedge admits an intuitive interpretation. To see this, it is helpful to multiply Γi
with uc,i, which yields
(θiuc,−i (C−i(a),N−i(a))−uc,i (Ci(a),Ni(a)))×
[
∂C−i(a)
∂a
−w−i∂N−i(a)∂a
]
.
The expression in squared brackets measures the change in household resources that a
marginal increase in wealth a induces by changing the consumption and working deci-
sions of household member −i. The expression in round brackets measures the marginal
valuation of this change in resources from the perspective of household member i. Sup-
pose that ∂C−i(a)/∂a > 0 and ∂N−i(a)/∂a = 0, i.e. there is no wealth effect on labor
supply and a marginal increase in assets a only leads to an increase in consumption of
household member −i, leaving its labor supply decision unchanged. The first term in
round brackets, θiuc,−i, is the marginal increase in utility that individual i derives from
the increase in spousal consumption due to its altruism. The second term, −uc,i, is the
marginal decrease in utility that household member i experiences because a higher value
of c−i reduces the amount of resources that i can spend on its own consumption. The term
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in round brackets thus measures the net marginal change in utility of household member
i associated with a change in available resources given by the term in squared brackets. If
the two terms in round brackets sum up to zero, the wedge Γi disappears from the Euler
equation. If the marginal valuation does not equal zero, the wedge Γi will deviate from
zero as well and distort the consumption-savings trade-off relative to the commitment
case.
When the household members are heterogeneous, it is difficult to make a clear state-
ment about how the wedges ΓF and ΓM affect the behavior of the household in detail.
Therefore, the next section will consider homogeneous household members, i.e. house-
hold members which share the same attributes xi = x−i = x for x∈{θ ,u,w}, which implies
that Xi(a) = X−i(a) = X (a) for X ∈ {C,N} in a symmetric equilibrium. Under this as-
sumption, one can isolate the role of lack of cooperation for household decision making.
The case of heterogeneous household members will further be examined in Section 3.2.5.
3.2.3 Homogeneous Household Members
When the household members share the same attributes, the equilibrium for the cooper-
ative and the non-cooperative household problem can be characterized by the following
lemma:
Lemma 1. If household members are homogeneous, i.e. xi = x−i = x for x∈ {θ ,u,w}, the
Markov-perfect equilibrium for the household decision problem satisfies the conditions
uc(C(a),N (a))w = −un(C(a),N (a)), (3.11)
uc(C(a),N (a)) = βuc (C(A(a)),N (A(a))) (3.12)
×
(
1+ r(A(a))+A(a)∂ r(a
′)
∂a′
+Γ(A(a))
)
,
with
Γ(a) =
{
(θ −1)
[
∂C(a)
∂a −w∂N (a)∂a
]
, without cooperation,
0, with cooperation,
(3.13)
as well as
A(a)+2C (a) = 2wN (a)+a(1+ r(a)) , (3.14)
for all a.
Proof. Without differences in altruism, wage rates and utility functions XF = XM = X
holds for X ∈ {C,N}, which implies that the first-order conditions for F and M co-
incide. As a result, only one of the two optimal labor supply conditions and (for the
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non-cooperative household solution) one Euler equation is needed to pin down the equi-
librium outcome. For the cooperative household solution, the sharing rule (3.2) becomes
redundant as it is always satisfied for homogeneous household members.
As summarized by the following corollary, perfect altruism and the absence of within-
household heterogeneity imply that the equilibrium outcome does not depend on the
household members’ ability to cooperate.
Corollary 1. If household members are homogeneous and perfectly altruistic (θ = 1), the
outcome of the MPE under cooperation coincides with the outcome of the MPE without
cooperation.
Proof. If θ = 1, Γ(a) = 0 holds regardless of whether household members cooperate or
not. The equilibrium conditions (3.11)-(3.14) then are identical for the household decision
problems with and without cooperation.
In contrast to the cooperative solution to the household problem, the exact value of the
degree of altruism θ matters for the non-cooperative solution if θ 6= 1. In particular, θ
governs the magnitude (and the sign) of the savings distortion given by the wedge Γi. To
understand the savings distortion, suppose that ∂C(a)/∂a > 0 as well as ∂N (a)/∂a ≤ 0
hold.17 With uc > 0, it then follows from (3.13) that Γ(a) Q 0, if θ Q 1. If individual
household members cannot commit to future actions and do not cooperate, imperfect al-
truism (θ < 1) hence leads a two-person household to save less (or borrow more) relative
to the case of perfect altruism (θ = 1) and thus relative to the cooperative case (see Corol-
lary 1). The presence of imperfect altruism effectively lowers the marginal return from
saving for a household member. While an additional unit of resources transfered into the
next period yields the marginal return 1+r(a′)+a′×(∂ r(a′)/∂a′), it will also encourage
the spouse to consume more (∂C(a′)/∂a′ > 0) and work less (∂N (a′)/∂a′ ≤ 0), which
tends to reduce the resources available for the saving household member to consume. If
the household member is perfectly altruistic (θ = 1), this change in future spousal con-
sumption and labor supply is valued like a change in its own consumption and working
time. As a result Γ= 0 holds and the Euler equation has the same shape as in the coopera-
tive case. If the household member is imperfectly altruistic (θ < 1), the increase in future
spousal consumption and labor supply is valued less than the decline in utility due to the
decrease in available resources, leading to a negative wedge Γ< 0. In the current period
by contrast, the household member can directly allocate financial resources towards its
17For standard utility functions that are used in the literature, these properties usually hold.
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own consumption. As a result, it has an incentive to reduce savings and allocate more
wealth into the present, where it can directly consume the resources itself.18
The intuition behind the savings distortion of the non-cooperative household is simi-
lar to that in political economy models of public debt (see Persson and Svensson, 1989,
and Alesina and Tabellini, 1990), where turnover risk and disagreement between political
parties result in a deficit bias. In these models, the incumbent party has an incentive to
front-load public spending since it might not be in charge of allocating resources in future
periods and disagrees with the way these resources are spent by its successor. Aguiar
and Amador (2011) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2014) demonstrate that there is in fact
a direct link between the behavior of a government in such a political economy model
and the behavior of a benevolent policy maker who exhibits quasi-geometric discounting
(see Laibson, 1997, or Krusell et al., 2002). Similarly, as first demonstrated by Hertzberg
(2012) for a finite-horizon model without labor supply, one can show a direct link be-
tween a two-person household which consists of non-cooperative, imperfectly altruistic
individuals that discount geometrically and a representative household which discounts in
a quasi-geometric fashion.
3.2.4 Imperfect Spousal Altruism and Quasi-Geometric Discounting
Consider the decision problem of a quasi-geometric household who consumes, works
and saves (see e.g. Laibson, 1997, or Krusell et al., 2002).19 In a given period t ≥ 0,
this household values the stream of current and future consumption and working time
{ct+s,nt+s}∞s=0 according to
u(ct ,nt)+δ
∞
∑
s=1
β su(ct+s,nt+s),
where u is the same period utility function used before, β a standard (long-run) discount
factor and δ > 0 the household’s short-run discount factor. For δ = 1, the household has
standard time-consistent preferences. In this case, the household therefore does not have
an incentive to deviate from a plan made in the past about future actions. If the short-
run discount factor deviates from one, the household exhibits preference reversals over
18Another way to think about the undersaving (or overborrowing) bias is pointed out by Hertzberg (2012,
p. 13) who proves the existence of such a bias for a finite-horizon setting with exogenous income (see
Proposition 1 in his paper). When the household members share their financial wealth, savings are a public
good and imperfect altruism leads the members to contribute less to the provision of this good than with
perfect spousal altruism.
19In the literature, quasi-geometric discounting sometimes is also referred to as quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting. However, Krusell et al. (2002) point out that, mathematically speaking, quasi-geometric is the
more appropriate term to describe this type of discounting.
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time, making such commitments to future actions time inconsistent. More specifically,
for δ < 1, the household has an incentive to delay costly actions into future periods. In
the context of the consumption-savings problem in this chapter, the household would like
to delay (costly) saving today and commit to save more in the future. However, in the next
period t +1, the household will again be tempted to delay saving, making a commitment
to save more in the future time inconsistent. For δ > 1, the household’s temptation goes
into the opposite direction, leading to an ”oversaving bias”. As pointed out by Laibson
(1997), the decision problem of such a quasi-geometric household can be modeled as a
dynamic game between multiple successive selves of the household.
To analyze this game, I follow Krusell et al. (2002) and study the stationary MPE
that is the infinite-horizon limit of the MPE of the finite-horizon household problem.20 In
recursive notation, the decision problem is given as
max
c,n
u(c,n)+δβV(a′(a,c,n)),
where savings a′ are given via the period budget constraint
a′ = wn+a(1+ r(a))− c,
and the continuation value V satisfies
V(a) = u(C(a),N (a))+βV(A(a)).
The MPE for the decision problem of the quasi-geometric household is formally defined
as follows:
Definition 5. A stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium for the decision problem of the
quasi-geometric household is given by a set of functions {A,C,N ,V} such that for all a,
(i) {X (a)}X∈{C,N} = argmax
c,n
{u(c,n)+δβV(a′(a,c,n))} ,
(ii) V(a) = u(C(a),N (a))+βV(A(a)),
(iii) a′(a,c,n) = wn+a(1+ r(a))− c,
(iv) A(a) = a′(a,C(a),N (a)).
20In addition, I again assume differentiability of the policy and value functions. Bernheim et al. (2015)
focus on subgame-perfect equilibria in general and study under which conditions quasi-geometric house-
holds can overcome their commitment problems by using different (non-Markov) strategies.
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Figure 3.1: Savings policy function
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(a) Constant interest rate (∂ r/∂a = 0)
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(b) Debt-elastic interest rate (∂ r/∂a≤ 0)
The next proposition summarizes the link between the quasi-geometric representative
household and the non-cooperative two-person household:
Proposition 3. If δ = θ , the Markov-perfect equilibrium for the decision problem of the
quasi-geometric household can be characterized by the same conditions given by Lemma
1 for the non-cooperative household, except that A(a)+ C (a) = wN (a)+ a(1+ r(a))
replaces condition (3.14).
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.1.
The direct link between the short-run discount factor δ and the degree of altruism θ
demonstrates that imperfect spousal altruism leads a non-cooperative two-person house-
hold to effectively discount in a quasi-geometric fashion even though its members exhibit
standard geometric discounting. The only difference between the equilibrium conditions
for the quasi-geometric household and those for the non-cooperative household is that
consumption and labor supply are total household quantities in the former case and in-
dividual quantities in the latter case. The nature of the trade-offs is however the same.
Hertzberg (2012) has previously established the direct link between the short-run discount
factor and spousal altruism for a finite-horizon model without endogenous labor supply.
In contrast to Hertzberg (2012), the derivation of this result in this chapter does not rely
on a specific functional form for the utility function, a finite time-horizon and exogenous
household income. However, Hertzberg (2012) can show that the non-cooperative house-
hold behaves in the aggregate like the representative quasi-geometric household, whereas
I only show that the trade-off faced by the two types of households is very close.
91
An important implication of Proposition 3 is that the behavior of the non-cooperative
two-person household exhibits the basic properties highlighted for (infinitely-lived) quasi-
geometric households in the literature (see e.g. Krusell et al., 2002, Chatterjee and
Eyigungor, 2014). In particular, when household members are imperfectly altruistic
(θ < 1) and the interest rate is constant by assumption, i.e. r(a) is always debt-inelastic
(∂ r(a)/∂a = 0), there is no interior steady state a∗ with A(a∗) = a∗ unless the (constant)
interest rate is given by r = 1/β − 1−Γ(a∗). If however, β (1+ r) = 1 and θ < 1 hold,
the wedge Γ(a) is negative and the non-cooperative household keeps on accumulating
debt (see Figure 3.1a), leading consumption and/or leisure to sharply decline in the long
run.21 As shown by Figure 3.1b, the debt-elastic interest rate introduces a mechanism that
discourages the persistent accumulation of debt and induces an interior steady state a∗.
3.2.5 The Role of Within-Household Heterogeneity
In Section 3.2.3, I have demonstrated that in the absence of within-household hetero-
geneity, lack of cooperation distorts household decision making when individual house-
hold members are imperfectly altruistic. I will now examine how heterogeneity between
household members affects the behavior of the non-cooperative household.
Model Specification
To study the impact of within-household heterogeneity on non-cooperative household de-
cision making, I use numerical examples. More specifically, I choose a baseline calibra-
tion for the model under the assumption that household members are homogeneous and
then perform comparative statics with respect to a specific attribute xi, with x ∈ {θ ,w},
leaving the other attributes unchanged. In particular, I will consider mean-preserving
spreads for one specific attribute x ∈ {θ ,w}, keeping the average value constant across
household members: xF = (1− ε)x and xM = (1+ ε)x, ε ∈ [0,1). I do not consider
preference heterogeneity for the numerical exercises, i.e. ui = u−i = u.
For the utility function, I use the specification
u(c,n) = α lnc+(1−α) ln(1−n).
A consumption share of α = 0.3 is chosen to match a steady-state working time of one
third for the cooperative household. The average wage rate w is normalized to one, i.e.
wF = wM = 1 in the baseline scenario without heterogeneity.
21For the case θ > 1, the opposite effect would lead to persistent accumulation of savings.
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Figure 3.2: Interest rate schedule
−0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0 0.1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Asset Level
In
te
re
st
 R
at
e
(a) r(a)
−0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0 0.1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Asset Level
M
ar
gi
na
l R
et
ur
n
 
 
κ=25
κ=40
κ=75
(b) r(a)+a× (∂ r/∂a)
Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), the interest rate schedule is specified as
r(a) = r¯+ψ (exp(−κa)−1) .
The parameters ψ and κ are set to 0.0001 and 25, whereas r¯ is set to 0.02. The interest
rate schedule r(a) is shown in Figure 3.2 for different κ-values. If the household saves,
the interest rate is virtually invariant to the asset position and increasing for negative asset
values. The chosen parametrization for r(a) ensures that the interest rate smoothly moves
away from r¯ for negative asset values. This property keeps the policy functions differen-
tiable and makes the use of standard computational methods feasible.22 The parameter κ
governs the steepness of the interest rate schedule. For ψ = 0, the interest rate is always
constant (r(a) = r¯) and thus independent of the asset position. The discount factor β is
set to 1/(1+ r¯). The interest rate schedule r(a) thus implies a steady-state asset value of
zero for the cooperative household solution.
Degree of Altruism
For the non-cooperative case, Figure 3.3 depicts the savings policy function for different
θ - and ε-values. The overall picture is that an increase in the spread ε tends to increase
the household’s incentive to borrow, leading to a lower (negative) steady-state asset value.
The intra-household allocation of consumption and labor supply always reflects relative
spousal altruism. As in the cooperative case, the ratio of the marginal utility of consump-
22Appendix 3.A.3 provides details on the numerical solution algorithm used in this chapter.
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Figure 3.3: Savings policy function and differences in the degree of altruism θi
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tion uc,F and uc,M is also given by the ratio (1+ θF)/(1+ θM) in the non-cooperative
case.23 In contrast to the cooperative case, this outcome is not the result of an explicit
sharing rule but determined by two Euler equations instead. Since savings differ for a
given combination of θF and θM, consumption and labor supply are not the same in the
cooperative and non-cooperative case unless θF = θM = 1.
Wage Rate
It is well documented that female workers tend to receive a lower wage rate in the labor
market than male workers. This phenomenon is also referred to as the ”gender pay gap”
in the literature (see e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2000). Does this pay gap matter in the context
of the household problem studied in this chapter? It turns out that it does not if ε ∈
[0,1). Again, I consider mean-preserving spreads ε for the household members, such
that wF = 1− ε and wM = 1+ ε since the average wage rate has been normalized to one.
While different spreads ε imply different expressions for Γi, the effect of these differences
cancels out across household members, leaving the savings policy of the household and
the ratio uc,F/uc,M unaffected. Labor supply of both household members is however
adjusted to the changed intra-household wage distribution.
For ε = 1, household savings are affected relative to ε ∈ [0,1). In this case, the labor
supply condition does not hold with equality since the female household member finds it
optimal not to participate in the labor market, i.e. nF = 0. This non-participation leads
to an asymmetry in the Euler equations for F and M that does not cancel out since the
23The properties highlighted in this paragraph are also shown by Hertzberg (2012) for his model.
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Figure 3.4: Savings policy function and differences in the wage rate wi
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derivative ∂NF(a)/∂a is not present in ΓM. As a result, the overborrowing bias is relaxed
for M and savings are higher compared to ε 6= 1 (see Figure 3.4).
3.3 Household Problem with Labor Income Risk
In the deterministic model environment studied so far, the household savings motive was
driven by the household’s impatience, as given by the discount factor β , relative to 1/(1+
r¯). To allow for a realistic evaluation of the quantitative and welfare implications of lack of
cooperation, this section studies a calibrated version of the model presented in Section 3.2
with idiosyncratic labor income risk and incomplete financial markets. Financial markets
only provide partial insurance against income fluctuations since the household can only
trade a non-state contingent one-period bond a′. In addition, the debt-elastic interest rate
schedule r(a′)makes it costly to borrow against future labor income in response to adverse
productivity shocks. As a result, there now is a role for precautionary savings such that
household savings are not only governed by the household’s impatience. In contrast to
most incomplete markets models (see Heathcote et al., 2009), the household does not face
income risk at the ”aggregate” household level.24 Instead, the two household members are
both subject to idiosyncratic, i.e. member-specific, labor productivity shocks that are not
perfectly positively correlated. In this case, as highlighted e.g. by Attanasio et al. (2005),
adjustment of spousal labor supply offers an additional insurance channel that allows the
24A notable exception within the incomplete markets literature are Ortigueira and Siassi (2013) who
study the importance of intra-household risk sharing in a general equilibrium incomplete markets model
with endogenous labor supply.
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household to smooth consumption in response to idiosyncratic shocks.
With labor income risk, the household budget constraint is given by
a′ = eFwFnF + eMwMnM +a(1+ r(a))− cF − cM, (3.15)
where ei is the random labor productivity of household member i ∈ {F,M}. When eiwi is
defined as the effective wage rate of household member i, changes in productivity ei can
be interpreted as shocks to the wage rate. The household members are assumed to have
perfect information about the productivity value of their spouse e−i. Labor productivities
ei follow first-order Markov processes with discrete support ei ∈ {e1, ...,eI}. I assume
that the productivities might be correlated across household members. It will however
be important that the shocks are not perfectly positively correlated. In such a case, the
productivity shocks would have the same impact as a single ”aggregate shock” at the
household level and intra-household risk sharing via spousal labor supply would not be
possible.
When the household members cooperate, the decision problem under uncertainty is
given by
max
cF ,cM ,nF ,nM
∑i∈{F,M} (1+θ−i)ui(ci,ni)+βEe′|e
[V(a′(a,e,cF ,cM,nF ,nM),e′)] ,
where savings are given by the period budget constraint (3.15), e = (eF ,eM) summarizes
the exogeneous household productivity state and Ee′|e [·] denotes the conditional expec-
tation operator. The value and policy functions now depend on asset holdings a as well
as on the labor productivities of both household members e. The continuation value V
satisfies
V(a,e) =∑i∈{F,M} (1+θ−i)ui(Ci(a,e),Ni(a,e))+βEe′|e
[V(A(a,e),e′)] .
Without cooperation, household member i ∈ {F,M} takes spousal consumption c−i and
labor supply n−i as given and solves
max
ci,ni
ui(ci,ni)+θiu−i(c−i,n−i)+βEe′|e
[Vi(a′(a,e,ci,c−i,ni,n−i),e′)] ,
where savings are given by
a′ = eiwini+ e−iw−in−i+a(1+ r(a))− ci− c−i,
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and Vi satisfies
Vi(a,e) = ui(Ci(a,e),Ni(a,e))+θiu−i(C−i(a,e),N−i(a,e))+βEe′|e
[Vi(A(a,e),e′)] .
The definitions of the MPE for the household problems under uncertainty are straightfor-
ward extensions of Definition 3 and Definition 4, and are therefore omitted here. With
productivity shocks, the conditions that describe the MPE outcome for the cooperative
and the non-cooperative household problem are also very similar to the ones in the model
of Section 3.2. The only changes are that: (i) the wage rate wi is replaced by the effective
wage rate eiwi, (ii) the minimal payoff-relevant state now includes the individual produc-
tivity values summarized by e in addition to the asset position a, and (iii) the household
members have to form expectations with respect to future productivities e′, conditional on
current productivities e.
In the remainder of this section, I will assume that the household members share the
same attributes xi, with x ∈ {θ ,u,w}, to isolate the impact of income risk on household
behavior. In addition, the productivities eF and eM will follow the same Markov process.
Importantly, the realizations of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks will not be perfectly
positively correlated across household members. As a result, transitory differences be-
tween the household members will occur, generating the possibility of intra-household
risk sharing.
3.3.1 Model Calibration
The model with labor income risk is specified as follows. In contrast to Section 3.2.5,
I will now follow Ortigueira and Siassi (2013) and use the additively-separable utility
function
u(c,n) = α
c1−γ −1
1− γ +(1−α)
(1−n)1−η −1
1−η ,α ∈ (0,1) ,γ,η > 0,
which is widely used in the incomplete markets literature.25
Following Ortigueira and Siassi (2013), I set the parameter γ to a standard value of
2 and η to a value of 3. The consumption share α is set to 0.4 to match an average
working time of 36% (see Floden and Linde´, 2001), which implies a Frisch elasticity
of roughly 60%.26 For the interest rate schedule r(a), I keep the parameter values from
25Of course, the utility function used in Section 3.2.5 is a special case of the one used here for γ→ 1 and
η → 1.
26For the chosen utility function, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 1η
1−n∗
n∗ , where n
∗ is the average
working time of the (symmetric) household members (see Ortigueira and Siassi, 2013).
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Figure 3.5: Savings policy function with labor income risk (θ = 0.9)
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Section 3.2.5. A model period corresponds to one year. Labor productivity follows the
log-normal AR(1)-process
eit = e
ρ
it−1 exp(σεit) ,εit
i.i.d.∼ N (0,1).
The productivity parameters ρ and σ are specified as in Floden and Linde´ (2001). Us-
ing the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data set, they estimate the values (ρ,σ) =
(0.9136,0.2064) based on wage data for the United States. I approximate the produc-
tivity process as a two-state Markov chain via the Rouwenhorst method as described
in Kopecky and Suen (2010), assuming that labor productivity shocks are uncorrelated
across household members. Labor productivity ei can thus take on one of two values:
ei ∈ {eL,eH}, with eL < eH . Following Domeij and Floden (2006), the discount factor β
is set to 0.95. This value satisfies the condition β (1+ r¯) < 1, which is standard in the
incomplete markets literature to prevent households from accumulating assets without
bound.27
3.3.2 Precautionary Savings and Imperfect Altruism
First, I assess how imperfect altruism affects precautionary savings. Figure 3.5 depicts the
savings policy function for a cooperative household (left panel) and a non-cooperative one
27When labor supply is exogenous and β (1+ r¯) = 1 holds, the precautionary savings motive leads to
the accumulation of infinitely high asset holdings in the long run (see e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004).
By contrast, Marcet et al. (2007) show that when labor supply is endogenous, household savings will be
(possibly large but) finite even for β (1+ r¯) = 1.
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Figure 3.6: Policy function for labor supply of household member i (θ = 0.9)
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(b) Without cooperation
(right panel), assuming that the degree of altruism is θ = 0.9 in both cases.28 Since the
household members are symmetric, the productivity states e = (eL,eH) and e = (eH ,eL)
lead to the same savings policy function. As probably expected given the results of Sec-
tion 3.2, the non-cooperative household saves less in all possible states.
Table 3.1 lists the average assets of the non-cooperative household relative to its an-
nual household labor income for different degrees of altruism. These values are calculated
based on 75 million simulated model periods. When the household members cooperate or
do not cooperate but are perfectly altruistic (θ = 1), the average asset position is 36.52%
of annual total household income. For the non-cooperative household, savings are already
notably lower (29.26%) when the members only exhibit small deviations from perfect al-
truism (θ = 0.98). The undersaving bias induced by imperfect spousal altruism and lack
of cooperation thus tends to dominate the precautionary saving motive. When the degree
of altruism is further reduced to θ = 0.90, the household holds substantially less assets
relative to the cooperative case (4.14%).
3.3.3 Intra-Household Risk Sharing
When household member i is hit by a low productivity shock, its spouse can work more
to increase household earnings and thereby reduce the impact of i’s bad labor market out-
come on household consumption. This risk-sharing aspect of spousal labor supply can be
seen in Figure 3.6 which displays the labor supply policy function for a household mem-
28When the household members share the same permanent attributes, the exact value of θ is irrelevant
for the behavior of the cooperative household.
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ber i. The interesting two cases are the states e = (eL,eH) and e = (eH ,eL). Compared
to the good state e = (eH ,eH), a bad shock to the labor productivity of household mem-
ber −i leads to an increase in i’s working time, partially recovering −i’s income loss. If
household member i is in a low productivity state, a bad shock to −i’s productivity leads
to a much weaker response of i’s labor supply. As shown by Figure 3.5, in this case, the
household relies more on its savings (or borrowing) to smooth consumption. Since lack
of cooperation increases the household’s willingness to borrow (or dissave) in response to
adverse shocks, its members need to work less for a given asset position and productivity
state.
However, one should not infer from Figures 3.6 that the non-cooperative household
smooths consumption in a more effective way compared to a cooperative one. To avoid
large adjustments in consumption and leisure, the cooperative household accumulates
large asset holdings that are used as a buffer stock in bad times. By contrast, the non-
cooperative household tends to have lower asset holdings which then require larger changes
in consumption and labor supply in response to bad shocks, increasing the volatility of
consumption and labor supply.
3.3.4 The Welfare Cost of Lack of Cooperation
Given the impact of lack of cooperation on the behavior of a household, it is interesting to
ask how much non-cooperative decision making matters in terms of welfare. To address
this question, I calculate the welfare-equivalent permanent change in consumption ζ that
the members of a non-cooperative household need to experience to achieve the same
expected life-time utility as in the cooperative case. Formally, I solve for the ζ -value that
satisfies
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β tU
(
cCFt ,c
C
Mt ,n
C
Ft ,n
C
Mt
)]
= E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β tU
(
(1+ζ )cNFt ,(1+ζ )c
N
Mt ,n
N
Ft ,n
N
Mt
)]
,
with
U (cF ,cM,nF ,nM) = (1+θM)uF(cF ,nF)+(1+θF)uM(cM,nM),
where the sequences of consumption and labor supply for the members of a household
with ( j =C) and without cooperation ( j = N) are denoted as {c jFt ,c jMt ,n jFt ,n jMt}∞t=0. Re-
member that θF = θM = θ holds. I calculate the unconditional expectation of life-time
utility for the two household types by computing the sum of realized discounted utilities
for 2500 periods and taking the average value over 50,000 samples. For each sample, the
first 1000 observations are not used to reduce the impact of initial conditions.
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θ = 1 θ = 0.98 θ = 0.96 θ = 0.94 θ = 0.92 θ = 0.90
Average assets 36.52 29.26 22.35 15.84 9.75 4.14
Welfare measure 0 0.32 0.64 0.95 1.25 1.54
Table 3.1: Average asset holdings of the non-cooperative household (in % of total house-
hold income) and welfare measure ζ (in %) for different degrees of spousal altruism θ
The results are displayed in Table 3.1. The welfare cost of lack of cooperation ζ
decreases monotonically with the degree of spousal altruism θ for θ < 1. For small
deviations from perfect altruism (θ = 0.98), the calculated ζ -value is already notable
(0.32%). For values lower than θ = 0.94, ζ exceeds one percent, going up to 1.54% for
θ = 0.9. Lack of cooperation therefore entails sizable welfare losses for the household
members for even modest deviations from perfect spousal altruism.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has studied the consumption-savings problem of a two-person household
whose individual members cannot commit to future actions and might not cooperate. The
interaction between the individual household members was modeled as a Markov-perfect
game. Intuitive first-order conditions were derived that illustrate how lack of cooperation
leads to a savings distortion relative to the case of full cooperation. More specifically, a
non-cooperative household tends to save less (borrow more) than a cooperative one when
its members exhibit imperfect spousal altruism. A calibrated model version with incom-
plete markets and idiosyncratic labor income risk was used to quantify the implications of
lack of cooperation for precautionary savings and welfare. Even modest deviations from
perfect altruism were shown to induce a decline in precautionary savings for the non-
cooperative household, leading to substantial welfare losses relative to the cooperative
case.
101
3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Proofs
This section contains the proofs of the propositions in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Under full cooperation of the household members, the first-order conditions for consump-
tion ci and labor supply ni are
(1+θ−i)uc,i(ci,ni)+β
∂V(a′)
∂a′
∂a′
∂ci
= 0,
(1+θ−i)un,i(ci,ni)+β
∂V(a′)
∂a′
∂a′
∂ni
= 0,
with i ∈ {F,M}. Differentiating the budget constraint with respect to consumption ci and
labor supply ni yields
∂a′
∂ci
= −1, (3.16)
∂a′
∂ni
= wi. (3.17)
Using these derivatives, the first-order conditions can be written as
(1+θ−i)uc,i(ci,ni) = β
∂V(a′)
∂a′
, (3.18)
−(1+θ−i)un,i(ci,ni) = β ∂V(a
′)
∂a′
wi, (3.19)
or combined as
−un,i(ci,ni) = uc,i(ci,ni)wi. (3.20)
By combining the first-order conditions for cF and cM, one can derive the sharing rule
uc,F(cF ,nF) =
1+θF
1+θM
uc,M(cM,nM). (3.21)
Using
V(a) =∑i∈{F,M} (1+θ−i)ui(Ci(a),Ni(a))+βV(A(a)),
and
A(a) = wFNF (a)+wMNM (a)+a(1+ r (a))−CF (a)−CM (a) ,
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the derivatives of V (a) and A(a) are given by
∂V(a)
∂a
= ∑i∈{F,M}
[
(1+θ−i)uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))∂Ci(a)∂a
+(1+θ−i)un,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))∂Ni(a)∂a
]
(3.22)
+β
∂V(A(a))
∂a′
∂A(a)
∂a
,
and
∂A(a)
∂a
=∑i∈{F,M}
[
wi
∂Ni(a)
∂a
− ∂Ci(a)
∂a
]
+1+ r(a)+a
∂ r(a)
∂a
. (3.23)
After combining (3.22) with (3.18) for i = F and (3.23),
∂V(a)
∂a
= ∑i∈{F,M}
[
(1+θ−i)uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))∂Ci(a)∂a
+(1+θ−i)un,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))∂Ni(a)∂a
]
+(1+θM)uc,F(CF(a),NF(a))
[
∑i∈{F,M}
[
wi
∂Ni(a)
∂a − ∂Ci(a)∂a
]
+1+ r (a)+a∂ r(a)∂a
]
,
and using (3.20) to replace un,i(ci,ni) with −uc,i(ci,ni)wi for i ∈ {F,M}, one obtains
∂V(a)
∂a
= ∑i∈{F,M}
[
(1+θ−i)uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
[
∂Ci(a)
∂a
−wi∂Ni(a)∂a
]]
+(1+θM)uc,F(CF(a),NF(a))
[
∑i∈{F,M}
[
wi
∂Ni(a)
∂a − ∂Ci(a)∂a
]
+1+ r (a)+a∂ r(a)∂a
]
,
This expression can further be rewritten by using (3.21) to rewrite
(1+θM)uc,F(CF(a),NF(a))∑i∈{F,M}
[
wi
∂Ni(a)
∂a
− ∂Ci(a)
∂a
]
,
as
∑i∈{F,M}
[
(1+θ−i)uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
[
wi
∂Ni(a)
∂a
− ∂Ci(a)
∂a
]]
,
which yields
∂V(a)
∂a
= ∑i∈{F,M}
[
(1+θ−i)uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
[
∂Ci(a)
∂a
−wi∂Ni(a)∂a
]]
+∑i∈{F,M}
[
(1+θ−i)uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
[
wi
∂Ni(a)
∂a
− ∂Ci(a)
∂a
]]
+(1+θM)uc,F(CF(a),NF(a))
(
1+ r (a)+a
∂ r (a)
∂a
)
,
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or
∂V(a)
∂a
= (1+θM)uc,F(CF(a),NF(a))
(
1+ r (a)+a
∂ r (a)
∂a
)
.
Updating this expression one period ahead and plugging it into (3.18) for i = F yields the
Euler equation for the cooperative household
uc,F(cF ,nF) = βuc,F(CF(a′),NF(a′))
(
1+ r
(
a′
)
+a′
∂ r (a′)
∂a′
)
.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Household member i ∈ {F,M} solves the decision problem (3.7), taking as given current
spousal decisions c−i and n−i as well as next period’s intra-household allocation given
by Xi(a′) and X−i(a′), with X ∈ {C,N}. The optimal consumption and labor supply
decisions of the household member satisfy
uc,i(ci,ni)+β
∂Vi(a′)
∂a′
∂a′
∂ci
= 0,
un,i(ci,ni)+β
∂Vi(a′)
∂a′
∂a′
∂ni
= 0.
Using the derivatives (3.16) and (3.17), the first-order conditions can be written as
uc,i(ci,ni) = β
∂Vi(a′)
∂a′
, (3.24)
−un,i(ci,ni) = β ∂Vi(a
′)
∂a′
wi, (3.25)
or combined as
−un,i(ci,ni) = uc,i(ci,ni)wi. (3.26)
Using (3.8) and
A(a) = wiNi (a)+w−iN−i (a)+a(1+ r(a))−Ci (a)−C−i (a) ,
the derivatives of Vi (a) and A(a) with respect to a can be calculated:
∂Vi(a)
∂a
= uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))∂Ci(a)∂a +un,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
∂Ni(a)
∂a
(3.27)
+θiuc,−i(C−i(a),N−i(a))∂C−i(a)∂a +θiun,−i(C−i(a),N−i(a))
∂N−i(a)
∂a
+β
∂Vi(A(a))
∂a′
∂A(a)
∂a
,
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and
∂A(a)
∂a
= wi
∂Ni(a)
∂a
+w−i
∂N−i(a)
∂a
− ∂Ci(a)
∂a
− ∂C−i(a)
∂a
+1+ r (a)+a
∂ r (a)
∂a
. (3.28)
Combined, the conditions (3.24), (3.27) and (3.28) yield
∂Vi(a)
∂a
= uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))∂Ci(a)∂a +un,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
∂Ni(a)
∂a
+θiuc,−i(C−i(a),N−i(a))∂C−i(a)∂a +θiun,−i(C−i(a),N−i(a))
∂N−i(a)
∂a
+uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))∂A(a)∂a
= uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))∂Ci(a)∂a +un,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
∂Ni(a)
∂a
+θiuc,−i(C−i(a),N−i(a))∂C−i(a)∂a +θiun,−i(C−i(a),N−i(a))
∂N−i(a)
∂a
+uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
(
wi
∂Ni(a)
∂a +w−i
∂N−i(a)
∂a − ∂Ci(a)∂a − ∂C−i(a)∂a
+1+ r (a)+a∂ r(a)∂a
)
,
which can be rewritten as
∂Vi(a)
∂a
= uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
[
∂Ci(a)
∂a
−wi∂Ni(a)∂a
]
+θiuc,−i(C−i(a),N−i(a))
[
∂C−i(a)
∂a
−w−i∂N−i(a)∂a
]
+uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
[
wi
∂Ni(a)
∂a
− ∂Ci(a)
∂a
]
+uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
[
w−i
∂N−i(a)
∂a
− ∂C−i(a)
∂a
]
+uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
(
1+ r (a)+a
∂ r (a)
∂a
)
,
by using the labor supply condition (3.26) to replace un,i(ci,ni) with −uc,i(ci,ni)wi and
un,−i(c−i,n−i) with −uc,−i(c−i,n−i)w−i. After collecting terms, this expression can be
reduced to
∂Vi(a)
∂a
= uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))
(
1+ r(a)+a
∂ r(a)
∂a
)
(3.29)
+[θiuc,−i(C−i(a),N−i(a))−uc,i(Ci(a),Ni(a))]
×
[
∂C−i(a)
∂a
−w−i∂N−i(a)∂a
]
.
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After updating (3.29) one period ahead and combining it with (3.24), one obtains the
Euler equation for household member i:
uc,i(ci,ni) = βuc,i(Ci(a′),Ni(a′))
(
1+ r
(
a′
)
+a′
∂ r (a′)
∂a′
)
+β
[
θiuc,−i(C−i(a′),N−i(a′))−uc,i(Ci(a′),Ni(a′))
]
×
[
∂C−i(a′)
∂a′
−w−i∂N−i(a
′)
∂a′
]
.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The first-order conditions for the decision problem of the quasi-geometric household are
given by
uc(c,n) = δβ
∂V(a′)
∂a′
, (3.30)
−un(c,n) = δβ ∂V(a
′)
∂a′
w, (3.31)
where I used that ∂a′/∂c=−1 and ∂a′/∂n=w. By combining these two conditions, one
obtains the standard labor supply condition
−un(c,n) = uc(c,n)w. (3.32)
Differentiating V(a) with respect to a yields
∂V(a)
∂a
= uc(C(a),N (a))∂C(a)∂a +un(C(a),N (a))
∂N (a)
∂a
+β
∂V(A(a))
∂a′
∂A(a)
∂a
,
and differentiating A(a) with respect to a gives
∂A(a)
∂a
= w
∂N (a)
∂a
− ∂C(a)
∂a
+1+ r (a)+a
∂ r (a)
∂a
.
Together with condition (3.30), the two expressions above can be combined to
∂V(a)
∂a
= uc(C(a),N (a))∂C(a)∂a +un(C(a),N (a))
∂N (a)
∂a
+
1
δ
uc(C(a),N (a))∂A(a)∂a
= uc(C(a),N (a))∂C(a)∂a +un(C(a),N (a))
∂N (a)
∂a
+
1
δ
uc(C(a),N (a))
(
w
∂N (a)
∂a
− ∂C(a)
∂a
+1+ r (a)+a
∂ r (a)
∂a
)
,
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which can be written as
∂V(a)
∂a
= uc(C(a),N (a))
[
∂C(a)
∂a
−w∂N (a)
∂a
]
+
1
δ
uc(C(a),N (a))
[
w
∂N (a)
∂a
− ∂C(a)
∂a
]
+
1
δ
uc(C(a),N (a))
(
1+ r (a)+a
∂ r (a)
∂a
)
= uc(C(a),N (a))
(
1− 1
δ
)[
∂C(a)
∂a
−w∂N (a)
∂a
]
+
1
δ
uc(C(a),N (a))
(
1+ r (a)+a
∂ r (a)
∂a
)
,
by using condition (3.32). Updating this condition one period ahead and combining it
with condition (3.30) yields the Euler equation for the quasi-geometric household:
uc(c,n) = βuc(C(a′),N (a′))
(
1+ r
(
a′
)
+a′
∂ r (a′)
∂a′
+Γ(a′)
)
,
with
Γ(a) = (δ −1)
[
∂C(a)
∂a
−w∂N (a)
∂a
]
.
3.A.2 Household Problem under Commitment
This section derives the optimality conditions for the cooperative and the non-cooperative
household problem under commitment.
Household Problem under Cooperation
Under commitment, the cooperative household chooses current and future consumption,
labor supply and savings {cFt ,nFt ,cMt ,nMt ,at+1}∞t=0 to maximize the joint objective func-
tion ∑∞t=0β t∑i∈{F,M} (1+θ−i)ui(cit ,nit) subject to a sequence of budget constraints (3.1)
for all periods t ≥ 0. The first-order conditions for this problem are
(1+θ−i)uc,i(cit ,nit) = λt , i ∈ {F,M} ,
−(1+θ−i)un,i(cit ,nit) = λtwi, i ∈ {F,M} ,
λt = βλt+1
(
1+ r(at+1)+at+1
∂ r(at+1)
∂at+1
)
,
with λt denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household budget constraint
of period t. After using λt+s = (1+θ−i)uc,i(cit+s,nit+s) to eliminate the multipliers λt
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and λt+1, these conditions reduce to
uc,F(cFt ,nFt)
uc,M(cMt ,nMt)
=
1+θF
1+θM
,
−un,i(cit ,nit) = uc,i(cit ,nit)wi, i ∈ {F,M} ,
uc,F(cFt ,nFt) = βuc,F(cFt+1,nFt+1)
(
1+ r(at+1)+at+1
∂ r(at+1)
∂at+1
)
,
which are the same conditions as listed by Proposition 1 for the case without commit-
ment when written using sequential notation.29 Under cooperation, the household hence
does not have an incentive to deviate from the optimal plan under commitment when
re-optimizing from period to period, i.e. the optimal plan under commitment is time con-
sistent.
The cooperative solution to the household problem under commitment is only time
consistent since the household members have standard time-consistent preferences and
there is (by assumption) no disagreement about how to evaluate consumption and labor
supply within and across periods. It is therefore crucial that the household members
share the same discount factor because heterogeneous time preferences would introduce
disagreement into the household problem (see e.g. Jackson and Yariv, 2014). In addition,
for the time-consistency result, it is also important that the interest rate charged in a given
period does not depend on the actions of the household in the subsequent period. If, for
instance, the household could default on a loan (a < 0) and the lender would charge an
actuarially fair interest rate that reflects the risk of default as a function of the size of the
credit as in Chatterjee et al. (2007), a time-inconsistency problem would arise. Only a
household who can commit to a plan for all future actions would internalize the adverse
effect that a default has on the interest rate in the previous period, leading to a different
outcome relative to the case without commitment.
Household Problem without Cooperation
The non-cooperative interaction between the household members under commitment is
modeled as an open-loop Nash game. Time-consistent (or subgame-perfect) outcomes
are thus not generally achieved. At period t = 0, the household members now sepa-
rately choose their own current and future consumption, labor supply as well as savings
{cit ,nit ,at+1}∞t=0 to maximize the own objective function∑∞t=0β tUi(cit ,c−it ,nit ,n−it) sub-
ject to a sequence of budget constraints (3.1) for all periods t ≥ 0, taking all current and
future decisions of the spouse {c−it ,n−it}∞t=0 as parametrically given.
29The household budget constraint is the same as well.
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The first-order conditions for household member i ∈ {F,M} are
uc,i(cit ,nit) = λit ,
−un,i(cit ,nit) = λitwi,
λit = βλit+1
(
1+ r(at+1)+at+1
∂ r(at+1)
∂at+1
)
,
where λit denotes i’s Lagrange multiplier associated with the period t budget constraint.
After eliminating the multipliers λit and λit+1 via λit+s = uc,i(cit+s,nit+s), these conditions
reduce to
−un,i(cit ,nit) = uc,i(cit ,nit)wi, i ∈ {F,M} ,
uc,i(cit ,nit) = βuc,i(cit+1,nit+1)
(
1+ r(at+1)+at+1
∂ r(at+1)
∂at+1
)
, i ∈ {F,M} .
Relative to the conditions listed by Proposition 2, the only but important difference is
that the term Γi does not appear in the Euler equations above, i.e. Γi(at+1) = 0 for the
commitment case. Note that the degree of altruism θi does not enter the equilibrium
conditions above and is thus irrelevant for the equilibrium outcome.
3.A.3 Numerical Solution
The model from Section 3.2 is solved via a time-iteration algorithm (see Judd, 1998).30 It
involves the following six steps:
1. Construct a discrete grid for household asset holdings [a,a].
2. Choose initial values for the policy functions Xstart(a), X ∈{A,CF ,CM,NF ,NM},
at all grid points a ∈ [a,a].
3. Set Xnext(a) = Xstart(a), X ∈{A,CF ,CM,NF ,NM}, for all a ∈ [a,a] and choose an
error tolerance ε .
4. For each grid point a ∈ [a,a], compute the policies Xnew(a), X ∈{A, CF , CM, NF ,
NM}, that satisfy the equilibrium conditions, given next period’s policy functions
Xnext(a).
5. If |Xnew(a)−Xnext(a)|< ε , X ∈ {A,CF ,CM,NF ,NM}, for all a ∈ [a,a], go to step
6, else set Xnext(a) = Xnew(a) and repeat step 4.
30It is straightforward to modify the algorithm to solve the model with labor income risk discussed in
Section 3.3.
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6. Take Xnew(a), X ∈{A,CF ,CM,NF ,NM}, as approximations of the respective equi-
librium objects X (a) in the infinite-horizon model.
The policies in step 4 are computed via a non-linear equation solver. Given the policy
functions Xnext that determine the allocation in the subsequent period, the equation solver
finds values for current savings, consumption and labor supply that satisfy the equilibrium
conditions at all grid points. In the cooperative case, these conditions are the ones listed by
Proposition 1. In the non-cooperative case, Proposition 2 summarizes the relevant equi-
librium conditions. To approximate the policy functions, I use Chebyshev polynomials.
The use of Chebyshev polynomials preserves the differentiability of the policy functions
which is crucial here since the equilibrium conditions in the non-cooperative case involve
derivatives of future policy functions with respect to savings.
Since I want to solve for the infinite-horizon limit of the finite-horizon model ver-
sion, the initial values used in step 2 need to be the policies that solve the final-period
problem of the household. In the final period, no savings decision takes place such that
the initial values for the savings policy Astart(a) are set to zero. For the final-period
problem of the cooperative household, the equilibrium conditions are given by the ones
listed by Proposition 1 except that the Euler equation (3.4) now is dropped from the set of
equilibrium conditions, leaving four conditions for four variables. In the non-cooperative
case, the equilibrium cannot be determined when the two Euler equations are not present
anymore. Therefore, I assume a Stackelberg timing for the non-cooperative household
problem in the final period which allows to compute policies for the final period prob-
lem. The assumption of Stackelberg leadership is only made for the final period. For
the other periods, the household members act simultaneously.31 Alternatively, similar to
Hertzberg (2012), one can also assume that savings in the final period are split evenly
between the two household members who then both optimize independently subject to
the private budget constraint
0 = wini+(a/2)(1+ r(a))− ci.
Under this assumption, the algorithm again converges to the same policy functions. The
same holds true when the cooperative solution is used for the last period instead of the
non-cooperative Stackelberg solution.
31Hertzberg (2012) considers an alternative version of his model with Stackelberg timing in every period.
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Concluding Remarks
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Concluding Remarks
This thesis has presented three essays that study how governments and households make
decisions in the absence of commitment, contributing to the literature on time-inconsistency
problems in macroeconomics. Chapters 1 and 2 have investigated the interaction between
monetary and fiscal policy when a government is not able to commit to future policies,
including debt repayment. Chapter 3 was concerned with the role of cooperation for the
trade-offs faced by two-person households whose individual members lack commitment.
While the three chapters highlight the role of lack of commitment for different ap-
plications and hence make individual contributions, they have several things in common.
They all use the Markov-perfect equilibrium concept to study decision making without
commitment. They all make use of computational methods to evaluate the quantitative
implications of the respective models. They all highlight that macroeconomists need to
be careful when making assumptions about agents and the way they interact since these
assumptions can strongly affect the implications that lack of commitment has for the pre-
dictions of a model.
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